Jackson v. State
Decision Date | 05 June 2014 |
Docket Number | No. SC12–1159.,SC12–1159. |
Parties | Ray JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Raheela Ahmed and Maria Christine Perinetti, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsels, Middle Region, Tampa, FL, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Lisa–Marie Lerner, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee.
Ray Jackson and codefendant Michael Wooten were indicted and tried together for the kidnapping and first-degree murder of Pallis Paulk. Jackson v. State, 25 So.3d 518, 522 (Fla.2009). Both defendants were convicted of the crimes, and Jackson was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Jackson's convictions and sentence of death. Id. at 536.
Jackson filed an initial motion to vacate his judgment of conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. In addition, he filed a motion for DNA testing, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. After holding an evidentiary hearing on some of the claims, the postconviction court denied relief, a holding that Jackson contests. The postconviction court also denied his request for DNA testing.
Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of death was imposed, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief and affirm the denial of DNA testing.
On direct appeal, this Court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:
Jackson, 25 So.3d at 522–24 (footnotes omitted).
During the penalty phase, the State presented victim impact statements from family and friends, as well as a stipulation from Jackson that announced that Jackson had previously been convicted of robbery, battery on a law enforcement officer, and resisting arrest with violence. Id. at 524–25. Jackson then presented a significant amount of mitigating evidence that this Court summarized as follows:
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