Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc.

• Citation: 577 F.3d 169
• Decision Date: 12 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-2500.,08-2500.
• Parties: Hawa Abdi JAMA, n/k/a Hali Hashi Egal; Jeyakumar Anantharajah; Abu Bakar; Cecilia Kou Jeffrey; Abraham Kenneth; Shamimu Nanteza; Dennis Raji; Agatha Serwaa; and Sarah Tetteh Yower v. ESMOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, INC., n/k/a Correctional Services Corporation; James Slattery; Aaron Speisman; Willard Stovall; John Lima; Diane McClure; Estate of Richard Staley and Philip Johnson Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., and John Lima, Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

577 F.3d 169

Hawa Abdi JAMA, n/k/a Hali Hashi Egal; Jeyakumar Anantharajah; Abu Bakar; Cecilia Kou Jeffrey; Abraham Kenneth; Shamimu Nanteza; Dennis Raji; Agatha Serwaa; and Sarah Tetteh Yower v. ESMOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, INC., n/k/a Correctional Services Corporation; James Slattery; Aaron Speisman; Willard Stovall; John Lima; Diane McClure; Estate of Richard Staley and Philip Johnson Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., and John Lima, Appellants.

No. 08-2500.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued May 20, 2009.

Filed: August 12, 2009.

James C. Owens, Esq, Virginia A. Seitz, Esq., Frank R. Volpe, Esq., Rebecca K. Wood, Esq. [Argued], Sidley Austin, Washington, DC, Larry S. Reich, Esq., Blank Rome LLP, New York, NY, for Appellants, Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., n/k/a Correctional Services Corporation; and John Lima.

Drew Dorman, Esq., Derek S. Tarson, Esq., Justin P. Smith, Esq. [Argued], Mary Beth Hogan, Esq., Alison J. Page, Esq., W. Barton Patterson, Esq., Erica Davila, Esq., Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, NY, Frank Askin, Esq., Rutgers University, Constitutional Law Clinic, Penny Venetis, Esq. [Argued], Rutgers University, Constitutional Litigation Clinic, Newark, NJ, for Plaintiffs-Appellees, Hawa Abdi Jama, n/k/a Hali Hashi Egal; Jeyakumar Anantharajah; Abu Bakar; Cecilia Kou Jeffrey; Abraham Kenneth;

Shamimu Nanteza; Dennis Raji; Agatha Serwaa; Sarah Tetteh Yower.

Before: RENDELL and GARTH, Circuit Judges, and VANASKIE,^* District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Appellee Hawa Abdi Jama¹ was detained as an illegal immigrant at a detention center run by Esmor Correctional Services, Inc. ("Esmor"). Jama sued Esmor and certain of its officers and employees, including facility administrator John Lima, for violating her rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., and on tort theories. The jury found in favor of Jama on the RFRA claim, against Esmor and Lima, and in favor of Jama on one state negligence claim, against Esmor, Lima, and two other Defendants. The jury awarded $1 in RFRA damages and $100,000 in tort damages. The District Court awarded Jama an attorney's fee against Esmor and Lima after concluding that a portion of the tort award was "designed as compensation for" RFRA injuries. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs. Inc., 549 F.Supp.2d 602, 607 (D.N.J.2008). Esmor and Lima appealed.

Appellants argue that the District Court's interpretation of the jury award was erroneous, and assert that no fee may be awarded because Jama's success on the fee-eligible RFRA claim was de minimis, and the pendent state claim cannot be considered. Appellants alternatively challenge the reasonableness of the amount awarded on several grounds. We agree that the District Court erred in interpreting the jury award, but do not agree that the Court is precluded from awarding fees under these circumstances as a matter of law. We will remand the matter for the District Court to reconsider the fee award under the legal standards discussed below.

I. INTRODUCTION

Ms. Jama, a Somalian immigrant and Muslim, filed a complaint in 1997, along with 19 other plaintiffs, to redress allegedly abusive treatment and deplorable conditions at a private detention center in Elizabeth, New Jersey ("the Facility"). The Facility was operated by Esmor under contract with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Esmor was named as a Defendant, as were certain officers and employees of the company, including the facility administrator John Lima.² By the time of the 2007 verdict, Jama was the last remaining plaintiff whose claims had not settled. At trial, she presented evidence of general indignities suffered in the Facility, as well as evidence specifically relating to restrictions on her practice of religion. This latter category included evidence that her attempts to pray were disrupted by guards, that she was picked up from the floor while praying and thrown onto her bed, that her Koran was thrown in the garbage, that she was subjected to unnecessary strip searches, that she was exposed naked in common view, that she was forced to eat pork, and that the only cleric available was a priest who urged her to pray to Jesus.³

The District Court submitted four claims to the jury, including a claim that Defendants substantially burdened Jama's ability to practice her religion in violation of RFRA,⁴ and a claim under state law that certain Defendants, including Esmor and Lima, were negligent in hiring, training, supervising, and/or retaining guards at the facility.⁵ On the RFRA claim, the Court instructed the jury that Jama had to prove either that the officials "inflicted or constrained conduct or expressions that manifested some central tenet" of her beliefs, that their acts or omissions "meaningfully curtailed" her "ability to express adherence to her faith," or that the officials denied her a "reasonable opportunity to engage in those activities that are fundamental to her religion." (JA 194-95.) To succeed specifically against Defendant Esmor, the Court instructed that the violations had to be caused by "an official policy or custom" or "from the actions of an official with final policy-making authority." (JA 196.)

For negligent hiring/training/supervision/retention, the Court instructed that, under New Jersey law, Jama must prove that one or more of the enumerated Defendants, including Esmor and Lima, were negligent, and that their negligence proximately caused Jama injury. Negligent acts or omissions within the purview of the claim included failures by the Defendants to exercise reasonable care in investigating the guards' conduct, and failures to exercise reasonable care in training and supervising the guards to prevent foreseeable harm to the inmates.

As for damages, if any, the jury was instructed to award "an amount that will fairly compensate her for any injury she actually sustained as a result of a defendant's conduct." (JA 207.) The Court explained that Jama claimed as damages "[p]hysical harm ... during and after the events at issue, physical pain, disability, disfigurement, or discomfort, [and] emotional or mental harm ... during and after the events at issue, including fear, humiliation, and mental anguish...." (JA 208-09.) The Court stated that the jury "must not award compensatory damages more than once for the same injury" and that it "must not award her any individual compensatory damages on each claim if the two claims resulted in the same injuries." (JA 209.) Further, "if different injuries are attributable to the separate claims, then you must compensat[e] Miss Jama for all of her injuries." (Id.) The Court also instructed that, "If you return a verdict for Miss Jama on the ... RFRA claim[], but Miss Jama has failed to prove compensatory damages, then you must award nominal damages of one dollar. A person whose federal rights were violated is entitled to a recognition of that violation, even if she suffered no actual injury." (JA 210.)

The jury found that Jama proved her RFRA claim against both Esmor and John Lima, but awarded only $1 on the claim. It indicated on the questionnaire that no RFRA damages were included in damages awarded on any other claim. The jury also found that Jama proved negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention against Esmor, Lima, and two other Defendants, and awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages on the claim.⁶ The jury found for Defendants on the two other claims.

Jama moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In ascertaining the degree of Jama's success under § 1988, the District Court reasoned that the jury "was not in a position to clarify whether it had concluded that Jama had simply not proven any compensable [RFRA] injury ..., or whether the result reflected the jury's inability to distinguish between those and other injuries," and that the jury may have "bundle[d] all of Jama's injuries into one substantial award under Jama's Negligence Claims." Jama, 549 F.Supp.2d at 606. The Court stated that, based on its assessment of the evidence, "between 33% and 50% of the jury's Negligence Claims award of $100,000 was designed as compensation for Jama's RFRA-related injuries." Id. at 607. The Court calculated a lodestar of $642,398.57 based entirely on counsels' work on the RFRA claim, and awarded the entire amount against Esmor and Lima, the two Defendants found liable under RFRA. Id. at 613. Esmor and Lima appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

This Court has jurisdiction to review the award of a statutory attorney's fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, once the award is reduced to a definite amount. Interfaith Comty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 701 (3d Cir.2005). We review the reasonableness of a fee award for abuse of discretion, but our review of the legal standard applied in calculating a fee is plenary. Evans v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 273 F.3d 346, 358 (3d Cir.2001). Plenary review also extends to a district court's interpretation of a jury's answers to interrogatories. See Failla v. Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 153 (3d Cir.1998). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision "rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact." Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir.2008) (internal quotations omitted).

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides that, "In any action or proceeding to enforce [certain federal statutes including RFRA], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs...." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (emphasis added). Appellants concede that, the jury having awarded nominal damages to Jama on her fee-eligible RFRA claim, Jama was the prevailing party for the purposes of § 1988. However, Appellants argue that the District Court erred in recharacterizing the jury verdict, and that no...