Jakeman v. Lawrence Grp. Mgmt. Co.
Decision Date | 21 March 2014 |
Docket Number | 1111018. |
Citation | 151 So.3d 1083 |
Parties | Kenneth JAKEMAN v. LAWRENCE GROUP MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Abbey Herrin, Birmingham, for appellant.
Michael H. Johnson of Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose LLP, Birmingham, for appellees Lawrence Group Management Co. and Montgomery Memorial Cemetery.
Kenneth Jakeman (“Kenneth”) appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing his claims against defendants Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC (“Lawrence”), Montgomery Memorial Cemetery (“MMC”), and Judy A. Jones (“Judy”).1 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This is the second time this case has come before this Court. In Jakeman v. Lawrence Group Management Co., 82 So.3d 655 (Ala.2011) (“Jakeman I ”), the Court succinctly summarized most of the facts and much of the key procedural history:
82 So.3d at 656–57 (footnotes omitted).
On August 24, 2010, Kenneth filed a “Memorandum of Law” in which he sought to explain to the trial court why he believed he had standing to pursue his claims. On October 14, 2010, Kenneth filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion seeking to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's dismissal order. Simultaneously, Kenneth filed a third amended complaint in his individual capacity and on behalf of the estate of Frances O'Neal.2 The complaint reiterated Kenneth's individual claim of breach of contract, it asserted a breach-of-contract claim on behalf of the estate of Frances O'Neal, and it stated a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief; the complaint did not allege any tort claims.
On September 9, 2010, Robert Jakeman, Kenneth's brother and the personal representative of Ben Jakeman's estate, purported to sell the rights to the Jakeman burial plot back to MMC for $4,000. He also purported to relinquish all rights thereto and waived any claims the estate of Ben Jakeman had or could have against MMC or against Lawrence.
On October 29, 2010, the trial court entered an order specifically denying only Kenneth's motion to alter, amend, or vacate. On November 29, 2010, the trial court entered an “Amended Order” reiterating its dismissal of all of Kenneth's claims but ordering that “all cross-claims filed by Judy ... are NOT DISMISSED and shall remain pending.” Kenneth filed a notice of appeal on that same date.
On October 7, 2011, this Court released its decision in Jakeman I. In Jakeman I, this Court noted that the trial court's order dismissing all claims asserted by both Kenneth and Judy did not become effective until it was entered by the clerk on September 17, 2010. At that time, Judy's previously premature motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment was deemed to be filed, giving the trial court 90 days to rule on her motion. The trial court ruled on her motion through its November 29, 2010, “Amended Order” which stated that Judy's cross-claims remained pending against the other defendants. The Jakeman I Court concluded that because undisposed claims remained in the action and the trial court had not entered a Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., order, Kenneth had appealed from a nonfinal judgment. Accordingly, this Court dismissed Kenneth's appeal.
On February 27, 2012, Kenneth filed in the trial court a motion seeking to have the judgment against him certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b), which the trial court granted on April 9, 2012. Kenneth again appeals.
The defendants3 grounded their motion to dismiss on three bases: (1) Kenneth's alleged lack of “standing”; (2) the abatement of Kenneth's tort claims; and (3) the time-bar created by the applicable statutes of limitations. As we noted in the rendition of the facts from Jakeman I, the trial court based its dismissal on a purported lack of standing. On appeal, Kenneth makes no argument in an effort to redeem the tort claims asserted by him in his original and first amended complaint. He appears to have relinquished those claims; therefore, we need not address the abatement issue. We thus turn to the other two issues listed above.
Although both sides label the first issue before us as one of “standing,” in reality it is merely one of whether Kenneth has stated a cause of action, i.e., whether he has alleged a set of facts that, if true, will entitle him to relief under Alabama law. See Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ P. “[O]ur courts too often have fallen into the trap of treating as an issue of ‘standing’ that which is merely a failure to state a cognizable cause of action or legal theory, or a failure to satisfy [an] element of a cause of action.” Wyeth, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 42 So.3d 1216, 1219 (Ala.2010). Compare, e.g., Steele v. Federal Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 69 So.3d 89, 91 n. 2 (Ala.2010) ( ). In Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, [Ms. 1110373, Sept. 13, 2013] 159 So.3d 31 (Ala.2013), this Court recently noted that the concept of standing was developed by the federal courts for use in public-law actions involving challenges to the actions of public officials and agencies. We quoted 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531 (3d ed.2008), for the explanation that in private-law cases such questions as whether “ ‘the present plaintiff is ... entitled to a remedy’ ” is “ ‘better addressed through private-law concepts' ” such as “ ‘cause-of-action, real-party-in-interest, capacity, intervention, and like...
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