Jacobs v. Sec'y Florida Dep't of Corr., Case No. 2:08-cv-786-FtM-29SPC

• Decision Date: 02 February 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:08-cv-786-FtM-29SPC
• Parties: SHEDDRICK JACOBS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

SHEDDRICK JACOBS, Petitioner,

v. SECRETARY FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OFCORRECTIONS and FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents.

Case No. 2:08-cv-786-FtM-29SPC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

Dated: February 2, 2012

OPINION AND ORDER

I.

Petitioner Sheddrick Jacobs¹ initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 9, 2008 and Memorandum of Law,² challenging his state court judgment of conviction entered in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in Lee County Florida (case number 04-16553) for: (count one) giving a false name by an arrested person; (count two) driving with a suspended or revoked license; and, (count three) possessionof a firearm by a convicted felon.³ Petition at 1; Exh. 8. Petitioner is proceeding on his Amended Petition (Doc. #9, Amended Petition) and Amended Memorandum of Law (Doc. #12, Memorandum). The Amended Petition sets forth the following grounds for relief:

Ground 1

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of Petitioner's vehicle and failing to call an exculpatory witness at a suppression hearing.

Ground 2

Prosecutorial Misconduct during closing argument when prosecutor made an inference about Petitioner's knowledge of the weapon in the car because he was the only person in the car and/or Ineffective Assistance of Appellate counsel for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal.

Ground 3

Due Process violated by a confusing Jury Instruction on "knowledge" of possession of firearm.

Ground 4

Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise claim of prosecutorial misconduct stemming from the prosecutor questioning Petitioner about past crimes committed.

See Amended Petition, Memorandum. Respondent filed a Response (Doc. #19, Response) in opposition to the Amended Petition and filed exhibits (Doc. #22, Exhs. 1-14) consisting of the trial courtand post-conviction records. Petitioner filed an unsigned, Reply (Doc. #20, Reply), addressing the Response to Ground One only.

This Court has carefully reviewed the record and, for the reasons set forth below, concludes no evidentiary proceedings are required in this Court. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (2007). Petitioner does not proffer any evidence that would require an evidentiary hearing, Chandler v. McDonough, 471 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 2006), and the Court finds that the pertinent facts of the case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474; Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004). This matter is ripe for review.

II. Applicable § 2254 Law

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), governs this action. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). Under AEDPA, the standard of review is greatly circumscribed and highly deferential to the state courts. Alston v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 610 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2010)(citations omitted). AEDPA altered the federal court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possibleunder law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). The following legal principles apply to this case.

A. Only Federal Claims are Cognizable

A federal court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus from a person in state custody pursuant to a state court judgment only on the grounds that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A claimed violation of state law is insufficient to warrant review or relief by a federal court under § 2254. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)(stating "[a] federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law."); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)(stating "[t]oday, we reemphasize that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions."); Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S. Ct. 823, 832 n.5 (2009)(same); Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)(stating that § 2254 was not enacted to enforce state-created rights); Carrizales v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 1983)(finding claim involving pure question of state law does not raise issue of constitutional dimension for federal habeas corpus purposes; state's interpretation of its own laws or rules provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, since no question of a constitutional nature is involved).

B. Federal Claim Must Be Exhausted in State Court

A § 2254 application cannot be granted unless a petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This imposes a "total exhaustion" requirement in which all of the federal issues must have first been presented to the state courts. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). "Exhaustion requires that state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process. That is, to properly exhaust a claim, the petitioner must fairly present every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review." Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2010)(citing O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) and Castile v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)).

To fairly present a claim, a petitioner must present the same federal claim to the state court that he urges the federal court to consider. A mere citation to the federal constitution in a state court proceeding is insufficient for purposes of exhaustion. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1983). "'[T]he exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas applicant to do more than scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record.'" McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotingKelley v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004)).

"The teeth of the exhaustion requirement comes from its handmaiden, the procedural default doctrine." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the procedural default doctrine, "[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, . . . . . " Smith, 256 F.3d at 1138. A procedural default for failing to exhaust state court remedies will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice" resulting from the asserted error. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006); Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). Second, under exceptional circumstances, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim, even without a showing of cause and prejudice, if such review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. House, 547 U.S. at 536; Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).

C. Deference to State Court Decision

A federal court must afford a high level of deference to the state court's decision. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Habeas relief may not be granted with respect toa claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2010). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008); Ferguson, 527 F.3d at 1146; Wright v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2002). When the last state court rendering judgment affirms without explanation, the Court presumes that it rests on the reasons given in the last reasoned decision. Powell v. Allen, 602 F.3d 1263, 1268 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010)(citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-05 (1991)).

"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). A state court decision can be deemed "contrary to" the Supreme Court's clearly established precedents within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) only if: (1) the state court applies a rule thatcontradicts the governing law as set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state court confronts a set of facts that is "materially indistinguishable" from those in a decision of the Supreme Court and yet arrives at a different result. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003). It is not mandatory for a state court decision to cite, or even to be aware of, the relevant Supreme Court precedents, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result . . . contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16.

A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedent if the state court correctly...