Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 04 March 2019
• Docket Number: S18A1598
• Citation: 825 S.E.2d 188,305 Ga. 614
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: JACKSON v. The STATE.

305 Ga. 614

825 S.E.2d 188

JACKSON

v.The STATE.

S18A1598

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: March 4, 2019

Reconsideration Denied March 27, 2019

Clifford L. Kurlander, for appellant.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Emily K. Richardson, Deborah D. Wellborn, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott O. Teague, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Bethel, Justice.

Alandis Jackson appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial following his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Steven Lewis.¹ On appeal, Jackson argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for burglary; that the trial court committed plain error when it charged the jury regarding circumstantial evidence, evidence of good character, and prior statements; that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial attorney’s failure to object to such instructions; and that the false imprisonment count should have merged with his conviction for the aggravated assault of Titus Robinson. As each of these enumerations of error are meritless, we affirm the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial.

1. Construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial showed that, in the morning and early afternoon of January 11, 2012, Steven Lewis and Paul Jones were playing video games at the ground-floor apartment Lewis shared with a roommate, Zavrae Ruff. Jones had been staying at the apartment for several weeks, and he sold marijuana from the apartment. That morning, Titus Robinson was also present in the apartment, and he and Ruff were playing a video game in the back bedroom.

Jones heard a knock at the door, which was locked, and he asked who was there. Jones heard Jackson say that it was "Rock," and he let Jackson and three other men into the apartment.² Jackson then asked Jones to sell him some marijuana.³ Jones locked the door behind Jackson and the others who had followed him in.

Jackson and his three companions drew guns on Lewis and Jones, and Jackson shot Lewis, killing him. Jackson then turned the gun on Jones, threatened to kill him, and demanded money from him. Jackson’s companions also had their guns drawn on Jones. Jones later testified that, at the time, he thought he was going to die.

After shooting Lewis, Jackson let two more men into the apartment and picked up another gun from the floor next to Lewis’ body. One of the men who came to the apartment with Jackson ordered Jones to lie next to Lewis’ body. Jackson took a bag containing money and drugs from underneath a table on which bags of marijuana were sitting. Jackson and the men he brought with him then proceeded to ransack the apartment.

Robinson and Ruff were in the bedroom the entire time, and Robinson heard Jones beg Jackson not to kill him. After hearing the gunshot and Jones’ screams, Ruff jumped out the bedroom window, and Robinson tried to hide in the closet. Ruff testified that he feared for his life when he heard the gunshot and Lewis’ scream. A short time later, Robinson decided to jump out the window as well, but, as he was halfway through the window, Jackson put a gun to the back of his head. Jackson ordered Robinson to move away from the window, put his hands up, and sit on the bed. Robinson complied and would later testify that Jackson’s words and actions prevented him from getting up or leaving the room.

As Robinson sat on the bed, Jackson and one of the other perpetrators rifled through Ruff’s bedroom and closet. Jones had stashed a supply of marijuana and money in a bag beneath a clothes bin in Ruff’s closet. Jackson left Ruff’s room carrying the bag of drugs and money belonging to Jones. He instructed his fellow perpetrator who had been holding Jones at gunpoint to leave with him. At that instruction, Jackson and each of his companions left the apartment.

As Jackson left, Robinson jumped out the window and ran to join Ruff. Robinson’s fiancée, Che Verdell, was driving to the apartment while the incident was occurring. When she arrived, she saw Ruff and Robinson running near the entrance to the apartment complex. As she drove closer to Lewis’ apartment, she also saw Jackson and two of the other perpetrators walking in the breezeway. She observed Jackson hide a shotgun in his pants and saw Jackson and the other men leave the apartment complex in a car.

Law enforcement officers who arrived at the scene took statements from Ruff, Robinson, Jones, and Verdell. Ruff, Robinson, and Jones each later identified Jackson in a photo lineup.

While Jackson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to his conviction for burglary, we find that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to authorize the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson was guilty of each of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

As to his burglary conviction specifically, Jackson argues that because he entered the apartment with the consent of its occupants, the State failed to prove that he entered "without authority." We disagree.

OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) provides that "[a] person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree when, without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, he or she enters or remains within an occupied, unoccupied, or vacant dwelling house of another[.]" Jones, who was residing at the apartment at the time of the incident, voluntarily admitted Jackson to the apartment. Lewis, who was seated near the door when Jackson knocked, did not protest Jackson’s entry. Jackson argues that because he and the others did not force their way into the apartment or enter after being denied permission, the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that Jackson entered the apartment without authority. See Bell v. State , 287 Ga. 670, 672-673 (1) (c), 697 S.E.2d 793 (2010) ; Thompson v. State , 271 Ga. 105, 106-108 (1), 519 S.E.2d 434 (1999).

However, despite the fact that Jackson was admitted to the apartment by Jones, he was a party to the crime of burglary because, after shooting Lewis, Jackson opened the apartment door to admit two of his companions who, along with Jackson and the others whom Jones let into the apartment, proceeded to ransack the apartment, steal drugs and money belonging to Jones, and hold both Jones and Robinson at gunpoint. The jury was authorized to find that Jackson did not have the authority to admit those two perpetrators into the apartment; therefore, their entry satisfied the element of entering without authority. As Jackson was a party to this act and the ensuing theft and other felonies committed inside the apartment, the evidence was sufficient to authorize his conviction for burglary. See Adams v. State , 271 Ga. 485, 485 (1), 521 S.E.2d 575 (1999) (evidence sufficient to support defendant’s burglary conviction where defendant’s accomplice entered residence without authority and committed a burglary to which defendant was party).

2. Jackson next argues that the trial court committed plain error when it issued inappropriate jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence, evidence of good character, and prior statements. We disagree.

OCGA § 17-8-58 (a) provides in relevant part that "[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate."

OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) further provides that a failure to object as specified in subsection (a) "preclude[s] appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties."

Jackson’s counsel did not raise an objection to the jury charges given by the trial court as contemplated by OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). Thus, we must determine whether the trial court committed plain error in giving any of the jury instructions now at issue. In the context of jury instruction errors, plain errors are remedied on appeal under the following four-part test:

First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of deviation from a legal rule—that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Kelly v. State , 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a), 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011). We consider each of Jackson’s enumerations in turn.

(a) Jackson first argues that the trial court committed plain error when it gave an erroneous instruction regarding circumstantial evidence, which did not include certain language Jackson requested regarding the State’s burden to exclude reasonable hypotheses other than guilt because the State’s case was based on circumstantial evidence. While we agree that the trial court’s denial of Jackson’s request for this instruction was erroneous, Jackson’s substantial rights were not affected, and it therefore did not amount to plain error.

The record reflects that Jackson’s trial counsel made a written request for the following instruction on circumstantial evidence: "To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proven facts must not only be consistent with the theory of guilt but also exclude every other reasonable theory other than the guilt of the...