Jackson v. Kelley
| Decision Date | 18 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-19-985,CV-19-985 |
| Citation | 2020 Ark. 255,602 S.W.3d 743 |
| Parties | Anarian Chad JACKSON, Appellant v. Wendy KELLEY, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Anarian Chad Jackson, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Jason Michael Johnson, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Anarian Chad Jackson filed in the circuit court in the county where he is incarcerated a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-101 (Repl. 2016). Jackson alleged in the petition that the judgment and commitment order was illegal on its face because it was signed by Judge Bogard, who did not preside at his trial and lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment; that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it admitted into evidence the pretrial statement of Takesha Griffin; and that Judge Bogard lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment because he failed to recuse himself after Jackson threatened to kill Judge Bogard's wife. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition. On appeal, Jackson raises the same claims for habeas relief raised in the petition filed below and further contends that the circuit court erred when it failed to conduct a hearing on his petition.1 We find no error and affirm. Jackson subsequently filed two motions to amend his reply brief and submitted a tendered reply brief upon filing his second motion to amend. The motions are denied.
A circuit court's decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon , 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364. A decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment and commitment order is invalid on its face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Foreman v. State , 2019 Ark. 108, 571 S.W.3d 484. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy. Baker v. Norris , 369 Ark. 405, 255 S.W.3d 466 (2007). When the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the appellant and also has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court has authority to render the judgment. Johnson v. State , 298 Ark. 479, 769 S.W.2d 3 (1989). Under our statute, a petitioner for the writ who does not allege his or her actual innocence and proceed under Act 1780 of 2001 must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and make a showing, by affidavit or other evidence, of probable cause to believe that he or she is being illegally detained. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016). Unless the petitioner can show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the judgment was invalid on its face, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Fields v. Hobbs , 2013 Ark. 416, 2013 WL 5775566. Moreover, a habeas proceeding does not afford a prisoner an opportunity to retry his or her case, and it is not a substitute for direct appeal or postconviction relief. Philyaw v. Kelley , 2015 Ark. 465, 477 S.W.3d 503. This court views an issue of a void or an illegal sentence as being an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. Collier v. Kelley , 2020 Ark. 77, 594 S.W.3d 50. A sentence is void or illegal when the trial court lacks the authority to impose it. Id. A trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving violations of criminal statutes. Id.
In 2003, a Pulaski County Circuit Court jury convicted Jackson of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. This court affirmed. Jackson v. State , 359 Ark. 297, 197 S.W.3d 468 (2004). Jackson subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Jefferson County Circuit Court alleging that Judge Bogard did not have jurisdiction to enter the judgment of conviction because Judge Bogard had not presided over his trial. The Jefferson County Circuit Court denied the petition because the judge who presided over the trial and the judge who signed the judgment had authority to act in the criminal proceedings because both had been elected within the same judicial district. See Jackson v. Kelley , 2019 Ark. 191, 575 S.W.3d 105. Without addressing the merits of Jackson's claim, we dismissed the petition because Jackson had been transferred to Lincoln County while the habeas appeal was pending. Id.
As stated above, Jackson alleges for a second time that his judgment of conviction is illegal on its face because it was signed by Judge Bogard, who did not preside over his trial and therefore did not have the authority to sign the judgment. Jackson is mistaken. Jurisdiction is granted to a particular position—that is, to a particular court—and not to the person who fills it. Lukach v. State , 2018 Ark. 208, 548 S.W.3d 810 (citing Simpson v. State , 310 Ark. 493, 837 S.W.2d 475 (1992) ). Here, Judge Bogard was the circuit judge elected in the judicial district where Jackson was tried and convicted, and Judge Bogard had authority to sign the judgment reflecting the jury's verdict. Jackson's reliance on Waddle v. Sargent , 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993), is misplaced because that case involved the lack of jurisdiction of judges who were not elected in the judicial district where the crime was committed. Jackson's further reliance on Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-13-211(d) (Repl. 2016) for the proposition that a presiding judge is required to sign the judgment is likewise misplaced because that statute is relevant to proceedings "where a jury is waived and a cause is submitted for trial before the court sitting as a jury." See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-13-211(b). Here, Jackson was tried by a jury, and this statute is not applicable.
Jackson's additional claims for relief are not cognizable in a habeas proceeding because his claims represent allegations of trial error. Assertions of trial error and due-process claims do not implicate the facial validity of the judgment or the jurisdiction of the trial court because the writ will not issue to correct errors or irregularities that occurred at trial. Stephenson v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 143, 544 S.W.3d 44. There is no merit to Jackson's claim that the admission into evidence of a particular pretrial statement deprived the court of jurisdiction. A challenge to the admission of evidence is not cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Tilson v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 128, 543 S.W.3d 505. Finally, Jackson's contention that Judge Bogard did not have jurisdiction to enter the judgment because he did not recuse himself is also without merit. Claims of judicial bias amount to allegations of trial error and are not cognizable in habeas proceedings. Jefferson v. Kelley , 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626 (per curiam). A trial judge's failure to recuse himself or herself in accordance with the Canons of Judicial Conduct does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The circuit court did not clearly err when it denied and dismissed Jackson's habeas petition.
Jackson contends that the circuit court was required to appoint an attorney and conduct a hearing on his habeas petition. While our statutory habeas corpus scheme contemplates a hearing in the event the writ is issued, there is no requirement that a hearing be given a petitioner regardless of the content of the petition. Sims v. State , 2018 Ark. 271, 555 S.W.3d 868. A hearing is not required on a habeas petition—even when the petition alleges an otherwise cognizable ground—when probable cause for the issuance of the writ is not shown by affidavit or other evidence. Id. Jackson failed to demonstrate probable cause for the issuance of the writ, and the circuit court was not required to appoint counsel and hold a hearing on his petition.
Affirmed; motions denied.
The circuit court erred in dismissing Jackson's habeas petition. This case involves the appointment of a special judge who presided at the trial but failed to sign the judgment and commitment order. The circuit court failed to ascertain that the trial court's jurisdiction was proper.
Before Tim Fox was elected to the circuit court, he was a practicing attorney in Pulaski County. Near the end of his tenure, Circuit Judge David Bogard took a vacation and Fox was appointed as a special judge in his stead. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the formalities of Administrative Order No. 16 were followed in appointing a special judge.
Amendment 80 § 4 of the Arkansas Constitution gives superintending control of circuit courts to the Supreme Court.1 It states that
Using that superintending authority, this court has created Administrative Order No. 16, which outlines the procedures regarding the assignment of judges. This section clearly establishes the Chief Justice's duties when exercising the duties of appointments granted by Amendment 80.
Administrative Order No. 16(II) outlines three bases for assignment of a special judge.
Once the threshold for a special judge is met, the Chief Justice's duties are set forth in the next section of the Administrative Order. Section (III) provides, in pertinent part, the rules...
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