Jackson v. Comm'r of Human Servs.
Decision Date | 04 June 2018 |
Docket Number | A17-1135 |
Parties | Shonwta Demar Jackson, Relator, v. Commissioner of Human Services, Respondent. |
Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed
Minnesota Department of Human Services
Mary F. Moriarty, Chief Hennepin County Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Gail A. Feichtinger, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Relator appeals respondent's denial of his request for reconsideration or to set aside his disqualification from providing direct-care services. Relator argues that respondent acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and without sufficient evidence in refusing to rescind the disqualification. He also argues the Minnesota Department of Human Services Background Studies Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.01-.34 (2016) (Background Studies Act), and respondent's actions under the act, violate his due-process rights, the separation-of-powers doctrine, and the rules of evidence. We affirm.
In 2010, Model Health Care Inc. submitted a background-study request to respondent Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services for relator Shonwta Demar Jackson. As part of the background study, respondent requested records related to a termination of relator's parental rights. The records revealed that, in 2002, relator's 12-year-old son accused relator of physical and sexual abuse that occurred when the child was eight or nine years old. A child-protection investigation was opened, and the investigation resulted in a finding of maltreatment on the basis of physical and sexual abuse. A 2003 petition to terminate relator's parental rights indicated that the report of sexual abuse had been substantiated. In 2004, relator's parental rights to five of his six children were voluntarily terminated.
Based on the information contained in the records, respondent concluded that relator was disqualified from positions allowing direct contact with persons receiving services from programs licensed by respondent. Specifically, respondent concluded that relator was disqualified under Minn. Stat. § 245C.14, subd. 1(2), for committing an act which met the definition of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. A letter was sent to respondent in July 2010 informing him of the disqualification and his ability to request reconsideration within 30 days of receiving the letter.
In January and May 2012, two other companies requested background studies on relator. Respondent notified relator after both requests that he was disqualified because "there is a preponderance of evidence that on or around 1998, [relator] committed an act which meets the definition of a disqualifying characteristic."
In July 2016, Park Avenue Center on Nicollet requested a background study on relator. On February 28, 2017, respondent sent a letter to relator informing him that he is permanently disqualified because he committed first-degree criminal sexual conduct on or around 1998 and because his parental rights were involuntarily terminated in 2004.
In March 2017, an attorney for relator requested reconsideration of the disqualification. He argued that relator voluntarily terminated his parental rights and was never convicted of criminal sexual conduct. On June 15, 2017, respondent affirmed relator's disqualification. Respondent stated that, because relator was previously notified of the disqualification in 2010 and 2012 and did not request reconsideration at those times, the "correctness of [the] disqualification became conclusive under Minnesota Statutes, section 245C.29, subdivision 2."
In July, respondent issued a letter superseding the June 15 letter. Respondent affirmed the disqualification for acts constituting first-degree criminal sexual conduct but found that the information used to disqualify relator on the ground of an involuntary termination was incorrect. Respondent rescinded that basis for disqualification. Respondent again indicated that the "correctness of [relator's] disqualification became conclusive" after he failed to challenge the disqualification in 2010 and 2012.
This certiorari appeal followed.
The parties agree that the case is not subject to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 14.001-.69 (2016). MAPA only applies to an agency's final decision in a "contested case." Minn. Stat. § 14.63. A "contested case" is "a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing." Minn. Stat. § 14.02, subd. 3. A person is not entitled to an agency hearing when a person is conclusively disqualified. Minn. Stat. §§ 256.045, subd. 3b(c) (Supp. 2017), 245C.27, subd. 1. Under Minn. Stat. § 245C.29, subd. 2(a)(2), relator is conclusively disqualified and is therefore not entitled to an agency hearing.
When considering an agency's quasi-judicial decision that is not subject to MAPA, this court examines "the record to review questions affecting the jurisdiction of the agency, the regularity of its proceedings, and, as to the merits of the controversy, whether the order or determination in a particular case was arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or without any evidence to support it." Anderson v. Comm'r of Health, 811 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2012). When reviewing agency decisions, we "adhere to the fundamental concept that decisions of administrative agencies enjoy a presumption of correctness." In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 278 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted).
Under the Background Studies Act, a person seeking employment in certain licensed facilities who will be providing direct-contact services must submit to abackground study. Minn. Stat. § 245C.03, subd. 1(a)(3). A person is permanently disqualified from providing direct-contact services if the person has been convicted of one or more listed crimes or it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that the person committed an act that meets the definition of one of those crimes. Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.14, subd. 1, .15, subd. 1. Included in the list of permanently disqualifying crimes are all degrees of criminal sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 1(a) (including Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342-.3451 (2016)). A disqualified individual may request reconsideration within 30 days of a disqualification decision. Minn. Stat. § 245C.21, subd. 2. But respondent may not set aside a disqualification if the individual was permanently disqualified for conduct listed in section 245C.15, subdivision 1. Minn. Stat. § 245C.24, subd. 2.
Relator argues that respondent acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and without sufficient evidence in refusing to reconsider or set aside the disqualification in 2017. Respondent argues that relator's challenge fails because the 2010 disqualification is conclusive and applies to all future background studies. Relator does not deny that he failed to request reconsideration in 2010 and 2012, but argues that this appeal is solely limited to the 2017 disqualification.
Minn. Stat. § 245C.29, subd. 2(a)(2) states, "A disqualification is conclusive for purposes of current and future background studies if . . . the individual did not request reconsideration of the disqualification under section 245C.21 on the basis that theinformation relied upon to disqualify the individual was incorrect . . . ." In Smith v. Minn. Dept. of Human Servs., this court considered whether a relator was barred from challenging a permanent disqualification that was conclusive under Minn. Stat. § 245C.29. 764 N.W.2d 388, 390-92 (Minn. App. 2009). The relator was disqualified from services in 2006 and 2007 and failed to timely challenge the determinations. Id. at 391. This court concluded that the relator was "conclusively permanently disqualified" because of his failure to challenge either determination in a timely fashion. Id. at 392. Because the challenge that was ultimately made was untimely, and thus barred, the department's action "was not arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, fraudulent, made under an error of law, or unsupported by the evidence." Id.
Our decision in Smith supports our conclusion that relator is barred from challenging the merits of respondent's disqualification decision. Relator received three notices of a disqualification in 2010 and 2012. He failed to timely request reconsideration of the 2010 disqualification under Minn. Stat. § 245C.21. Therefore his disqualification became conclusive for all future background studies, and he is procedurally barred from challenging the 2017 disqualification decision.
Even if the prior disqualifications did not render relator's 2017 disqualification conclusive, we would conclude that respondent's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary or capricious.
This court may reverse an agency decision if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary and capricious. Rodne v. Comm'r of Human Servs., 547 N.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Minn. App. 1996). An agency's decision is not arbitrary and capricious if there is a "rational connection between the facts found" and the agency's decision. Blue Cross, 624 N.W.2d at 277 (quotation omitted). We will affirm an agency's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record submitted. White v. Minn...
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