Odom v. State

• Decision Date: 27 April 1950
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 895
• Citation: 253 Ala. 571,46 So.2d 1
• Parties: ODOM v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1

46 So.2d 1

253 Ala. 571

ODOM v. STATE.

6 Div. 895.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 27, 1950.

Jos. C. Barnard, of Birmingham, for appellant.

A. A. Carmichael, Atty. Gen., and MacDonald Gallion, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. The following charges were refused to defendant:

1. I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that unless you are convinced by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession introduced was voluntarily made, you would have no right to consider the confession and if the other testimony exclusive of the confession is insufficient to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt then it would be your duty to acquit the defendant.

2. I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the burden is on the State to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession of defendant was a voluntary statement, and given by him without fear or punishment or hope of reward on the part of those who had him in custody at the time of the alleged confession.

6. The court charges the jury that a reasonable doubt might exist although there is no probability of the defendant's innocence from the testimony; and if the jury do not have an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the guilt of the defendant, then in that event you should acquit the defendant.

12. The court charges the jury that if they are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, and to a moral certainty, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis but of his guilt, then they would find him not guilty; and it is not necessary to raise a reasonable doubt, that the jury should find from all the evidence a probability of defendant's innocence, but such a doubt may arise, even where there is no probability of his innocence in the testimony, and, if the jury have not an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of his guilt, it is the duty of the jury to acquit him.

14. The court charges the jury that the burden is upon the State, and it is the duty of the State to show, beyond all reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis every circumstance necessary to show that the defendant is guilty; and, unless the State has done that in this case it is your duty, gentlemen of the jury, to render a verdict of not guilty.

19. The test of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal case is whether the circumstances, as proven, are capable of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis consistent with defendant's innocence, and, if they are capable of such explanation, then the defendant should be acquitted.

33. I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the burden is upon the State, and it is the duty of the State, to show beyond all reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis, every circumstance necessary to show that the defendant is guilty; and, unless the State has done that in this case, it is your duty, gentlemen of the jury, to render a verdict of not guilty.

35. Before the jury can convict the defendant, they must be satisfied, to a moral certainty, not only that the proof is consistent with the guilt of the defendant, but that it is wholly inconsistent with every other rational conclusion; and, unless the jury are so convinced by the evidence of the defendant's guilt that they would each venture to act upon that decision in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest, they must find the defendant not guilty.

SIMPSON, Justice.

Appeal from the death sentence on conviction of murder in the first degree.

The defendant, Homer Garland Odom, a white man twenty-two years of age, shot and killed William Alexander McDonald, seventy-one years of age, during a robbery of the deceased's small grocery store on Highway 31 near Gardendale in Jefferson County, Alabama. The defendant from about midday of February 8, 1949, the fatal day, loitered around the store and a short time after nightfall, when deceased was in the process of closing the building for the night, in robbing the deceased of his money sack, on the deceased's resistance shot and killed him with a .38 calibre revolver. The crime was not discovered until the following morning when passers-by noticed the body of deceased lying on the floor of the store.

There was no eyewitness to the actual shooting, but several witnesses observed the defendant at the store during the period until late afternoon and the finger of suspicion pointed toward him. On his apprehension, he made two voluntary confessions detailing the murder as above outlined. He informed the officers that the murder weapon was at his home and on a search the revolver was located and later brought into court, identified and introduced in evidence. This was the evidence proffered by the State. The defendant did not testify or offer any countervailing evidence.

The corpus delicti was fully established and there is, therefore, no foundation for the contention that the defendant was entitled to the affirmative charge.

One of the defendant's confessions was made immediately after his arrest and another later, while in jail, on interrogation by the deputy solicitor, and taken down by the court reporter. It was proven by the State that both of these confessions were entirely voluntary.

The mere fact that accused was a prisoner in custody of officers at the time of his confession does not render it inadmissible as involuntary, though made to or in the presence of an officer and in response to his questioning. Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441, 37 So.2d 753; Huntley v. State, 250 Ala. 303, 34 So.2d 216; Phillips v. State, 248 Ala. 510, 28 So.2d 542; Brooks v. State, 248 Ala. 628, 29 So.2d 4; Flanigan v. State, 247 Ala. 642, 25 So.2d 685.

While confessions are prima facie involuntary, they may appear otherwise from the circumstances attending their narration. The duty does rest in the first instance on the trial court to determine whether or not a confession was voluntary and unless it so appears to exclude it, but if there is preliminary proof as was the case here, that no threats were made nor inducements offered and if the circumstances attending the confession disclose its voluntary character, the court in the exercise of a wise discretion will permit its introduction. Logan v. State, supra; Reedy v. State, 246 Ala. 363(7), 20 So.2d 528; Taylor v. State, 249 Ala. 130, 30 So.2d 256; Johnson v. State, 242 Ala. 278, 5 So.2d 632.

As was said in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 207, 28 L.Ed. 262, 'the question is necessarily addressed, in the first instance, to the judge, and since his discretion must be controlled by all the attendant circumstances, the courts have wisely foreborne to mark with absolute precision the limits of admission and exclusion.'

It was proven for the State that no threats were made nor inducements offered and it appears from the circumstances that the confessions were freely made without fear, compulsion, reward or inducement. We hold, therefore, that they were properly admitted.

Likewise without merit is the contention that the county coroner, of twenty-five years experience in the examination of bodies of persons whose deaths had been caused by bullet wounds, was not shown to be sufficiently qualified to give expert testimony as to the path and location of the bullet and the fact that bullet caused Mr. McDonald's death. Quite true, a coroner as such is not necessarily qualified to express...