El Jamal v. Weil

• Citation: 116 A.D.3d 732,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02408,986 N.Y.S.2d 146
• Parties: Sammy EL JAMAL, respondent, v. James A. WEIL, appellant.
• Decision Date: 09 April 2014
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

116 A.D.3d 732
986 N.Y.S.2d 146
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02408

Sammy EL JAMAL, respondent,
v.
James A. WEIL, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

April 9, 2014.

[986 N.Y.S.2d 147]

Oxman Tulis Kirkpatrick Whyatt & Geiger, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Mark S. Oxman and Lois Rosen of counsel), and Kornstein Veisz Wexler & Pollard, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Daniel J. Kornstein and Ina R. Bort of counsel), for appellant (one brief filed).

Bruno V. Gioffre, Jr., PLLC, Harrison, N.Y., for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, ROBERT J. MILLER, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for defamation, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Walker, J.), dated September 28, 2012, as denied those branches of his motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the amended complaint or the plaintiff's request for punitive damages.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the amended complaint is granted.

The plaintiff and the defendant are adversaries in ongoing litigation arising from their business disputes. In this action to recover damages for defamation arising from those disputes, the amended complaint alleges three causes of action. The first cause of action alleges libel per se. On July 21, 2011, the defendant wrote and sent an email to three employees of the plaintiff's business. In that email, which the defendant also sent to his own attorneys, the defendant referred to a recent development in the litigation and also described the plaintiff as “someone who is a liar and not in touch with reality.”

The second cause of action also alleges libel per se, based on another email. Part of the dispute between the parties concerned money allegedly due a business owned by the plaintiff, the defendant, and a third man, Leon Silverman, from a business owned by the plaintiff. On August 25, 2011, in response to an email that the defendant and Silverman had sent to the plaintiff about their attempts to recover the money allegedly due, the plaintiff said, among other things, “I'm glad that you are admitting that the money isn't stolen.” The defendant responded to this email the same day, August 25, 2011, in an email sent to the plaintiff, Silverman, the defendant's attorneys, and the plaintiff's attorney. As relevant here, the defendant wrote, “Leon and I are in no way saying the money was not stolen[;] we know it was.”

In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges slander per se arising from various allegedly defamatory statements made by the defendant over several months to various individuals.

In each of the three causes of action, the plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages.

The defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint or to strike the demand for punitive damages. The Supreme Court, among other things, denied those branches of the motion, and the defendant appeals.

In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, a court

[986 N.Y.S.2d 148]

must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the factual allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v. Martinez, 84...