Miami Ass'n of Firefighters Local 587 of the Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters of Miami v. City of Miami

• Decision Date: 25 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. 3D11–748.,3D11–748.
• Citation: 87 So.3d 93
• Parties: MIAMI ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL 587 of the International Association of Firefighters of Miami, Florida, Appellant, v. The CITY OF MIAMI, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

87 So.3d 93

MIAMI ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL 587 of the International Association of Firefighters of Miami, Florida, Appellant,

v.The CITY OF MIAMI, Appellee.

No. 3D11–748.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 25, 2012.

Phillips, Richard & Rind and Kathleen Phillips; Bruce S. Rogow, Fort Lauderdale; Richard A. Sicking, for appellant.

Julie O. Bru, City Attorney, John A. Greco, Assistant City Attorney, and Warren Brittner, Deputy City Attorney, for appellee.

Before RAMIREZ, SUAREZ and ROTHENBERG, JJ.

SUAREZ, J.

The Miami Association of Firefighters Local 587 (“Firefighters' Union”) appeals an order granting a motion to dismiss in favor of the City of Miami (“the City”). We affirm the trial court's order.

On October 23, 2009, the Firefighters' Union and the City entered into an agreement to provide for wages, fringe benefits and other terms of employment. Paragraph 18.18 of the agreement provided that the City knowingly and intelligently “waives its right not to fund any year of the agreement.” The agreement provides:

The city hereby knowingly, intelligently, and unequivocally waives its right not to fund any year of this agreement. The only exception to this waiver is in the case of a “true fiscal emergency,” which is unanticipated at this time.

In order for the City to establish “a true fiscal emergency” so as to lawfully not fund any year or years of this agreement, the City must demonstrate that there is no other reasonable alternative means of appropriating monies to fund the agreement for that year or years.

An exception under the waiver in the agreement exists in the case of a “true fiscal emergency.” On April 30, 2010, the City wrote to the Firefighters' Union, claiming that a financial emergency required modification of the agreement. On August 31, 2010, the City unilaterally took action to modify downward wages, insurance, pension, and other Firefighters' benefits. The Firefighters' Union brought a complaint against the City for declaratory and injunctive relief on constitutional grounds. The Firefighters claim that the City violated the Firefighters' collective bargaining rights guaranteed by Article I, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution by not following the procedures of sections 447.403, 447.4095, Florida Statutes (2010), and by conducting a shade meeting in violationof section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2010), the Sunshine law. The trial court dismissed the action, ruling that the Public Employees Relation Commission (“PERC”) preempted the circuit court from hearing the issues raised. This appeal by the Firefighters' Union follows.

The Firefighters' Union alleges in its Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief that “despite the provisions of Section 447.4095 and the statutory procedures under Section 447.403 ... the City unilaterally took action to modify downward wages, insurance, pension benefits and other benefits.” In other words, the Firefighters' Union claims that, by acting unilaterally and not following the statutory requirements of sections 447.4095 and 447.403, the City abridged the Union's constitutionally guaranteed right of collective bargaining. The Firefighters' Union bases its allegations on the fact that the City unilaterally adopted a resolution that modified certain wages, healthcare and pension benefits, effective September 30, 2010. This was done in contravention of the statutory requirement that, in the event of a financial urgency, the City was required to hold a meeting between the chief executive officer or representative, and the bargaining agent or representative to negotiate the impact of the financial urgency.¹ The statutes further require that, in the event the dispute was not resolved within fourteen days, an impasse shall have been deemed to have occurred and, after declaration in writing, a mediator appointed to assist in resolution of the impasse.² Clearly, this was not done in this situation.

The issue presented on appeal is whether a violation of the requirements and procedures under the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those provided in Florida statutes creates an issue within the jurisdiction of the circuit court prior to being heard by PERC. We agree with the trial court that it does not.

The weight of authority holds that, before resorting to the courts, “one must pursue and exhaust any extra judicial or administrative remedy which may provide the relief sought.” City of Miami v. Fraternal Order of Police, 378 So.2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); accord., Kaufman v. Machiedo, 357 So.2d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Koenig v. Tyler, 360 So.2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Fredericks v. Sch. Bd. of Monroe Cty., 307 So.2d 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Jacksonville Roofing & Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Local Union No. 435, 156 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). As held by the Supreme Court in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965), actions for breach of collective bargaining agreements may not be maintained unless the complaining employee or his union first attempts and exhibits the “use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress.” PERC governs the Collective Bargaining Agreement before us and requires submission of all unresolved issues to an appointed mediator or special magistrate. See§ 447.403. Therefore, we hold that affirmance of the trial court's order is mandated here. Commc'n Workers of Am. v. Indian River Sch. Bd., 888 So.2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that labor union cannot bypass PERC's jurisdiction where failure to follow collective bargaining process is alleged and school board unilaterally...