Jackson v. Kaplan Higher Educ., LLC

• Decision Date: 05 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1:14–CV–00073–AWI–BAM.,1:14–CV–00073–AWI–BAM.
• Citation: 106 F.Supp.3d 1118
• Parties: Marcella JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. KAPLAN HIGHER EDUCATION, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, an unknown business entity, Kaplan, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Does 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

106 F.Supp.3d 1118

Marcella JACKSON, Plaintiff,

v.KAPLAN HIGHER EDUCATION, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, an unknown business entity, Kaplan, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Does 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 1:14–CV–00073–AWI–BAM.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed May 5, 2015.

Amanda Brooke Whitten, Shelley G. Bryant, Law Offices of Shelley G. Bryant, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiff.

Cheryl Denise Orr, Saba Suheil Shatara, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, San Francisco, CA, Philippe A. Lebel, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. # 27)

ANTHONY W. ISHII, Senior District Judge.

This is an action in diversity for damages arising from the termination of the employment of plaintiff Marcella Jackson ("Plaintiff") by her employer Kaplan Higher Education, LLC, et al. ("Defendant" or "Kaplan Higher Education Corporation" ("KHEC")). Plaintiff's action was removed to this court from Fresno County Superior Court on January 16, 2014. Plaintiff's complaint alleges six claims for relief pursuant to California's fair employment practices statute, California Government Code § 12940 et seq., and one claim pursuant to the California Family Rights Act. Plaintiff's complaint also alleges one claim pursuant to the federal Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615. Currently before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Defendant's "Motion"). The parties do not dispute there is complete diversity between the parties and that the amount in question exceeds the statutory amount. Diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is therefore uncontested. Venue is proper in this court.

GENERAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts were submitted jointly by the parties and/or are not contested.¹

Plaintiff began her employment with KHEC as a Career Services Advisor in May 2009. As a Career Services Advisor ("CSA"), Plaintiff's primary job duty consisted of working with students to help them find jobs following graduation. The immediate supervisor for all CSAs was the Director of Career Services. Plaintiff worked successfully under her original Director, Connie LoFreso, and under the person who temporarily filled that position when LoFreso became Director of Admissions. Plaintiff received good performance reviews from 2010 through 2012 and was the top performing CSA in 2012. About November 2012, Tamara Honohan ("Honohan") was hired to permanently fill the position of Director of Career Services. Honohan therefore became Plaintiff's immediate supervisor as of November 2012.

On January 7, 2013, Plaintiff requested leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and/or the California Family Rights Act ("CFRA"). Although the Parties' joint undisputed facts and Defendant's Undisputed Material Facts do not directly address the reason for Plaintiff's request for leave, undisputed portions of Plaintiff's proffer of Additional Material Facts indicate that Plaintiff requested leave upon advice of her physician after presenting with symptoms of mental anxiety, emotional stress and related physical symptoms arising from her interactions with Honohan. Plaintiff's physician initially indicated that Plaintiff's medical leave was to continue through January 20, 2013. Thereafter, Plaintiff's physician requested a total of four extensions, continuing Plaintiff's medical leave through April 29, 2014. During the latter part of her medical leave, Plaintiff was in communication with Nancy O'Neal ("O'Neal"), KHEC's Employee Relations Director at the time, and with Andrew Field, who at the time was Director of Finance and Interim Executive Director.

Plaintiff applied for, and began receiving Long Term Disability benefits on or about April 12, 2013. Plaintiff's physician extended Plaintiff's medical leave through May 19, 2013. Plaintiff's physician later issued the final extension of medical leave to September 9, 2013. KHEC terminated Plaintiff's employment on May 2, 2013. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") on May 13, 2013, alleging age-based and disability-based discrimination. Plaintiff's DFEH complaint was denied and a right to sue letter was issued on June 18, 2013.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges a total of eight claims for relief. Six of the eight claims for relief are alleged pursuant to California Government Code section 12940. Pertinent to this action, section 12940 prohibits discrimination based on age or physical or mental disability

. Plaintiff's first claim for relief alleges discrimination based on age and the second alleges discrimination based on "a medical condition." Plaintiff's third and fourth claims for relief are related to the claim for discrimination based on medical disability in that the third claim alleges failure to accommodate the medical disability in violation of section 12940(m) and the failure to timely engage in the "Interactive Process" in good faith, respectively. Plaintiff's fifth claim for relief alleges that Defendant failed to prevent discrimination against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's sixth claim for relief alleges Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff's complaints to KHEC administrators over her relationship with Honohan and for filing of the DFEH complaint. Plaintiff alleges such retaliation is in violation of section 12940(h). Plaintiff's seventh and eighth claims for relief allege Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff by terminating her employment and not rehiring her following the exercise of rights under California's Family Rights Act and the federal Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615, respectively.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ; Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) ; Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir.1985) ; Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir.1984).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Although the party moving for summary judgment always has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, the nature of the responsibility varies "depending on whether the legal issues are ones on which the movant or the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial." Cecala v. Newman, 532 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1132–1133 (D.Ariz.2007). A party that does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial—usually but not always the defendant—"has both the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion for summary judgment." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2000). "In order to carry its burden of production, the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Id.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) ; Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir.1979). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e) ; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575 ; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir.1973). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575 ; T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." " Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); International Union of Bricklayers ...