Jackson v. United States

• Decision Date: 04 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 83-995.,83-995.
• Citation: 498 A.2d 185
• Parties: Edward A. JACKSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 185

498 A.2d 185

Edward A. JACKSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 83-995.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted April 25, 1985.

Decided September 4, 1985.

Matthew C. Leefer, appointed by the court, was on briefs for appellant.

Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., Michael W. Farrell, Judith Hetherton and R. Jeffrey Behm, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellee.

Before BELSON and ROGERS, Associate Judges, and REILLY, Chief Judge, Retired.

BELSON, Associate Judge.

Appellant was convicted by the trial court sitting without a jury of carrying a pistol without a license, D.C. Code § 22-3204 (1981), possession of an unregistered firearm, id. § 6-2311, and possession of ammunition without valid registration, id. § 6-2361 (amended 1983). He argues on appeal that he was deprived of his constitutional right to trial by jury because the trial court failed to inquire whether he wished to waive that right.¹ We agree and reverse.

Appellant was arraigned on an information charging him with commission of the aforementioned three offenses. He entered pleas of not guilty and demanded a jury trial. A hearing was held on his motion to suppress evidence regarding a loaded pistol that the police had found near him and seized at the time of his arrest. After receiving testimony from two police officers and from appellant, the court denied his motion. The court also denied appellant's request for certain preliminary rulings about the availability at trial of a defense of innocent possession.²

Appellant's counsel then requested a trial on stipulated facts. He and government counsel proceeded to stipulate that the arresting officers and appellant would all testify at trial precisely as they had at the motion hearing, that the pistol seized near appellant was operable and that appellant had neither a license to carry the pistol nor a firearm registration for it. The court, without conducting any inquiry of appellant, recited its understanding of the stipulation and rendered its verdict, finding appellant guilty of all three charges.

Entitlement to a trial by jury and the right to waive it are set forth in D.C. Code § 16-705 (1981) which, in relevant part, states:

(a) In a criminal case tried in the Superior Court in which, according to the Constitution of the United States, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial shall be by jury, unless the defendant in open court expressly waives trial by jury and requests trial by the court, and the court and the prosecuting officer consent thereto. In the case of a trial without a jury, the trial shall be by a single judge, whose verdict shall have the same force and effect as that of a jury.

(b) In any case where the defendant is not under the Constitution of the United States entitled to a trial by jury, the trial shall be by a single judge without a jury, except that if —

(1) the case involves an offense which is punishable by a fine or penalty or [sic] more than $300 or by imprisonment for more than ninety days (or for more than six months in the case of the offense of contempt of court), and

(2) the defendant demands a trial by jury and does not subsequently waive a trial by jury in accordance with sub-section (a), the trial shall be by jury. Additionally, Super.Ct.Crim.R. 23(a) provides that:

Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant in open court orally and in writing waives a jury trial with the approval of the Court and the consent of the prosecuting officer.

Proper application of the statute and the rule prompts a dual inquiry. First, it must be determined whether a criminal charge is such as to entitle defendant to a jury trial. If the defendant is so entitled, the second question is whether he entered a valid waiver of that right. We proceed to address each of these inquiries in turn.

The grant of jury trial is a fundamental right. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1451-52, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). Its purpose is to prevent the possibility of governmental oppression.³ Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1890, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970) (plurality opinion); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56, 88 S.Ct. at 1450-51; Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31, 85 S.Ct. 783, 788, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965). The Constitution twice guarantees the right to trial by jury. Art. III, § 2, cl. 3 provides that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . . ." Also, the Sixth Amendment directs that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. . . ." The Supreme Court has declared, however, that "the right of trial by jury . . . does not extend to every criminal proceeding." District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624, 57 S.Ct. 660, 661, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937). "So-called petty offenses were tried without juries both in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt from the comprehensive language" of the jury trial provisions of the Constitution. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160, 88 S.Ct. at 1453; Cheff Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 1525, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966); Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624, 57 S.Ct. at 661; District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 72-73, 51 S.Ct. 52, 53, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68-71, 24 S.Ct. 826, 827-28, 49 L.Ed. 99 (1904); see Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 1307, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888). Only those offenses deemed so serious as to rise to the level of crime within the meaning of Art. III and the Sixth Amendment entitle the accused to the benefit of a jury trial prescribed therein. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 625, 57 S.Ct. at 662; Colts, 282 U.S. at 72-73, 51 S.Ct. at 53; Schick, 195 U.S. at 69-70, 24 S.Ct. at 827.

In light of this distinction between petty and serious infractions the Court has endeavored to draw a line in the spectrum of crime, separating the two categories. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68, 90 S.Ct. at 1887; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160-61, 88 S.Ct. at 1453. The Court has evaluated the nature of the offense, Colts, 282 U.S. at 73, 51 S.Ct. at 53, as well as the severity of the penalty authorized, Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159, 88 S.Ct. at 1452; Clawans, 300 U.S. at 625, 57 S.Ct. at 662, in determining whether a particular offense is so serious as to require a jury trial. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. at 1888 n. 6; Schick, 195 U.S. at 68, 24 S.Ct. at 826; see Gaithor v. United States, 251 A.2d 644, 645 (D.C. 1969). In Baldwin the Court pronounced that the most relevant criterion in deciding whether an offense is petty or serious is the severity of the maximum authorized punishment. 399 U.S. at 68, 90 S.Ct. at 1887. The Court there held that a potential sentence in excess of 6 months' imprisonment is sufficiently severe to take the offense out of the category of petty and to render it triable by jury. Id. at 69, 90 S.Ct. at 1888; cf. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476, 95 S.Ct. 2178, 2190, 45 L.Ed.2d 319 (1975) ("In determining the boundary between petty and serious contempts for purposes of applying the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee . . . a punishment of more than six months in prison could not be ordered without making a jury trial available to the defendant. . . .")

Applying these teachings to the case at bar, it is clear that none of the offenses with which appellant was charged was "petty", as that term has been construed by the Supreme Court. The maximum potential sentence of imprisonment for the offense of carrying a pistol without a license is 1 year. D.C.Code § 22-3204, -3215 (1981). The same penalty is prescribed for the offenses of possession of an unregistered firearm and possession of ammunition without valid registration. Id. § 6-2376. Under Baldwin, therefore, appellant's case was one "in which, according to the Constitution of the United States, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial. . . ." D.C.Code § 16-705(a). Thus, we now turn to the question whether appellant properly waived his right to trial by jury, pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-705(a) and Super.Ct.Crim.R. 23(a).

Trial by jury is the constitutionally preferred method of disposing of criminal cases. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253, 263, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930). Nevertheless, the right to such a trial is one which the accused has the power to waive not only in the case of a petty offense, id. at 308, 50 S.Ct. at 261; Schick, 195 U.S. at 67, 71-72, 24 S.Ct. at 828, but also in one involving a serious crime, Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158, 88 S.Ct. at 1452; Singer, 380 U.S. at 33-34, 85 S.Ct. at 789; Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277-78, 63 S.Ct. 236, 240-41, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942); Patton, 281 U.S. at 298, 312, 50 S.Ct. at 258, 263; Eliachar v. United States, 229 A.2d 451, 452 (D.C.1967); United States v. Martin, 81 A.2d 651, 653 (1951). "[S]ince trial by jury confers burdens as well as benefits, an accused should be permitted to forego its privileges when his competent judgment counsels him that his interests are safer in the keeping of the judge than of the jury."⁴ Adams, 317 U.S. at 278, 63 S.Ct. at 241. with respect to waiver of jury trial).

So important, however, is the right to trial by jury that certain safeguards must attend its waiver. Singer, 380 U.S. at 34. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a waiver of the right to jury trial is effective only if it is the product of "the express and intelligent consent of the defendant."⁵ Patton, 281 U.S. at 312, 50 S.Ct. at 263; Adams, 317 U.S. at 277-78, 63 S.Ct. at 240-41. "And whether or not there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case." Adams, 317...