Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 26 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. ED 108640,ED 108640
• Parties: Rojai R. JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

615 S.W.3d 873

Rojai R. JACKSON, Appellant,

v.STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. ED 108640

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION THREE.

Filed: January 26, 2021

FOR APPELLANT: Alexandria Assareh Shah, 1010 Market Street, Suite 1100, St. Louis, Missouri 63101.

FOR RESPONDENT: Kristen Shively Johnson, Eric Schmitt, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102.

Angela T. Quigless, P.J., Kurt S. Odenwald, J., and James M. Dowd, J.

James M. Dowd, Judge

Introduction

Appellant Rojai R. Jackson appeals the denial without an evidentiary hearing of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief. Jackson had pleaded guilty to second degree murder for the May 19, 2016 slaying of Raymond Hunter and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. In his Rule 24.035 motion, Jackson claimed his plea counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to advise him of the potential defense at trial that he was guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a lesser-included offense, instead of murder, (2) for failing to be ready for trial and then coercing Jackson to plead guilty by telling him that he had no defense, would be convicted at trial, and would receive a sentence of life without parole, and (3) that his counsel had a financial conflict of interest because Jackson still owed him attorney's fees. We affirm.

Standard of Review

Appellate review of the denial of a Rule 24.035 motion is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings, conclusions, and judgment are clearly erroneous. Wooldridge v. State , 239 S.W.3d 151, 153–54 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). The motion court's findings and conclusions are presumptively correct and will be overturned only when this Court, after reviewing the entire record, is left with a "definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Vaca v. State , 314 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Mo. banc 2010).

To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction relief claim, a movant must (1) allege facts, not conclusions, that, if true, would warrant relief; (2) the facts alleged must raise matters not refuted by the record and files in the case; and (3) the matters complained of must have resulted in prejudice to the movant. Barnett v. State , 103 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Mo. banc 2003). An evidentiary hearing is not required if the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. Id. And where a movant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel following a guilty plea, movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if an examination of the guilty plea proceedings directly refutes movant's assertion that his plea was involuntary. Cain v. State , 859 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993).

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that his attorney failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances, and (2) that he was prejudiced thereby. Sanders v. State , 738 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Mo. banc 1987) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ). There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable and effective. Zink v. State , 278 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Mo. banc 2009). To overcome this presumption, the movant must point to "specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance."

Whitehead v. State , 481 S.W.3d 116, 122 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (quoting Zink , 278 S.W.3d at 176 ).

A guilty plea must be a voluntary expression of the defendant's choice and a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of the act. Davis v. State , 435 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). After a guilty plea, our review is limited to a determination of whether the movant's plea was knowing and voluntary. Loudermilk v. State , 973 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) ; Cain , 859 S.W.2d at 717. As a result, in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim following a guilty plea, a movant "must establish a serious dereliction of duty that materially affected his substantial rights and further show that his guilty plea was not an intelligent or knowing act." Evans v. State , 921 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996). Prejudice exists if the movant can show that, but for counsel's ineffective assistance, he would not have pleaded guilty and instead would have insisted on going to trial. May v. State , 309 S.W.3d 303, 306 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010).

Discussion

I. Jackson failed to establish his claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his counsel failed to inform him of the potential defense that he was guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, instead of murder.

Our inquiry is centered on the colloquy between the plea court and Jackson at the plea hearing. The court asked Jackson if he had "enough time to speak with [his] attorney about [his] case, specifically the facts and any trial strategy [he] might consider in [Jackson's] defense?" Jackson initially answered "No." Then after the plea court asked if he needed time to "speak to [counsel] some more," Jackson said, "I mean, we already done that." The court then asked again whether Jackson believed he "had enough time to speak with [his] attorney about [his] case, specifically the facts and any trial strategy [he] might consider in [Jackson's] defense," and Jackson said that they "never came up with a trial strategy or nothing." Later, Jackson stated that plea counsel "fully advised him in detail of the charges" and of "all legal aspects of [his] case, including [his] legal rights and the consequences of [his] two pleas of guilty."

The question here is whether this record refutes Jackson's claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his plea counsel failed to advise him that he could have asserted the defense at trial that he was guilty of the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter instead of murder. We find that the record is sufficient to refute Jackson's claim in this regard.

Jackson relies on Wiggins v. State , 480 S.W.3d 379 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015). Wiggins claimed his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to discuss with him the potential defense at trial that he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter not second-degree murder. Id. at 383. This Court reversed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion and remanded the matter back to the plea court for an evidentiary hearing. We relied on the transcript of the plea hearing and specifically the absence of any testimony by the defendant that his plea counsel had discussed the available defenses or whether counsel had fully advised him about all aspects of his case. Id. at 385.

The State, for its part, directs us to Whitehead v. State , in which this Court distinguished Wiggins and affirmed the denial of the movant's Rule 24.035 motion based principally on the movant's testimony that his attorney "explained each of these charges to [him] and discussed any possible defenses that might be available to [him]." 481 S.W.3d at 123. The Whitehead Court distinguished Wiggins because there "the plea court did not ask Movant specifically whether his plea counsel had explained any available or known defenses to him, or if plea counsel had fully advised Movant as to all aspects of the case." Wiggins , 480 S.W.3d at 385. Wiggins was also distinguishable because the legal concept underlying the potential lesser-included offense in Wiggins —sudden passion arising from adequate cause—"is not as evident to a non-lawyer." Id. While in Whitehead , the Court noted that the movant plead guilty to "the very lesser-included offense about which he claims plea counsel should have advised him," which demonstrates his familiarity with that charge and its status as a lesser-included offense. 481 S.W.3d at 125.

Whitehead relied on another case, Muhammad v. State , in which the movant's testimony that "defense counsel fully explained to him the nature of the charges and the elements of those charges," and "that defense counsel had also explained any possible defenses" was deemed sufficient to dispose without an evidentiary hearing of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the potential defenses at trial of self-defense and that he could have been convicted of a lesser included offense. 367 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).

We turn again to the record here in which Jackson admitted that counsel "fully advised him in detail of the charges" and of "all legal aspects of [his] case, including [his] legal rights and the consequences of [his] two pleas of guilty." This is certainly more robust than the record in Wiggins which lacked any testimony by the defendant that his plea counsel had discussed the available defenses or that counsel had fully advised him about all aspects of his case. Wiggins , 480 S.W.3d at 385. So, Wiggins does not help Jackson.

But this record is also not quite as robust as the records in Whitehead and in Muhammad because in those two cases there was testimony that counsel had discussed "any possible defenses," and here the scant record before us lacks any specific reference to defenses. We would have to find that Jackson's admission that counsel fully advised him of "all legal aspects of [his] case" is sufficient to refute his assertion that counsel did not discuss with him the defense at trial that he was guilty of the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter as opposed to first-degree murder or second-degree murder.

So, what were the "legal aspects" of Jackson's case? And what did Jackson understand them to be when he admitted that his counsel had discussed all of them with him? While a deep dive into Merriam-Webster's Dictionary for the meaning of legal aspects might prove interesting, we find it unnecessary. Other than...