Jacobs v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 July 2020
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO. 3:19-cv-1167 DRL-MGG
• Citation: 474 F.Supp.3d 987
• Parties: Adrian JACOBS, Plaintiff, v. THOR MOTOR COACH, INC. and Ford Motor Company, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

474 F.Supp.3d 987

Adrian JACOBS, Plaintiff,

v.THOR MOTOR COACH, INC. and Ford Motor Company, Defendants.

CAUSE NO. 3:19-cv-1167 DRL-MGG

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

Signed July 23, 2020

Ronald L. Burdge, Burdge Law Office Co. LPA, Dayton, OH, for Plaintiff.

Trevor Q. Gasper, Thor Industries Inc., Elkhart, IN, for Defendant Thor Motor Coach, Inc.

Jeremiah J. Wood, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Columbus, OH, for Defendant Ford Motor Company.

OPINION & ORDER

Damon R. Leichty, Judge

This case presents warranty and contract claims from alleged defects in a recreational vehicle. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss all claims. The company says Adrian Jacobs failed to file a timely claim. On this record of pleading, the court denies Thor's motion under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

BACKGROUND

The court assumes the truth of the amended complaint's well-pleaded allegations for this motion. On April 13, 2017, Mr. Jacobs purchased a 2017 Thor Outlaw 37RB recreational vehicle from North Trail RV Center, a Thor-authorized dealership. North Trail sold the RV under a retail installment contract, and Thor warranted to repair and replace defects.

The warranty was memorialized in a written contract that Mr. Jacobs alleges he never read, signed, or ratified, but that allegation has already been foreclosed (as it turns out here) by a prior Florida state court decision finding that Mr. Jacobs both relied on the warranty and signed an acknowledgement that he received, read, and agreed to its terms. Point in fact, he has likewise relied on that warranty for his claims here.

The written warranty (ECF 13-2) covered the RV for a period of 12 months after its delivery or after the RV had been driven for 15,000 miles, whichever occurred first. It contained a forum selection clause, requiring that any action be filed in Indiana, and a choice of law clause, stating that Indiana law governs any dispute. It likewise contained a provision saying that any claim for its breach must be commenced within 15 months after the breach occurred.

Mr. Jacobs says the RV didn't conform to Thor's warranty or representations. To remedy the defects, he took the RV to the shop for warranty repairs at least three times. By September 2019, the RV had been there well over 400 days. Mr. Jacobs notified Thor of the defects and of the failed repair attempts by the company's authorized repair facilities. He requested his money back for the purchase. Thor declined.

On June 20, 2019, Mr. Jacobs filed suit in Florida state court alleging claims for state law breaches of warranty and contract and violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. Thor filed a motion to dismiss based on the warranty's forum selection clause. In November 2019, the Florida state court granted the motion without prejudice, allowing him leave to refile in the Northern District of Indiana. When he did, he again alleged breaches of the warranty and contract and violations of the MMWA.

Although agreeing that this suit should be treated as if it had been filed on June 20, 2019 (the date the Florida court action was commenced), Thor views Mr. Jacobs’ claims as untimely based on the warranty provision that requires any suit to be brought within 15 months of its breach. Because Thor's opening motion to dismiss the original complaint became moot upon the amended complaint's filing, the court addresses only the second motion to dismiss filed on March 24, 2020.

STANDARD

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc. , 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement must contain enough factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim, not a speculative one. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim must be plausible, not probable. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. , 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). Whether a claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." McCauley v. City of Chicago , 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense; a complaint need not anticipate or plead against it. See Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. , 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of a statute of limitations defense "may be appropriate when the plaintiff effectively pleads [himself] out of court by alleging facts that are sufficient to establish the defense." Hollander v. Brown , 457 F.3d 688, 691 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006).

Generally, if a party attaches evidence outside the pleadings in a motion to dismiss, "the court must either convert [the motion] into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 ... or exclude the documents attached to the motion to dismiss and continue under Rule 12." 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc. , 300 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Levenstein v. Salafsky , 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998) ). There is a narrow exception: a Rule 12(b)(6) motion can rest on critical documents, central to the claim and referred to in the complaint. Geinosky v. City of Chicago , 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) ; 188 LLC , 300 F.3d at 735.

This allowance applies particularly in cases of contractual interpretation, Levenstein , 164 F.3d at 347, and to matters of public record, Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp. , 128 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (7th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the court may rely on the limited warranty (ECF 13-2) and the previous Florida state court judgment and briefing (ECF 13-4; ECF 13-5) without converting this motion to one for summary judgment. Indeed, both parties rely on the state court judgment. The court excludes only Celina Tyler's affidavit and Adrian Jacobs’ affidavits.

DISCUSSION

This case presents one overarching issue: whether this action was timely filed under the applicable statute of limitations. Thor, relying on Indiana's statute of limitations, says no. Mr. Jacobs, relying on Florida's statute of limitations, says yes. Indiana and Florida have different statutes of limitations. Indiana allows a party to shorten the period of limitations contractually in the sale of goods from four years to one year; Florida doesn't. Compare Ind. Code § 26-1-2-725(1) with Fla. Stat. § 95.03. The court thus turns first to choice of law.

A. Under the Choice of Law Analysis, Indiana's Statute of Limitations Applies to this Case.

Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts in diversity cases or any case where state law supplies the rule of decision must apply state "substantive" law but federal "procedural" law, Gacek v. Am. Airlines, Inc. , 614 F.3d 298, 301-02 (7th Cir. 2010) ; see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78-79, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), though that distinction has never been considered one so simple, see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities , 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) ; Hanna v. Plumer , 380 U.S. 460, 471, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) ; Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York , 326 U.S. 99, 109-10, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945).

Thankfully, federal courts have blazed the trail already for statutes of limitations and choice-of-law rules—deeming both "substantive" from a federal perspective, no matter whether a state might characterize its own law differently. See Jinks v. Richland County , 538 U.S. 456, 464-65, 123 S.Ct. 1667, 155 L.Ed.2d 631 (2003). Thus, statutes of limitations, and any rules that are an "integral part of the statute of limitations, such as tolling and equitable estoppel," are part of the forum state's substantive law. Hollander v. Brown , 457 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2006) ; see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. , 446 U.S. 740, 752-53, 100 S.Ct. 1978, 64 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980).

Substantive law also includes a state's rules on conflicts of law—which state law applies to a dispute. A federal court "does not necessarily apply the substantive law of the forum state; rather, it applies the choice-of-law rules of the forum state to determine which state's substantive law applies." Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Websolv Computing, Inc. , 580 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. , 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941) ); accord Ruckman v. Pinecrest Marina, Inc. , 367 F. Supp. 25, 26 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (Sharp, J.). The court must consequently apply Indiana's choice-of-law rules to determine which state's law applies here—Indiana or Florida.

States retain the right to adopt the choice-of-law rules they want without denying full faith and credit to any foreign substantive right. See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co. , 345 U.S. 514, 516, 73 S.Ct. 856, 97 L.Ed. 1211 (1953). Indiana has chosen to view its statute of limitations as a procedural constraint on when a suit may be filed, see Kissel v. Rosenbaum , 579 N.E.2d 1322, 1326-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), so "the law of the forum state where the suit is filed" governs the statute of limitations under Indiana's choice-of-law rules, see Smither v. Asset Acceptance, LLC , 919 N.E.2d 1153, 1157-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

That is to say Indiana law governs the statute of limitations here.

Indiana's choice endures even when the parties contractually agree to apply the substantive law of another state because Indiana characterizes its time bar as procedural, unless the parties include in their contract a stipulation that another state's statute of limitations...