Jackson v. Internatl. Fiber

• Decision Date: 03 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2005-CA-38.,2005-CA-38.
• Parties: JACKSON, Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL FIBER, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

863 N.E.2d 189

169 Ohio App.3d 395

2006-Ohio-5799

JACKSON, Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL FIBER, Appellee.

No. 2005-CA-38.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Champaign County.

Decided November 3, 2006.

Joanne Jocha-Ervin, Dayton, for appellant.

Ray A. Cox, Dayton, for appellee.

BROGAN, Judge.

{¶ 1} In this case, Martin Jackson appeals from a trial court decision granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the case based on Jackson's alleged failure to file within the statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.10 and Jackson's failure to timely file suit within the period specified by an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") "dismissal." In addition, the trial court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because of previous administrative proceedings and generally adopted the rationale and information set forth in the defendant's motion to dismiss.

{¶ 2} Jackson appeals, raising as assignments of error that:

{¶ 3} "I. The trial court erred by dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant's race discrimination claim under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.99; and {¶ 4} "II. The trial court erred by dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant's disability discrimination claim under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.99."

{¶ 5} After considering the record and applicable law, we find that the assignments of error have merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.

I

{¶ 6} Jackson filed the present action on October 6, 2003, against International Fiber ("Fiber"). The complaint stated that Jackson's claims were being brought pursuant to R.C. 4112.01 et seq. and R.C. 4112.99. Jackson alleged in the complaint that he was a black male and had been employed by Fiber from September 2000 until March 9, 2001, when he was terminated, allegedly for violating Fiber's attendance policy. Further, Jackson claimed that he had been continuously employed with Fiber's predecessor, Ralston Purina of St. Louis, from 1992 to 2000, when Ralston Purina sold the plant to Fiber.

{¶ 7} Jackson alleged that he had been diagnosed in 1996 with pancreatitis, which is a condition that periodically flares up. Purportedly, Ralston Purina had allowed Jackson leave during times that his illness did not allow him to work. However, after Fiber purchased the company, it improperly terminated Jackson for medical absences in excess of company policy, while allowing white employees to take nonpenalized leave under the same conditions. Therefore, Jackson claimed that Fiber had discriminated against him on the basis of both race and disability. Jackson also included claims for breach of contract and violation of public policy.

{¶ 8} Shortly thereafter, Fiber filed a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case due to previous administrative proceedings. These included proceedings with the EEOC and the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, proceedings for unemployment compensation, and a labor grievance. Fiber also claimed that Jackson had failed to comply with the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.10. And, finally, Fiber argued that Jackson was not disabled and that there were legitimate reasons for his discharge. An affidavit from the plant manager was attached to the motion to dismiss, outlining the reasons for Jackson's discharge. Some documents were also attached, including a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC.

{¶ 9} Jackson filed a reply to the motion, contending that the trial court was required to construe the allegations in the complaint as true and that he had stated a claim for discrimination. Jackson also attached his own affidavit, arguing that summary judgment would be improper due to factual issues. When Fiber responded to Jackson's memorandum, Fiber specifically stated that its motion was not one for summary judgment but was a motion to dismiss. Fiber also stated that "[i]t is not enough to make unsupported allegations in the State of Ohio to avoid dismissal under Civ. R. 12(B)." Notably, this is an incorrect statement of law, because allegations in the complaint are construed as true for purposes of evaluating motions to dismiss. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753. After reviewing the pleadings, the trial court filed a decision agreeing with Fiber and dismissing the case.

{¶ 10} In discussing the assignments of error, Jackson has addressed three main issues that are applicable to both assignments of error. We will follow the same approach and will not address the assignments of error separately. In this regard, Jackson's first claim is that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations, because the applicable time period for discrimination claims is six years, not two.

{¶ 11} As a preliminary point, we note that Jackson did not respond to the statute-of-limitations argument that Fiber made in the trial court. We would normally find any error waived, since courts are reluctant to consider error that was not brought to the trial court's attention. In Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099, the Ohio Supreme Court said:

{¶ 12} "In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself." Id. at syllabus.

{¶ 13} Exceptional circumstances may be found when the trial court commits certain kinds of error. For example, in First Fed. S & L Assn. of Lakewood v. Dus, Cuyahoga App. No. 79039, 2003-Ohio-3639, 2003 WL 21545126, the Eighth District Court of Appeals vacated a trial court's grant of summary judgment for a party, even though the impropriety of granting judgment had not been raised in the trial court. The Eighth District felt that exceptional circumstances were present because the party who received judgment had not even asked the trial court for summary judgment. Id. at ¶ 22-29.

{¶ 14} Similarly, in Gevedon v. Gevedon, 167 Ohio App.3d 450, 2006-Ohio-3195, 855 N.E.2d 548, we considered plain error because the trial court applied the wrong statute in finding that a party was a vexatious litigator and had awarded relief under a statute that was not even raised. Id. at ¶ 30. See, also, Sandberg v. John T. Crouch Co., Inc., Montgomery App. No. 21342, 2006-Ohio-4519, 2006 WL 2522404, at ¶ 162 (recognizing that plain error could apply when the trial court granted sanctions without letting the sanctioned party respond to the allegations being made. Under such circumstances, the trial court's action seriously affected the basic fairness of the judicial process).

{¶ 15} Notably, we have held in the past that dismissing "a cause of action, upon statute of limitations grounds, when the statute of limitations has clearly not yet run, constitutes civil plain error." Miller v. Xenia (Aug. 25, 2000), Greene App. No. 99CA137, 2000 WL 1209273, *1. In view of this precedent, we find that the error in the present case was not waived and may be considered under the plain-error doctrine.

{¶ 16} In deciding whether a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, a trial court "must presume that all factual allegations of the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. * * * Then, before * * * [the court] may dismiss the complaint, it must appear beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts warranting a recovery." Mitchell, 40 Ohio St.3d at 192, 532 N.E.2d 753. Our review of such decisions is de novo. Crestmont Cleveland Partnership v. Ohio Dept. of Health (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 928, 936, 746 N.E.2d 222.

{¶ 17} De novo review requires an "independent review of the trial court's decision without any deference to the trial court's determination." State ex rel. AFSCME v. Taft, 156 Ohio App.3d 37, 2004-Ohio-493, 804 N.E.2d 88, at ¶ 27.

{¶ 18} In Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 376, 23 O.O.3d 346, 433 N.E.2d 147, the Ohio Supreme Court also noted that "[a] motion to dismiss based on the bar of the statute of limitations is erroneously granted when the complaint does not conclusively show on its face the action is barred by the statute of limitations." Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 19} The complaint in the present case states that Jackson's employment was terminated on March 9, 2001. Jackson filed the complaint two and a half years after the termination, and alleged that the action was being brought under R.C. 4112.99. The trial court applied the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.10 and found that the action was barred. However, this was incorrect, because the proper statute of limitations is the six-year period found in R.C. 2305.07.

{¶ 20} In 1994, the Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 4112.99 is a remedial statute and is subject to R.C. 2305.07's six-year statute of limitations. Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., Inc., (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 281, 638 N.E.2d 991, syllabus. Therefore, the applicable limitations period has been established for many years. Our own district has applied the six-year statute of limitations a number of times to employment-discrimination claims brought under R.C. 4112.99. See, e.g., Bodkins v. Navistar Internatl. Transp. Corp. (Dec. 12, 1997), Clark App. No. 97-CA-22, 1997 WL 761849, *6 (handicap discrimination) and Barlowe v. AAAA Internatl. Driving School, Inc., Montgomery App. No. 19794, 2003-Ohio-5748, 2003 WL 22429543, at ¶ 14 (disability-discrimination claim). The exception to the six-year limitations period is for age-discrimination claims brought specifically under R.C. 4112.02(N), which has...