Jackson v. State

• Citation: 264 Ala. 528,88 So.2d 206
• Decision Date: 02 February 1956
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 817
• Parties: Melvin JACKSON v. STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Page 206

88 So.2d 206

264 Ala. 528

Melvin JACKSON v. STATE.

4 Div. 817.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 2, 1956.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1956.

V. Cecil Curtis and Roy L. Smith, Phenix City, for appellant.

John Patterson, Atty. Gen., and Paul T. Gish, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

MERRILL, Justice.

Appellant was tried in the Circuit Court of Russell County under an indictment charging the offense of rape. He entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity; he was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death in the electric chair. This appeal is prosecuted under the automatic appeal statute. Code 1940, Title 15, Sec. 382(1) et seq.

The record shows that all the legal requirements appertaining to a capital case were properly met, leaving for our consideration only the questions of sufficiency of the evidence, charges, rulings on evidence, and the ruling on motion for a new trial.

The defendant, a Negro boy 17 years and 11 months old, had escaped from the city jail in Phenix City. Early the next morning, September 3, 1954, he entered the rural home of a Mr. and Mrs. Clark, with whom prosecutrix and her two year old son lived. Mr. and Mrs. Clark were not at home at the time. The defendant went into an unoccupied bedroom, put on a ladies short sleeve dress, rolled up his trousers, tied a handkerchief around his face, put on a straw hat, picked up a shotgun, walked into the bedroom where the prosecutrix and her little boy were sleeping and told her to get up.

The prosecutrix testified that when she awoke and saw him standing at the foot of the bed she asked what he wanted and his answer was 'you know what I want'. Her little son began to scream and she was ordered to get up out of bed and fix the child some breakfast. The defendant found a rifle in the house and exchanged the shotgun for it. After a time of begging on her part, he threatened to kill both her and the baby if she did not submit. She tried to get him to desist on the ground that her menstrual period was on, a fact, but he proceeded to rape her. He then left the house, returned for some extra cartridges and left again with the rifle and prosecutrix' billfold. He discarded the dress, the hat, and a cold drink bottle about 100 yards from the house.

He was apprehended six days later at a movie house in Columbus, Georgia, being identified to the officers by his father. He made two voluntary confessions--one oral and one written; each full and complete. He led the officers to a briar patch where he had hidden the rifle after he left the house.

The prosecutrix identified the defendant; the evidence was undisputed that he raped her; it was undisputed that the confessions were voluntary and the only possible conflict in the testimony was on the question of his sanity and that evidence fell far short of the burden imposed, because all the evidence on that subject was that he sometimes acted a little funny or peculiar. His father so testified but also swore that in his judgment, the defendant knew right from wrong. The defendant did not take the stand.

The undisputed evidence was ample to support the verdict of the jury. We have carefully read the record and there is no reversible error in any of the court's rulings on the evidence.

Defendant's argument in brief is directed principally to the refusal of the court to give requested written charges 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10.

Charge 10 was not predicated on a belief from the evidence and was properly refused. Willingham v. State, 262 Ala. 550, 80 So.2d 280.

Charges 8 and 5 were held bad in Odom v. State, 253 Ala. 571, 46 So.2d 1 (charges 1 and 2).

Charge 4 is not applicable to the facts in this case and was properly refused.

Charges 1, 2, 6 and 7 are 'burden of proof' charges. They could well have been given and it would seem that the trial court would have given them out of the abundance of precaution. Charge 1 was upheld in Neilson v. State, 146 Ala. 683, 40 So. 221 (charge M). Charge 2 was upheld in Davis v. State, 8 Ala.App. 147, 62 So. 1027 (charge 28) and charge 7 was upheld in Diamond v. State, 15 Ala.App. 33, 72 So. 558 (charge 7).

Title 7, Sec. 273, Code 1940 provides in part as follows:

'* * * The refusal of a charge, though a correct statement of the law, shall not be cause for a reversal on appeal if it appears that the same rule of law was substantially and fairly given to the jury in the court's general charge or in charges given at the request of parties. * * *'

After a careful consideration of these charges in connection with the oral charge, we are convinced that they were fairly and substantially covered in the court's general oral charge, and their refusal will not effect a reversal of the cause, even though some of the charges correctly stated the applicable law and could well have been given. Odom v. State, 253 Ala. 571, 46 So.2d 1; Woodard v. State, 253 Ala. 259, 44 So.2d 241; Helms v. State, 254 Ala. 14, 47 So.2d 276; Cawthon...