Vaca v. State
| Decision Date | 15 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 90554.,SC 90554. |
| Parties | Miguel VACA, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Susan L. Hogan, Public Defender's Office, Kansas City, for Appellant.
Daniel N. McPherson, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for Respondent.
A jury convicted Miguel Vaca of various violent felonies arising from a string of armed robberies. Now Vaca asks for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his bifurcated trial. Because Vaca's defense counsel possessed mental health evidence detailing Vaca's mental illness, was apprised of the jury's interest in Vaca's mental condition, and did not consider whether to present such records or testimony to the jury, trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Vaca's motion for post-conviction relief should have been granted in part. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
The factual basis for this Rule 29.15 motion is not disputed. Vaca committed three armed robberies in Platte County in October and November 2002. All three robberies followed the same pattern: Vaca, wearing a ski mask, rode his bicycle from his apartment to nearby locations to commit a robbery with a Taurus revolver. He robbed two businesses—Quality Cleaners and Salon North. He also attempted the robbery of a child's birthday party in his own apartment complex, where he abducted a woman at gunpoint and discharged his revolver at a bystander. From this pattern, police were able to apprehend Vaca and find the bicycle, ski mask, and revolver in addition to other evidence linking him to the robberies.
When appointed counsel first visited Vaca at the Platte County jail, Dr. Anya, the county jail psychiatrist, had already been attending to Vaca. Dr. Anya suspected that Vaca suffered from mental illness and had prescribed a regimen of Trazadone, Paxil, Clonazepam, and Zyprexa. In response to both this and Vaca's overall demeanor, defense counsel enlisted the services of Dr. Bill Geis, a licensed clinical and forensic psychologist, to determine Vaca's competency to stand trial and whether he had diminished capacity.
Dr. Geis interviewed Vaca and administered various psychological tests. This included the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale to determine Vaca's cognitive ability. The results showed that Vaca had an overall IQ of 73, which was confirmed by Vaca's school records.
Two tests designed to detect the presence of schizophrenia were also administered. Both came back suggesting a schizophrenic condition. Dr. Geis also reviewed a Social Security Administration determination assessing a disability due in part to schizophrenia, which confirmed his results. Other medical records indicated that Vaca crashed his bicycle in 1988, which resulted in head trauma and a blood clot.
Dr. Geis' report also documented a violent history including incidents in which Vaca stabbed an elementary school classmate with a pencil, punched a woman who allegedly made comments about him and physically fought with family members.
Neither Dr. Geis nor defense counsel remembers discussing the report with each other, but both testified that it was standard practice to discuss any prepared psychological report. Both had vague recollections of a discussion and ultimately concluded that one must have occurred.
Vaca's trial was bifurcated by the newly codified procedure for non-capital cases in sec. 557.036, RSMo Supp.2008. Although defense counsel was an experienced trial advocate, this was his first bifurcated non-capital trial.
Defense counsel's theory during the guilt phase was complete innocence centered on misidentification by key witnesses. Part of this strategy included counsel eliciting evidence of an uncharged fourth robbery at K.C. Collectibles. Police had recovered fingerprints from that robbery location that did not match Vaca. While police initially grouped this robbery with the three charged robberies, they later excluded it as unrelated.
It is unclear from the record whether counsel intended to introduce Vaca's mental condition to the jury during the guilt phase. However, the State succeeded in preemptively excluding any mental condition evidence before defense counsel's case in chief, arguing that defense counsel failed to notify the State of his intention to introduce such evidence as required by chapter 552.1
The trial record does show that defense counsel tried to tease out testimony about Vaca's mental condition during direct examination of his brother, but was met with sustained objections from the State. At no point during the guilt phase did defense counsel call Dr. Geis or attempt to submit his report into evidence.
During guilt phase deliberations, the jury sent four questions to the court:
The court did not answer any of the questions. The jury returned with guilty verdicts on all the charges against Vaca.
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the State called to the stand the robbery victims. Each testified about how Vaca's actions had adversely affected their lives.
In response, defense counsel called Vaca's father. He testified that he and Vaca's mother had only visited Vaca twice in prison. Dr. Geis was not called during this phase of the trial, nor was his report received into evidence. The jury returned with sentences of life plus 102 years, which the court ordered to run consecutively.
Defense counsel filed a timely Rule 29.11 motion for a new trial. During the subsequent hearing, defense counsel asked the court to set aside the sentences based in part on the pre-sentence investigation report, which counsel argued, "does make mention of a report by Dr. Geis which evidences historical suffering from psychological disorders."2 The trial court did not modify the jury sentence. On appeal, the conviction and sentence were affirmed. State v. Vaca, 204 S.W.3d 754 (Mo.App. 2006)
Vaca brought a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief attacking trial counsel's effectiveness during the sentence and guilt phase. Defense counsel and Dr. Geis were the only witnesses at the proceeding.
Dr. Geis testified during the Rule 29.15 proceeding that he was available during the sentencing phase to testify and that he would have been able to expand on his report and Vaca's history of mental illness.
Defense counsel also testified during the Rule 29.15 proceeding. Counsel stated that the State's evidence was substantial, that Vaca's conviction was likely, and that he knew that this case would probably be going to the sentencing phase. The following exchange between post-conviction counsel and defense counsel then occurred:
The trial court overruled Vaca's motion for post-conviction relief. Vaca relies on two points on appeal. First, during the guilt phase, defense counsel was ineffective for eliciting evidence of the fourth uncharged robbery. Second, during the sentencing phase, defense counsel was ineffective for giving no consideration to calling Dr. Geis to testify or to entering his report into evidence.
The motion court's findings are presumed correct. Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Mo. banc 2009). A motion court's judgment will be overturned only when either its findings of fact or its conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(k); Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Mo. banc 2005). This Court must be left with a "definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Id.
"To show that his counsel was ineffective, Vaca must demonstrate, first, that his counsel's representation `fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 518 (Mo. banc 2006) quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Second, there must be a showing of "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," which is a probability "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
Vaca contends that defense counsel's decision to enter into evidence a fourth uncharged robbery at K.C. Collectibles was unreasonable strategy that prejudiced both his guilt and sentencing phases.
"The selection of witnesses and evidence are matters of trial strategy, virtually unchallengeable in an ineffective assistance claim." Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 37 (Mo. banc 2006); Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Mo. banc 2005). "Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter...
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