Jacksonville Roofing & Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Local Union No. 435, Sheet Metal Workers' Intern. Ass'n of Jacksonville, E-283

• Citation: 156 So.2d 416
• Decision Date: 19 September 1963
• Docket Number: No. E-283,E-283
• Parties: 54 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2405, 48 Lab.Cas. P 50,919 JACKSONVILLE ROOFING AND SHEET METAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, a corporation, Appellant, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 435, SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF JACKSONVILLE, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 416

156 So.2d 416

54 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2405, 48 Lab.Cas. P 50,919

JACKSONVILLE ROOFING AND SHEET METAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, a corporation, Appellant, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 435, SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF JACKSONVILLE, Appellee.

No. E-283.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Sept. 19, 1963.

Austin, Basford & Millar, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Edwin C. Coffed, Jacksonville, for appellee.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Judge.

The plaintiff, an employers' association, has appealed from an order entered by the Circuit Court for Duval County dismissing without prejudice its suit for a declaratory decree construing a collective bargaining agreement its members had entered into with the defendant labor union.

The crucial question before us on this appeal is whether the Circuit Court properly dismissed the suit in view of an article of the said agreement setting up a procedure for settling the grievances of either party arising out of the interpretation or enforcement of the agreement.

On or about July 1, 1961, the members of the plaintiff association and the defendant union signed a collective bargaining agreement. Section 1, Article VI, of the agreement contained the schedule of hourly wage rates, including a 20-cent hourly increase effective July 1, 1963, 10 cents of which would be used toward the establishment of a welfare fund. In a provision immediately following this wage schedule, the parties agreed that during the first two years of the agreement they would study and investigate, separately and jointly, the feasibility of the establishment of the proposed welfare fund; that, in the event both parties decided that such establishment was not feasible, the 10 cents set aside for that purpose would instead go into the wage scale.

Subsequent to the signing of this agreement the parties thereto met independently and jointly on the subject of the proposed welfare fund but reached opposite conclusions, the employers concluding that the fund was not feasible and the union finding that it was feasible and demanding that the fund be established.

On June 28, 1963, three days before the 20-cent wage raise was to become effective under the agreement, the plaintiff filed in the Circuit Court the instant suit seeking a judicial declaration construing the said agreement and decreeing the rights and obligations of the parties in respect to the establishment of a welfare fund. In its complaint the plaintiff stated that each of its members was agreeable, as of July 1, 1963, to pay 10 cents of the 20 cent per hour increase into the trust department of a certain bank to be held in trust subject to disposition in accordance with the decree of the court; that is, if the court should hold that the establishment of the welfare fund is feasible, the trust money would be paid to the trustees of the welfare fund when established; but, if the welfare fund should be held to be not feasible, the trust money would be paid to the respective employees.

In its answer to the complaint the defendant labor union says that, as appears from the face of the complaint, the agreement between the parties, in Article VIII thereof, 'provides for complete and adequate procedures to be followed by the parties for the final and binding settlement of disputes arising out of interpretation or enforcement of said agreement and that such procedures are now pending, the defendant having appealed the instant dispute to the Local Joint Adjustment Board pursuant to Section 2 of said Article VIII of said agreement.'

Article VIII of the collective bargaining agreement provides in Section 1 that grievances of the employer or the union 'arising out of interpretation or enforcement of this Agreement' shall be settled between the employer and the duly authorized representative of the union 'if possible.' Section 2 provides that grievances not settled in accordance with Section 1 may be appealed by either party to the Local Joint Adjustment Board in the area in which the work is performed, which board shall meet promptly but in no more than seven days following the request for its services, 'to render a final and binding determination, except as provided below.' The said board shall consist of an equal number of representatives of the union and of the local employers' association, and both sides shall cast an equal number of votes at each meeting.

Section 3, Article VIII, of the collective bargaining agreement provides that grievances not settled as provided in Section 2 because of a deadlock between the parties to the Local Joint Adjustment Board or because of its failure to act, may be appealed by either party to a panel consisting of one representative chosen by the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association and one chosen by the employer involved. The said panel shall meet promptly, but in no more than seven days following the request for its services, to render a final and binding determination 'except as provided below.' Section 4 of Article VIII provides that grievances not settled as provided in Section 3 because of a deadlock between the parties to the panel, may be appealed by either party to the National Joint Adjustment Board, as established by the aforementioned international association and a national contractors' association.

The above provisions in Article VIII of the collective bargaining agreement form the basis for the chancellor's ruling in the final order appealed from, dismissing the plaintiff's cause. The chancellor stated in the order that it appeared to the court that the said Article VIII 'embodies a complete procedure, agreed upon by the parties, for the interpretation of Section 1 of Article VI of that agreement * * *.' He further found that the parties had been utilizing the procedure in Article VIII 'for some months before this case was filed,' were still utilizing it when the case was filed, 'and will continue to utilize it until 'final and binding determination' unless this court prevents them from doing so by assuming jurisdiction in this case.' In his order the chancellor further stated that, if Section 1 of Article VI of the agreement should be construed to require the establishment of a welfare fund, it appeared to the court that 'the mechanics thereof can better be prescribed by the representatives of the contending parties designated in Article VIII than by this court.' Then the chancellor gave the following as his reason for declining to assume jurisdiction and render a declaratory decree:

'This court could properly assume jurisdiction in this case, but, under those circumstances, conceives that it should exercise its judicial discretion to leave the contending parties to the procedure ...