Jackson v. National Football League

• Decision Date: 24 September 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 4-92-876.
• Citation: 802 F. Supp. 226
• Parties: Keith JACKSON, D.J. Dozier, Thomas Everett, Louis Lipps, Stephone Paige, Joseph Phillips, Webster Slaughter, Natu Tuatagaloa, Garin Veris and Leon White, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; The Five Smiths, Inc.; Buffalo Bills, Inc.; Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc.; Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.; Cleveland Browns, Inc.; The Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd.; PDB Sports, Ltd.; The Detroit Lions, Inc.; The Green Bay Packers, Inc.; Houston Oilers, Inc.; Indianapolis Colts, Inc.; Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc.; The Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd.; Los Angeles Rams Football Company, Inc.; Miami Dolphins, Ltd.; Minnesota Vikings Football Club, Inc.; KMS Patriots Limited Partnership; The New Orleans Saints Limited Partnership; New York Football Giants, Inc.; New York Jets Football Club, Inc.; The Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, Inc.; B & B Holdings, Inc.; Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc.; The Chargers Football Company; The San Francisco Forty-Niners, Ltd.; The Seattle Seahawks, Inc.; Tampa Bay Area NFL Football Club, Inc.; and Pro-Football, Inc.; Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

802 F. Supp. 226

Keith JACKSON, D.J. Dozier, Thomas Everett, Louis Lipps, Stephone Paige, Joseph Phillips, Webster Slaughter, Natu Tuatagaloa, Garin Veris and Leon White, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; The Five Smiths, Inc.; Buffalo Bills, Inc.; Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc.; Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.; Cleveland Browns, Inc.; The Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd.; PDB Sports, Ltd.; The Detroit Lions, Inc.; The Green Bay Packers, Inc.; Houston Oilers, Inc.; Indianapolis Colts, Inc.; Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc.; The Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd.; Los Angeles Rams Football Company, Inc.; Miami Dolphins, Ltd.; Minnesota Vikings Football Club, Inc.; KMS Patriots Limited Partnership; The New Orleans Saints Limited Partnership; New York Football Giants, Inc.; New York Jets Football Club, Inc.; The Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, Inc.; B & B Holdings, Inc.; Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc.; The Chargers Football Company; The San Francisco Forty-Niners, Ltd.; The Seattle Seahawks, Inc.; Tampa Bay Area NFL Football Club, Inc.; and Pro-Football, Inc.; Defendants.

Civ. No. 4-92-876.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

September 24, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edward M. Glennon, Carol T. Rieger, Charles J. Lloyd, and Lindquist & Vennum, Minneapolis, Minn., James W. Quinn, Jeffrey L. Kessler, and Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York City, for plaintiffs.

James Fitzmaurice, Daniel J. Connolly, and Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minn., Herbert Dym, Jeffrey Pash, and Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., Frank Rothman, Shepard Goldfein, and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.

Peter S. Hendrixson, and Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, Inc.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

DOTY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prohibit defendants from continuing to restrict plaintiffs pursuant to the Right of First Refusal/Compensation Rules of Plan B. Based on a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, the court grants plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and defers ruling on their motion for a preliminary injunction.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are professional athletes who have been employed by various member teams of the National Football League ("NFL"). Plaintiffs bring the present action seeking relief for injuries that they allegedly have suffered as a result of defendants' Right of First Refusal/Compensation Rules of Plan B ("the Plan B rules"). Plaintiffs' contracts with their respective teams all expired as of February 1, 1992. By operation of the Plan B rules, as of April 1, 1992, all of the plaintiffs' former teams gained the exclusive rights to plaintiffs' services.¹ At the time the present suit was filed, September 14, 1992, all ten players remained restricted under those rules.

As of the date of this order, September 24, 1992, only four players remain restricted by the Plan B rules: Keith Jackson, Webster Slaughter, D.J. Dozier and Garin Veris. Of the remaining six players, Thomas Everett was traded and has subsequently signed a contract for the 1992 season. Natu Tuatagaloa, Louis Lipps and Leon White were released by their former clubs and have subsequently signed contracts with new clubs for the 1992 season. Stephone Paige and Joseph Phillips were also released by their former clubs, and at the present time remain unrestricted free agents.

The four players who remain restricted under the Plan B rules contend that they are entitled to injunctive relief because they have suffered and continue to suffer immediate, irreparable harm for which monetary damages are inadequate. Relying on the jury's findings in the McNeil case² as the basis for the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, plaintiffs also contend that they demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, and thus ask the court to grant the requested relief.

DISCUSSION

The court considers four factors when determining whether to issue either a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction:

1. The probability that the movant will succeed on the merits of its claims;

2. The threat of irreparable harm to the movant if the requested relief is denied;

3. The balance between the harm to the movant if injunctive relief is denied and the injury that will result if such relief is granted; and

4. The public interest.

Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir.1981) (en banc) (preliminary injunction); S.B. McLaughlin & Co. v. Tudor Oaks Condominium Project, 877 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir.1989) (in the Eighth Circuit, courts apply Dataphase factors to analyze requests for temporary restraining orders). The court will examine each factor in turn.

A. Probability of Success on the Merits

Plaintiffs rely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. See, e.g., Truck Drivers, Local 705 v. Almarc Mfg., Inc., 553 F.Supp. 1170, 1173 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (considering application of collateral estoppel for purposes of determining likelihood of success on the merits).

Collateral estoppel is appropriate where:

1. The issue was identical to one raised in a prior adjudication;

2. There was a final judgment on the merits;

3. The estopped party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and

4. The estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.

See, e.g., Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 279 (8th Cir.1979) (citing Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir.1975)). In the present case, plaintiffs seek to use the doctrine offensively to prevent the NFL defendants from relitigating the legality of the Plan B rules, an issue that defendants previously lost in the McNeil case.³ In Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, the Supreme Court held that the use of offensive collateral estoppel was within the trial court's discretion and emphasized three factors that courts should consider when making that determination:

1. Whether a plaintiff is being rewarded for failing to join in the prior action;

2. Whether the defendants had an incentive to litigate the first action "fully and vigorously"; and 3. Whether there are any procedural opportunities available to defendants in the second action that were not available to them in the first action of a "kind that might be likely to cause a different result."

439 U.S. 322, 331-32, 99 S.Ct. 645, 651-52, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). Applying those standards, the court finds that it is likely that in the present action, defendants are collaterally estopped from relitigating the legality of the Plan B rules. The issue on which plaintiffs will seek collateral estoppel is identical to that raised in the McNeil litigation.⁴ The court further notes that the probability of an appeal by defendants in the McNeil case does not necessarily preclude the application of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., In re Ewing, 852 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir.1988) ("the pendency of an appeal does not diminish the res judicata effect of a judgment rendered by a federal court", quoting Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (D.D.C.1983) (citations omitted)). Defendants in the present action are also the same parties as in McNeil, and were given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the legality of the Plan B rules in McNeil.

Turning to the additional factors relevant to offensive use of collateral estoppel, the court determines that such use will not improperly reward plaintiffs for their failure to join in the McNeil litigation. The court further concludes that the NFL defendants had significant incentive to fully litigate the legality of the Plan B rules in McNeil. Finally, defendants' procedural opportunities are similar to those in McNeil, and thus not likely to create a different result in the present action.

Even if the court were to determine that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply, the court nonetheless concludes, after hearing all of the evidence and arguments in the McNeil case, that plaintiffs demonstrate a substantial probability of success on the merits of their claims. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-89 (D.D.C.1978) (NFL draft violates Rule of Reason); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620-23 (8th Cir.1976) (Rozelle Rule found illegal under Rule of Reason), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801, 98 S.Ct. 28, 54 L.Ed.2d 59 (1977); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., Civ. No. 901071, slip op. at 19-23, 1992 WL 88039 (D.D.C. March 10, 1992) (applying Rule of Reason, and granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment concerning defendants' antitrust liability for fixing the wages of developmental squad players in 1989 NFL season); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F.Supp. 73, 82-83 (N.D.Cal. 1974) (NFL draft and Rozelle Rule not justified by Rule of Reason), judgment aff'd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907, 99 S.Ct. 1996, 60 L.Ed.2d 375 (1979); cf. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1395-98 (9th Cir.) (affirming jury verdict that NFL rule limiting franchise relocation was unreasonable), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990, 105 S.Ct. 397, 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984); North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257-61 (2d Cir.) (overturning district court's decision and holding that NFL's cross-ownership rule violates Rule of Reason), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074, 103 S.Ct. 499, 74 L.Ed.2d 639 (1982); United States v. National Football League, 116 F.Supp. 319, 327 (E.D.Pa.1953) (striking down NFL rules limiting broadcast of games).

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that this factor tips in favor of granting plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief.

B. ...