Whitehead v. Hester

• Decision Date: 27 March 1987
• Docket Number: Nos. 85-526,85-529,s. 85-526
• Citation: 512 So.2d 1297
• Parties: Jack Randall WHITEHEAD and Mae M. Whitehead v. Walston HESTER, Jewell Hester, and T.E. Farned. CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. Walston HESTER, Jewell Hester, and T.E. Farned.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1297

512 So.2d 1297

Jack Randall WHITEHEAD and Mae M. Whitehead v. Walston HESTER, Jewell Hester, and T.E. Farned.

CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. Walston HESTER, Jewell Hester, and T.E. Farned.

Nos. 85-526, 85-529.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 27, 1987.

Rehearing Denied May 15, 1987.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

Aug. 21, 1987.

Roger H. Bedford, Sr., of Bedford, Bedford & Rogers, Russellville, for appellants Whitehead.

Jerry C. Porch, Russellville, and J. Robert Fleenor of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, for appellant Champion Intern. Corp.

Joe Fine and David Neal of Fine & Associates, Russellville, for appellees.

MADDOX, Justice.

Walston Hester, Jewell Hester, and T.E. Farned (hereinafter "Hester and Farned") filed a bill to quiet title to a mineral interest in land located in Franklin County against Jack Randall Whitehead, and May M. Whitehead ("the Whiteheads") and Champion International Corporation ("Champion"). The Whiteheads and Champion filed motions to dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court overruled the motions to dismiss. The Whiteheads and Champion then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court also denied.

The trial court conducted a hearing at which certain stipulations of fact were made and certain documentary evidence and exhibits were admitted. There was no oral testimony. The trial court held, after consideration of the pleadings, testimony, exhibits, and stipulations, that a deed existed which conveyed a separate mineral estate to a grantee other than the owner of the surface estate; that, through various conveyances that mineral interest came to Hester and Farned; and that paramount legal title to the minerals was vested in Hester and Farned. The trial court further found from the evidence that Hester and Farned and their predecessors in interest had held exclusive title to the subject mineral interest since the conveyance of that interest by a quitclaim deed in 1892. The Whiteheads and Champion filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, which was overruled. The Whiteheads and Champion each appealed. We affirm.

The subject land is located in the Southwest 1/4 (SW 1/4) of Section 32, Township 8 South, Range 15 West, Franklin County, Alabama. The parties derive their respective claims of title to the minerals under two separate chains of title which do not emanate from a common grantor and which are not traced back to a patent from the United States. The land was conveyed by the United States to Elijah Bullen by patent dated December 9, 1844, but a break in each party's chain of title exists, because in 1890, a fire destroyed the courthouse in which land records were maintained in Franklin County. See Appendix A for a diagram of the separate chains of title.

Hester and Farned claim ownership of the mineral interest in the subject property by virtue of a direct and unbroken chain of conveyances commencing in 1892. The original conveyance, a quitclaim deed, dated October 7, 1892, from Sheffield Land, Iron & Coal Company ("Sheffield") to John C. Cheney is the first documentary evidence The Whiteheads and Champion trace their surface ownership through a chain of conveyances commencing with a warranty deed from W.H. Tipton and wife to J.A. Thorn, dated October 27, 1906, which was 14 years after the initial quitclaim deed conveying the mineral interest to Hester and Farned's predecessor. The Whiteheads and Champion (and their predecessors in interest) have assessed and paid taxes for various periods of time from the initial acquisition of their surface chain of title in 1906. Taxes were paid on the subject property from 1906 to 1915 and from 1926 until the time suit was filed, but no separate assessment was made for the mineral estate.

                in the record which shows a transfer of the subject properties or the mineral estate therein following the destruction by fire of all records of title maintained in Franklin County in 1890.  The quitclaim deed from Sheffield to Cheney was made in consideration of payment by Cheney of several hundred thousand dollars and specifically covered "the mineral interest [owned by Sheffield in the] SW  1/4 of Section 32;  [other described lands] ... all in Township 8 Range 15."   Each successive deed in Hester and Farned's chain of title following this conveyance was recorded in Franklin or Colbert County, although some of the conveyances were filed of record many years after they were executed, and each succeeding conveyance transfers the subject mineral estate.  (Appendix A shows the date of recordation of each conveyance).  Hester and Farned, and those through whom they claim, did not assess or pay taxes on the mineral interest claimed by them until 1980.  Since 1980, Hester and Farned have assessed to them and paid twice the taxes on the mineral interest claimed
                

The issues raised by the Whiteheads and Champion on appeal are: (1) whether the trial court erred when it failed to grant the motions to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment; (2) whether the trial court erred in finding that a separate mineral estate existed, and that legal title to the minerals was vested in Hester and Farned; and (3) whether the trial court erred in not holding that Hester and Farned were barred by the rule of repose.

As earlier stated, the trial court decided this action based upon the pleadings, stipulations, documentary evidence, and exhibits, and no oral testimony was taken; consequently, the ore tenus rule is not applicable in this case, and findings of fact made by the trial court are not entitled to the traditional presumption of correctness which is available when the trial court hears oral testimony and observes the witnesses. Home Indemnity Co. v. Reed Equipment Co., 381 So.2d 45 (Ala.1980); Perdue v. Roberts, 294 Ala. 194, 314 So.2d 280 (1975). We must consider the evidence anew and render a judgment in light of the evidence and the applicable legal principles. Perdue v. Roberts, supra.

It is well settled law in this state that a dismissal for failure to state a claim is properly granted only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Rule 12(b), Ala.R.Civ.P.; Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So.2d 669 (Ala.1985). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, this Court resolves all doubts in favor of the plaintiff. Rice v. United Ins. Co. of America, 465 So.2d 1100 (Ala.1984).

A summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P.; Whitehead v. Davison Oil Co., 352 So.2d 1339 (Ala.1977).

I

The parties disagree on the nature of the action filed by Hester and Farned, which they styled as one seeking injunctive relief and a declaration concerning the ownership of the mineral interests underlying the property situated in Franklin County. The Whiteheads and Champion contend that this was an action to quiet title under the provisions of the Grove Act, Code 1975, § 6-6-560, et seq., and that Hester and Farned failed to allege and prove that they came within the provisions of that statute.

Hester and Farned claim that the argument by the Whiteheads and Champion concerning the applicability of the Grove Act is raised for the first time on appeal, but they answer the argument regarding the applicability of the Grove Act by contending that their complaint is not governed by the provisions of the Grove Act.

In any event, there is only one form of action in Alabama, known as a "civil action," in which all claims between the parties should be litigated. DuBoise v. Brewer, 349 So.2d 1086 (Ala.1977); Rule 2, Ala.R.Civ.P.

Alabama law, even prior to the effective date of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, was to the effect that the character of a pleading was determined by its essential substance and not from its description, name, or title. See, Guaranty Funding Corp. v. Bolling, 288 Ala. 319, 260 So.2d 589 (1972); Union Springs Tel. Co. v. Green, 285 Ala. 114, 229 So.2d 503 (1969).

Even if the designation of a pleading is incorrect, it will not result in any penalty against the pleader under our Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Swain v. Terry, 454 So.2d 948 (Ala.1984); Ex parte Jones, 447 So.2d 709 (Ala.1984).

The precise point applicable to the instant appeal was addressed by this Court in Long v. Ladd, 273 Ala. 410, 142 So.2d 660 (1962), wherein the Court opined:

"An amendment to a bill in equity does not depart from the original purpose of the bill if it seeks to adjudicate property rights, between the same parties, as the result of the same transaction though presenting different versions of fact and calling for application of different legal principles and molding of relief in different form." (Emphasis added.)

273 Ala., at 412, 142 So.2d, at 661-62. The Court continued, stating:

"It was held in Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Yancey, 201 Ala. 200, 77 So. 726, that a bill to quiet title brought under the statute, Sections 5443 and 5446, Code of 1907, now Section 1109, et seq. of Title 7, Code of 1940 [code provisions antedating Section 6-6-540, et seq., Title 12, Code of 1975, relied on by Appellants] could be converted into a bill to remove a cloud from title, and that the change was not such as to constitute a departure." (Citations omitted). (Emphasis added.)

Id., 273 Ala. at 412, 142 So.2d at 662.

We are of the opinion that Hester and Farned, who alleged that they held legal title to the mineral interest in the subject property, were entitled to the remedy set forth in their pleadings that the trial court "quiet title in and to the mineral interest in the subject property in the names of the plaintiffs...."

In Smith v. Gordon, 136 Ala. 495, 34 So. 838 (1902), complainants had filed a bill in equity to compel a determination...