Jackson v. Illinois Prisoner Review Bd.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85 C 4545.,85 C 4545.
• Parties: William JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS PRISONER REVIEW BOARD, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

657 F. Supp. 823

William JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS PRISONER REVIEW BOARD, Defendant.

No. 85 C 4545.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

March 19, 1987.

Michael J. Charysh, Craig A. Tomassi, Williams & Montgomery, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Thomas M. Battista, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHADUR, District Judge.

William Jackson ("Jackson") initially sued the Illinois Prisoner Review Board and its individual members (collectively ("Board") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), asserting their violation of:

1. the Fourteenth Amendment's due process of law guaranty and

2. the prohibition against ex post facto laws (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 10, cl. 1),

both those claims arising out of Board's May 1984 denial of Jackson's parole. This Court's March 14, 1986 memorandum opinion and order (the "Opinion," 631 F.Supp. 150) granted Board's motion to dismiss Jackson's second claim but denied the motion as to the first claim.

Now Jackson and Board have filed cross-motions for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 56 as to that remaining claim (the "1984 Due Process Claim"). Then on November 26, 1986 (after those motions had been fully briefed)¹ Jackson filed a Third Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"), reasserting the original 1984 Due Process Claim and adding a like claim based on Board's May 1986 denial of Jackson's parole (the "1986 Due Process Claim"). On both claims, Jackson asks for declaratory relief plus an award of attorney's fees and costs.² For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, each party's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Facts³

On December 16, 1977 a Cook County Circuit Court judge sentenced Jackson to 40 to 120 years in prison based on his conviction for murder (¶ 4). Jackson is now an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center ("Stateville") (¶ 2).

On May 2, 1984 Jackson appeared before a three-member Board for a parole hearing (PSF ¶ 1). At that time Illinois Prisoner Review Board Rule IV-C ("Rule IV-C") provided (Jackson R.Mem.Ex. A, at 152):

A parole candidate shall have access to all documents which the Board shall consider in denying parole or setting a release date. If such documents have not been disclosed to the candidate before the interview, they shall be disclosed to him during the interview. If, in light of the documents, the candidate so desires, he shall be granted a 30-day continuance.

Board's official file concerning Jackson and matters relating to his potential parole ("parole file") (PSF ¶ 2) included two psychological reports (Jackson R.Mem.Ex. D). Jackson did not ask to see, and Board did not provide to Jackson, that parole file before or during the May 2, 1984 hearing (PSF ¶¶ 3 and 4). Board's panel offered to show Jackson only a letter of protest from the State's Attorney's office and letters of support for his parole (PSF ¶ 5). Then, acting under Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, ¶ 1003-3-2, Board's panel deferred Jackson's parole decision to the entire Board (PSF ¶ 6).

On May 8, 1984 Board held an en banc hearing and denied Jackson parole (PSF ¶¶ 7 and 8). In reaching its decision, Board considered documents in Jackson's parole file other than the letters Board's panel had previously offered to show Jackson (PSF ¶ 12). Jackson did not ask to see those documents, and Board did not provide them to him (PSF ¶¶ 9 and 10).

In October 1985 Rule IV-C was replaced by 20 Ill.Admin. Code § 1610.30 ("Section 1610.30") (Jackson Mem.Ex. C):

(a) Notice to the Inmate. Approximately sixty days prior to his next scheduled parole release hearing, the inmate will be notified in writing by the Board that he has been scheduled on the monthly docket.

(1) Request for Preliminary Record Review

(A) Request By the Inmate. Within fifteen days following the date of the notice of docketing, the inmate may request the opportunity for preliminary review of his parole file by using the form provided by the Board with the notice. When a timely request for preliminary review is made, the Board will arrange for the inmate to review his parole file, in accord with the provisions of Section 1610.30(b), approximately thirty days prior to his hearing date. If no preliminary request is made or if transfer or security considerations prohibit review, the inmate will be allowed to review his file in accord with Section 1610.30(b), at the time of his release hearing.

* * * * * *

(b) Access to Records by the Inmate

(1) The inmate shall have access to all evidence considered by the Board unless the evidence is specifically found to:

(A) Include information which, if disclosed, would damage the therapeutic relationship between the inmate and the mental health professional;

(B) Subject any person to the actual risk of physical harm.

(C) Threaten the safety or security of the Department or an institution.

(2) An inmate who wishes to review a document submitted to the Board which bears the signature of a mental health or clinical services employee of the Department of Corrections must request that review through the Department of Corrections pursuant to Department Regulations (20 Ill.Admin. Code 107). The Board will not provide direct access to any documents in this category.

Board does not anticipate any change in Section 1610.30 (Klincar Aff. in Board Mem.Ex. A).

Board conducted another parole hearing May 7, 1986 and again denied Jackson parole (id.). Jackson complains of that hearing (¶ 9):

a. Jackson's rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when Board failed to allow him access to all evidence considered by Board concerning his May 7, 1986 parole hearing.

b. Jackson's rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when Board failed to inform him of the existence of psychological reports within his official file, and the fact that they had been withheld from his consideration.

May 1984 Hearing

Jackson claims Board's refusal to provide him with documents Board considered in denying him parole in 1984 deprived him of the opportunity to ensure Board did not ground its parole decision on erroneous information, thus violating his right to procedural due process. In support of that claim Jackson Mem. 2 cites Walker v. Prisoner Review Board, 694 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1982), on remand, 594 F.Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill.1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 396 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 817, 88 L.Ed.2d 791 (1986).

Walker first found (694 F.2d at 501, citing United States ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Parole and Pardon Board, 669 F.2d 1185, cert. denied sub nom. McCombs v. Scott, 459 U.S. 1048, 103 S.Ct. 468, 74 L.Ed.2d 617 (1982)) Illinois law creates an expectancy of release on parole, entitled to due process protection. Next our Court of Appeals examined what process was due a parole candidate: whether due process required Board to provide such a candidate with access to records Board had considered in denying parole. It concluded the "what process is due" question must generally be resolved on a case-by-case basis (694 F.2d at 503):

The relevant inquiry is whether, after taking into account the inherently flexible nature of due process, the combination of procedures available to the parole candidate is sufficient to minimize the risk that a decision will be based on incorrect information.

After setting out that general test, the Court concluded it was unnecessary to apply it where, as in Walker, Board had promulgated a rule that "creates for parole candidates a justified expectation of access, and ... specifies precisely an element of due process" (id.). Hence, because Rule IV-C expressly entitled parole candidates to access to all documents considered by Board in denying parole, the Court concluded due process required such access.

When Board failed to provide Jackson with his parole file in May 1984, that same Rule IV-C was in effect, mandating access to "all documents" Board had considered in denying parole.⁴ Nonetheless Jackson cannot be found to have been denied due process, as articulated in Rule IV-C, until this Court addresses a more fundamental issue: whether Jackson's 1984 Due Process Claim was rendered moot when Rule IV-C was replaced by Section 1610.30. After all, mootness would deprive this Court of power to reach the merits of Jackson's claim. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1705, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (per curiam).

Jackson's 1984 Due Process Claim for declaratory relief, because not precise as to the exact relief sought, might be viewed in retrospective or prospective terms or both. But whatever perspective is adopted, the answer is the same: It is moot.

If Jackson really seeks a declaratory judgment as to Board's past actions — without any substantive relief involved — neither the Declaratory Judgment Act standard (28 U.S.C. § 2201) nor Article III's "case" or "controversy" requirement is satisfied. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463-64, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). As the Supreme Court explained in Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S.Ct. 423, 428, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985) (footnote omitted),⁵ the only use a declaratory judgment would have under such circumstances is an impermissible one:

We think that the award of a declaratory judgment in this situation would be useful in resolving the dispute over the past lawfulness of respondent's action only if it might be offered in state court proceedings as res judicata on the issue of liability, leaving to the state courts only a form of accounting proceeding whereby damages or restitution would be computed. But the issuance of a declaratory judgment in these circumstances would have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being of course prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. The teachings of Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070,

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