Jallen v. Agre, 38345

• Decision Date: 04 January 1963
• Docket Number: No. 38345,38345
• Citation: 264 Minn. 369,119 N.W.2d 739
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: Ingvald V. JALLEN, Appellant, v. Ole N. AGRE and Betty R. Ingalls, Respondents.

Page 739

119 N.W.2d 739

264 Minn. 369

Ingvald V. JALLEN, Appellant, v. Ole N. AGRE and Betty R. Ingalls, Respondents.

No. 38345.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 4, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 15, 1963.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A definite settlement of a lawsuit will be enforced, absent fraud or collusion, mistake, or such an improvident agreement that it ought not to stand in equity and good conscience.

2. A compromise settlement of a lawsuit is contractual in nature. There must be such a definite offer and acceptance that it can be said there has been a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement.

3. It is not essential that an agreement to settle a lawsuit be in writing unless it is within the statute of frauds, but it is desirable, in order to avoid a dispute as to what the terms of the settlement were.

4. Where there is a dispute as to whether a settlement was reached, it is ordinarily for the trial court to determine what the facts are.

5. Where no record is made of negotiations for a settlement and the result thereof, and the trial court has failed to determine that a settlement was agreed to but, instead, orders the case on for trial, we cannot hold that the record requires enforcement of an alleged settlement.

6. The evidence has been examined and found to support the verdict of the jury. No reversible error has been found.

Olson, Kief & Severson, Bemidji, for appellant.

Romaine Powell, Bemidji, Cummins, Cummins & Gislason, David W. Nord, St. Paul, Rosengren, Rufer, Blatti, & Hefte, Fergus Falls, for respondents.

KNUTSON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying plaintiff's alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

The case arises out of injuries sustained by plaintiff while riding as a passenger in a 1953 GMC pickup truck driven by defendant Ole N. Agre with the consent of the owner, defendant Betty R. Ingalls. At the time of the accident, plaintiff and Agre were both employed by H. Reese & Sons Construction Company, which was then engaged in road construction on State Trunk Highway No. 1 near Red Lake, Minnesota. The accident occurred about 6 a.m. on August 18, 1955, while Agre was driving the pickup in an easterly direction on State Trunk Highway No. 1, which at that time had an ungraded sandy surface. It contained slight dips and rises as it followed the contour of the land. As they came over a slight rise, they were confronted by a pack of dogs in a dip some distance ahead. According to Agre's testimony, the dogs were hidden from his view until he was about 100 feet away from them. They were then observed to be in his lane of traffic. In an attempt to avoid hitting the dogs, he turned to the left side of the road, but one of the dogs ran into the right front wheel and became lodged between the wheel and the fender, causing him to lose control of his truck, which swerved to the right, hit a sandbank, flipped over on its side and then onto its top. He estimated that he was traveling about 45 miles per hour when he first saw the dogs and that he had reduced his speed to 30 or 35 miles per hour when he collided with the one dog.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover for his injuries. The action was originally called for trial on October 14, 1959, before the Honorable Arnold C. Forbes at Bemidji. At about 9:30 in the morning, counsel for the parties were permitted to meet in the chambers of the judge to confer on the case and to attempt to negotiate a settlement. It had developed that there was a possibility that Agre was covered by two insurance policies covering the operations of H. Reese & Sons Construction Company, the existence of which policies had theretofore been unknown to defendants' counsel. Counsel for the defendants actually represented their insurers, both of which had denied liability. A motion was made for continuance of the trial in order to enable counsel to tender the defense of the action to the insurers of H. Reese & Sons Construction Company. At the same time, plaintiff moved the court for permission to increase his prayer for relief. Both motions were granted. No record was made of the conference or settlement negotiations, although it does appear from the record that the attorneys met from 9:30 in the morning until late in the afternoon.

On February 5, 1960, Judge Forbes issued an order to show cause why judgment should not be entered against defendants for the sum of $15,000 on the ground that the case had been settled for that amount. Hearing on this order was set for March 21, 1960.

On February 16, 1960, the Honorable Paul A. Lundgren was presiding at the term of court then commencing in Beltrami County. At the call of the calendar, plaintiff moved for entry of judgment in his favor in the sum of $15,000, based on the alleged settlement consummated on October 14, 1959. It was his contention that the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement in that amount, subject only to the tender of the defense to the insurers for H. Reese & Sons Construction Company; that such tender had now been made and declined by these insurers; and that the conditions of the settlement were therefore removed and the settlement absolute. Defendants resisted this motion and denied that a settlement had been consummated. In view of the fact that consummation of the settlement was in dispute and there was no record upon which the presiding judge could act, Judge Lundgren refused to act upon plaintiff's motion and directed that the case stand for trial, subject to the further order of Judge Forbes.

On March 21, 1960, the order to show cause came on for hearing before Judge Forbes. Counsel for defendant Agre and counsel for plaintiff were present. Counsel for defendant Ingalls was not present. A record was made of this hearing. Affiliated counsel for defendant Agre first stated his recollection of the conference. He stated that the settlement of $15,000 was agreed upon, but that such agreement was not to affect defendants as uninsured individuals or the insurance companies not represented, and that first a declaratory judgment action was to be commenced to settle the issues of policy coverage. After a heated discussion between Judge Forbes and counsel, in which a violent disagreement appeared as to the recollection of the parties and the court, nothing seems to have been decided.

On April 21, 1960, Judge Forbes, without deciding the order to show cause, set the case for trial on May 2, 1960, before Judge Lundgren and a jury. Before the trial commenced, counsel were called into the court chambers and a conference was had, at which time plaintiff renewed his motion for entry of judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement. Judge Lundgren, in a memorandum attached to his order denying plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding or a new trial, said:

'The Court, deeming that said Order of April 21, 1960, was a denial of the plaintiff's motion, the parties being present, a jury being in attendance, and a vacancy existing in the trial calendar by virtue of the settlement of the scheduled cause, this Court elected to treat the Order as a directive to proceed with the trial. This was assented to by counsel for all parties.' (Italics supplied.)

Thereafter, a trial was had, resulting in a verdict adverse to plaintiff. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial was denied, and this appeal followed. In that motion plaintiff again renewed his contention that a settlement had been reached on October 14, 1959, and that judgment should be entered in his favor in the amount of such settlement.

1. The difficulty with plaintiff's position is not in finding law to support his contentions but in finding facts to support his position. There can be no doubt that a definite settlement of a lawsuit, under our decisions, will be enforced, absent fraud or collusion, mistake, or such an improvident agreement that it ought not to stand in equity and good conscience. ¹ The law favors settlement of litigation.

2. A compromise settlement of a lawsuit is contractual in nature. ² To constitute a full and enforceable settlement, there must be such a definite offer and acceptance that it can be said that there has been a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement. ³

3. It is not essential to the enforcement of an agreement to settle a case that the agreement be in writing unless it is within the statute of frauds, ⁴ but the terms of the settlement should normally be stated to the court and taken down by the reporter or otherwise reduced to writing so as to prevent a dispute as to what the terms of the settlement are. We have recently upheld the settlement of lawsuits in two cases where the terms of the settlement were definite. Rogalla v. Rubbelke, 261 Minn. 381, 112 N.W.2d 581; Schoenfeld v. Buker, 262 Minn. 122, 114 N.W.2d 560.

4. Where there is a dispute as to whether a settlement was reached, it is ordinarily for the trial court to determine what the facts are. ⁵

5. Plaintiff's difficulty here is that the trial court has not determined that there was a valid settlement. To the contrary, it is implicit in his order assigning the case for trial that he found otherwise, or at least felt that the record was so unsatisfactory that he could not find that there had been a completed settlement. The judge before whom the case was tried so construed the order as shown by his memorandum now before us. His memorandum states that counsel for all parties assented to the trial.

Plaintiff it also faced with still another obstacle--a settlement may be abandoned. Any conduct inconsistent with an intention to rely on a compromise agreement will ordinarily be held to be an abandonment. ⁶ Plaintiff could have insisted upon a determination by the court of its order to show cause. Having voluntarily proceeded with the trial, plaintiff cannot...