Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 24 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 84475,84475
• Citation: 659 So.2d 1060
• Parties: 20 Fla. L. Weekly S432 Tyrone Stephan JACKSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1060

659 So.2d 1060

20 Fla. L. Weekly S432

Tyrone Stephan JACKSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 84475.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Aug. 24, 1995.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and David P. Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; James W. Rogers, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Giselle Lylen Rivera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Jackson v. State, 641 So.2d 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), based upon direct and express conflict with Davis v. State, 630 So.2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), and Longley v. State, 614 So.2d 34 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution.

Petitioner contends that our decision in Daniels v. State, 595 So.2d 952 (Fla.1992), mandates that his three-year minimum mandatory sentence term under section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1993), must run concurrent with his habitual offender minimum mandatory sentences. He also contends that Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla.1983), prohibits the stacking of minimum mandatory sentences for offenses within a single episode. The district court, in a two-to-one decision, held that neither Daniels nor Palmer "precludes a habitual offender minimum mandatory followed by a firearm minimum mandatory within a single criminal episode." Jackson, 641 So.2d at 966. The district court reasoned that because the legislature was addressing "separate harms" in enacting both the habitual felony offender statute and the firearm enhancement statute, it did not intend for "section 775.087(2) to have no meaningful effect in the context of a criminal episode for which a habitual offender minimum mandatory sentence is imposed." Id.

Recently, two other district courts have addressed and answered the same issue. In Longley v. State, 614 So.2d 34 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), Longley was convicted of one count of robbery with a firearm. He was sentenced as a habitual felony offender and given a minimum mandatory term of fifteen years. He was also given a consecutive three-year minimum mandatory term for use of a firearm during the robbery. On appeal, Longley argued that the trial court had improperly stacked the two minimum mandatory terms for committing only a single episode of armed robbery.

Relying on the holding in Daniels (defendant to serve minimum mandatory portions of the sentences concurrently for crimes that arise out of a single episode), the Fifth District held that the trial court had erred by ordering Longley to serve the minimum mandatory portions of his sentence consecutively rather than concurrently. 614 So.2d at 35.

In Davis v. State, 630 So.2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), Davis was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's sentence imposing a three-year minimum mandatory sentence for possession of a firearm to run consecutively to his fifteen-year mandatory sentence as a habitual violent felony offender. In rejecting this sentencing scheme, the district court agreed with the Fifth District's analysis in Longley and concluded that Daniels required reversal of Davis's consecutive minimum mandatory sentence because the minimum mandatory sentences were not required by the statutes at issue in Davis's case. In reaching this conclusion, the district court stated:

The supreme court held [in Daniels ] that the sentences could only be imposed concurrently because the statutes prescribing penalties for those offenses [burglary while armed, sexual battery with a deadly weapon, and armed robbery committed during a single criminal episode] do not require minimum mandatory sentences. Rather, it was the habitual offender statute that required the minimum mandatory sentences and, "as in the case of the three-year minimum mandatory sentence required for committing a felony while in possession of a gun, section 775.084 constitutes an enhancement of the felony prescribed by statute for the underlying offense."

Davis, 630 So.2d at 595.

In Palmer, the defendant was charged with committing thirteen counts of armed robbery at the same time and place. He was sentenced to seventy-five years on each armed robbery count. In addition, the court sentenced him to three years minimum mandatory on each count of armed robbery. ¹ On appeal, the State argued that when section 775.087(2), ² Florida Statutes (1981), and section 775.021(4), ³ Florida Statutes (1981), were read together, they permitted the stacking of consecutive mandatory three-year minimum sentences. We disagreed and held that there was no express authority in section 775.087(2) to deny a "defendant eligibility for parole for a period greater than three calendar years." Palmer, 438 So.2d at 3. However, we made it clear that our holding in Palmer did not mean that

we ... prohibit the imposition of multiple concurrent three-year minimum mandatory sentences upon conviction of separate offenses included under subsection 775.087(2), nor do we prohibit consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for offenses arising from separate incidents occurring at separate times and places.

Id. at 4.

Subsequently, in Daniels, we further explained our holding in Palmer. Daniels was charged with separate offenses arising from one criminal episode. This Court held that Daniels' minimum mandatory sentences arising from crimes committed during one criminal episode could only be imposed concurrently and not consecutively. In conclusion, we rejected the State's argument that section 775.021, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), required that minimum mandatory sentences be imposed consecutively and said:

In the first place, our opinion in Palmer rejected the contention that section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1981), which was worded substantially the same as section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), permitted the stacking of consecutive minimum mandatory sentences. The subsequent addition of subsection (b) to section 775.021(4) was designed to overrule this Court's decision in Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla.1987), pertaining to consecutive sentences for separate offenses committed at the same time, and had nothing to do with minimum mandatory sentences. ⁴

Id. at 954 (footnote omitted).

In a more recent case, Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 278, 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994), the district court certified whether a trial court had the authority to impose consecutive rather than concurrent minimum mandatory sentences. Id. This Court answered the district court's question in the negative. Hale was found guilty of the sale of cocaine and the possession of cocaine with intent to sell. Pursuant to the habitual offender statute, Hale was habitualized. As a result, Hale was sentenced to two consecutive twenty-five-year habitual violent felony offender terms, with each sentence carrying a minimum mandatory ten-year sentence. Finding Daniels persuasive authority, we held that Hale's enhanced maximum sentences had to run concurrently. Id. at 524. In reaching this conclusion, we said:

We find nothing in the language of the habitual offender statute which suggests that the legislature also intended that, once the sentences from multiple crimes committed during a single criminal episode have been enhanced through the habitual offender statutes, the total penalty should then be further increased by ordering that the sentences run consecutively.

Id.

Similarly, in Brooks v. State, 630 So.2d 527, 527 (Fla.1993), we were asked the following certified question:

MAY CONSECUTIVE ENHANCED SENTENCES BE IMPOSED UNDER SECTION 775.084, FLORIDA STATUTES, FOR CRIMES GROWING OUT OF A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE?

In answering the certified question in the negative, we relied on our resolution of this issue in Hale and the reasoning set forth in Daniels. In so doing, we explained:

We noted [in Hale ] that the habitual offender statute constitutes an enhancement statute and that because the original statutory provisions governing the crimes of which Hale was convicted contain no provision authorizing the imposed punishment his sentences cannot be served consecutively....

Id.

Although we have not squarely answered the issue now confronting us, we conclude that our previous holdings in Palmer, Daniels, Hale, and Brooks, prohibiting consecutive enhancement sentences arising out of a single criminal episode, and the reasoning thereof, are equally applicable to Jackson's sentence. As we noted in Daniels, possession of a gun, section 775.087, is an enhancement statute applying to the punishment prescribed by statute for the underlying offense. Daniels, 595 So.2d at 954. Under Daniels' rationale, Jackson's minimum mandatory sentence for possession of a firearm must run concurrent with the habitual offender minimum mandatory sentences, since both of these minimum mandatory sentences are enhancements. Also, like Daniels, the crimes for which Jackson was convicted do not contain a provision for a minimum mandatory sentence.

Finally, the State argues that section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1993), which gives the trial court discretion to impose sentencing either consecutively or concurrently, applies to all criminal offenses because section 775.021(2) specifically states: "The provisions of this chapter are applicable to offenses defined by other statutes, unless the code otherwise provides." Thus, the State claims that because the possession-of-firearm statute at issue here does not "otherwise provide," the trial court had discretion to impose a consecutive sentence. We have rejected this argument in both Daniels and Hale.

In accordance with the above, we quash the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith. We approve the opinions in Davis and Longley.

It is so ordered.

GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, KOGAN, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ.,...