James v. Cleveland Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 17 August 2022
• Docket Number: 21-60688
• Citation: 45 F.4th 860
• Parties: Olecia JAMES, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. The CLEVELAND SCHOOL DISTRICT; Dr. Lisa Bramuchi, in her individual and official capacity; Dr. Randy Grierson, in his individual and official capacity; Dr. Jacqueline Thigpen, in her individual and official capacity; Richard Boggs, in his individual and official capacity; Todd Fuller, in his individual and official capacity; Dr. Chresteen Seals, in her individual and official capacity; Tonya Short, in her individual and official capacity; George Evans, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants—Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

45 F.4th 860

Olecia JAMES, Plaintiff—Appellant,

v.The CLEVELAND SCHOOL DISTRICT; Dr. Lisa Bramuchi, in her individual and official capacity; Dr. Randy Grierson, in his individual and official capacity; Dr. Jacqueline Thigpen, in her individual and official capacity; Richard Boggs, in his individual and official capacity; Todd Fuller, in his individual and official capacity; Dr. Chresteen Seals, in her individual and official capacity; Tonya Short, in her individual and official capacity; George Evans, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 21-60688

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED August 17, 2022

Lisa Mishune Ross, Esq., Jackson, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Arnold U. Luciano, Esq., Daniel J. Griffith, Esq., Katherine Mayo Portner, Jacks Griffith Luciano, P.A., Cleveland, MS, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before Smith, Duncan, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:

Olecia James was a model student with reason to hope she would graduate second in her high school class. But, as the result of a longstanding desegregation decree, her high school was consolidated with another school before her senior year. This reshuffled the class rankings, and James ended up third. She sued school officials, alleging she had been denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court correctly dismissed her claims. James alleges only a property interest, but she has no such interest in her class ranking or in the points awarded for her courses. This defeats both her procedural and substantive due process claims.

That James did not end up class salutatorian may seem unfair. It was surely disappointing. But it was not unconstitutional.

We affirm the district court's judgment.

I.

Based on a fifty-year-old desegregation consent decree, a federal judge ordered the consolidation of Cleveland, Mississippi's two high schools—East Side High School ("ESHS") and Cleveland High School ("CHS"). See Cowan v. Bolivar Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 186 F. Supp. 3d 564, 621 (N.D. Miss. 2016) ; Cowan v. Bolivar Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , No. 2:65-CV-31 (N.D. Miss. July 22, 1969). Olecia James, a displaced rising senior at ESHS, enrolled in the newly opened Cleveland Central High School ("CCHS"). James was by any metric a model student. She played basketball, participated in mock trial, and was elected homecoming queen. She also excelled academically, contending for valedictorian and salutatorian. But the consolidation made the race tighter than usual, with more students now vying for fewer honors.

To complicate matters, the consolidated high schools had both failed, at times, to follow the Cleveland School District's handbook when awarding course credit and quality points for the preceding three years. The handbook designated each course as "regular" (4 points), "accelerated" (5 points), or "advanced" (6 points) based on the course's rigor. Due to slipups in a handful of courses, CCHS seniors with identical grades in identical courses had received different quality points on their transcripts. That error bled over into the class ranking, where even a minor quality point discrepancy reshuffled the rank and, ultimately, who would receive graduation honors.

Weeks before graduation, Superintendent Jacqueline Thigpen and Assistant Superintendent Lisa Bramuchi diagnosed the problem and, in the interest of fairness, set out to align all transcripts with the handbook retrospectively. CCHS counselors independently reviewed each senior's transcript and flagged any errors. The District then altered the transcripts (including James's) to match the handbook and distributed the updated transcripts to CCHS seniors, who could dispute any discrepancies.

James and her family were understandably caught off guard by her altered quality point average. The next day, they met with Thigpen, who vowed to restore James's quality points, though her transcript would be inconsistent with the handbook. James and her family also met with CCHS Principal Randy Grierson and appeared at the regular school board meeting to complain about the unfairness of last-minute transcript changes. After the meetings, James received an updated transcript, which credited her with the quality points her family had requested.

Two days later, Thigpen backtracked again after meeting with another disgruntled parent. This time her decision was final: all CCHS seniors would receive the same credit and weight for identical courses, consistent with the handbook. James's transcript was again altered. Thigpen deemed it the fairest outcome for a bad situation. The District printed the updated transcripts and distributed them to all CCHS seniors.

Once teachers finalized spring grades, Principal Grierson announced the final class rankings. K.B., a black female from ESHS, graduated valedictorian. W.M., a white male from CHS, ranked second. James, a black female, finished third. James contested her rank, but Thigpen and Bramuchi claimed they could not alter the course weights against the handbook.

James sued Bramuchi, Thigpen, Grierson, the District, and the school board members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a conspiracy to strip her of salutatorian honors in violation of Mississippi law as well as her federal due-process and equal-protection rights. Invoking qualified immunity, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in their favor. James v. Cleveland Sch. Dist. , No. 4:19-CV-66-DMB-RP, 2021 WL 3277239, at *1 (N.D. Miss. July 30, 2021). The court found no constitutional violation, reasoning in a meticulous opinion that James produced no evidence that she was deprived of quality points (due process), nor that the calculation had any discriminatory effect or purpose (equal protection). Id. at *13–22. James timely appealed, preserving only her procedural and substantive due process claims against school officials Thigpen, Bramuchi, and Grierson.

II.

We review summary judgments de novo. Patel v. Tex. Tech Univ. , 941 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2019) ; FED. R. CIV. P . 56(a). Because the officials invoked qualified immunity, James bore the burden "to show that the defense is not available, though we still draw all inferences in [her] favor." Wilson v. City of Bastrop , 26 F.4th 709, 712 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Government officials merit qualified immunity unless (1) they "violated a statutory or constitutional right of the plaintiff" and (2) "the right was clearly established at the time of the violation." Dyer v. Houston , 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

III.

James contends the school officials violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, § 1. Her due process claims come in two varieties—"procedural" and "substantive"—which we address separately. See generally United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (distinguishing the two concepts) (citations omitted).

A.

First, the procedural variety. A procedural due process claim turns on " ‘(1) whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State,’ and (2) ‘whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.’ " Richardson v. Tex. Sec'y of State , 978 F.3d 220, 228–29 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson , 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) ). Without a cognizable interest in liberty or property, "there is nothing subject to Due Process protections and our inquiry ends." Hampton Co. Nat. Sur., LLC v. Tunica County , 543 F.3d 221, 225 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). James claims only a property interest. Namely, she asserts an interest in "continued receipt of an education pursuant to the rules adopted by the school board as well as the laws the Mississippi Legislature adopted to govern public schools in this state."¹

The district court assumed James had a cognizable property interest. Specifically, the court assumed James alleged a property interest in two "aspect[s]" of her public education—rules on class rankings and rules assigning quality points to specific courses, both contained in the school's curriculum guide for James's graduating year. Based on those assumptions, the court engaged in a detailed analysis and found James had not been deprived of either interest because the school calculated her rank and quality points correctly. While we respect the court's meticulous analysis (and see no reason to doubt its correctness), the court's threshold assumption that James had a cognizable property interest was unwarranted.

"[W]hether a state-created property interest ‘rises to the level’ of a constitutionally-protected interest is a matter of federal constitutional law." Wigginton v. Jones , 964 F.3d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales , 545 U.S. 748, 757, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) ). By establishing a compulsory school system, a state creates a property interest in "entitlement to a public education ... protected by the Due Process Clause." Goss v. Lopez , 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). Accordingly, a student may not be expelled or suspended from a public school "without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that Clause." Id. at 574, 95 S.Ct. 729. Applying Goss , our cases have explained that due process is triggered only by "a student's ‘total exclusion from the educational process.’ " Swindle v. Livingston Par. Sch. Bd. , 655 F.3d 386, 401 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Goss , 419 U.S. at 576, 95 S.Ct. 729 ). Thus, a student must receive due process before being denied state-guaranteed access to an alternative education, ibid. , or before being suspended from school for ten days, Harris ex rel. Harris v. Pontotoc Cnty. Sch. Dist. , 635...