James v. Florida, CASE NO: 8:11-cv-1767-T-23-EAJ

• Decision Date: 24 August 2012
• Docket Number: CASE NO: 8:11-cv-1767-T-23-EAJ
• Parties: RAYMOND L. JAMES, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

RAYMOND L. JAMES, Petitioner,

v.STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

CASE NO: 8:11-cv-1767-T-23-EAJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

Dated: August 24, 2012

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the court on a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Florida prisoner Raymond L. James ("James"). James challenges a judgment and sentence rendered in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in Hillsborough County, Florida. Respondent filed a response to the petition along with the appendix record of James's state court proceedings. (Dkts. 9, 10.) James did not file a reply to the response. The Court, having carefully considered the parties' submissions, finds that the petition is due to be denied.

Procedural History

On June 24, 2004, James was charged by information with ten counts: (1) grand theft auto; (2) carrying a concealed firearm; (3) battery on a law enforcement officer; (4) battery on a law enforcement officer; (5) obstructing or opposing an officer with violence; (6) obstructing or opposing an officer with violence; (7) felony possession of acontrolled substance; (8) falsely identifying himself to a law enforcement officer; (9) felon in possession of a firearm; and (10) possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 1, Record on Direct Appeal, R14-18.) A superseding information was then filed on September 22, 2004, charging James in thirteen counts: (1) grand theft auto; (2) armed burglary of a conveyance; (3) battery on a law enforcement officer; (4) battery on a law enforcement officer; (5) obstructing or opposing an officer with violence; (6) obstructing or opposing an officer with violence; (7) felony possession of a controlled substance; (8) falsely identifying himself to a law enforcement officer; (9) felon in possession of a firearm; (10) possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal; (11) possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal; (12) carrying a concealed firearm; and (13) possession of a forearm during the commission of a felony. (Id. at R28-34.)

On February 18, 2005, James's trial counsel filed a motion to suppress. (Id. at R42.) The motion was denied after a hearing on August 15, 2005. (Id. at R78, 179-181.) On September 1, 2005, James pled no contest while reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. (Id. at R47-49.) Count 11 of the information, one of the possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal counts, was then nolle prossed. (Id. at R54.) James filed a notice of appeal on September 26, 2005. (Id. at 71.) The assistant public defender filed an initial brief on James's behalf on March 7, 2006. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 2.) The State filed an answer brief. (Id. at Ex. 3.) The Second District Court ofAppeal issued its opinion affirming James's convictions and sentences on August 23, 2006. (Id. at Ex. 4.) See James v. State, 936 So.2d 738 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).

On August 29, 2007, James filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 3.850, with the trial court. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 5, R38-52.) Therein, he raised the following five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:

1. Counsel misadvised Defendant to plead to a 15 year sentence where the maximum for the charged crimes was 15 years, therefore rendering Defendant's plea involuntary;

2. Counsel failed to investigate and familiarize himself with the relevant facts of his client's case in regard to the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony where firearm was found under car seat after Defendant pushed the officer and fled;

3. Counsel failed to investigate and familiarize himself with the relevant facts of his client's case where there was no evidence to support allegation of carrying a concealed firearm since state would be unable to prove that Defendant had actual possession of or knowledge of firearm found under car seat after Defendant fled scene of the arrest;

4. Counsel failed to investigate and familiarize himself with the relevant facts of his client's case in regard to the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where the state would be unable to prove that Defendant had actual possession of or knowledge of the firearm that was found under the car seat after Defendant fled the scene of the arrest; and

5. Counsel misadvised Defendant that he would receive a life sentence if he proceeded to trial based on an armed burglary charge that counsel knew would be nolle prossed prior to the acceptance of the offer.

(Id. at R44-51.)

The trial court summarily denied Claim 1 of the motion and ordered the State to respond to the remaining grounds. (Id. at R53-58.) The court conducted an evidentiaryhearing on August 25, 2009, where James was represented an assistant public defender. (Id. at R196-273.) The trial court denied the remaining claims following the evidentiary hearing on December 16, 2009. (Id. at R66-72.) James filed a notice of appeal on January 8, 2010. (Id. at R274.) An assistant public defendant filed the initial brief on James's behalf on August 6, 2010. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 6.) The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his amended motion for post-conviction relief as untimely and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Claims 2 through 4 of his original motion for post-conviction relief. (See id. at 11-20.) The State filed an answer brief. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 7.) The Second District Court of Appeal ultimately affirmed without a written opinion on April 15, 2011. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 8.) The mandate issued on May 10, 2011. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 9.)

James timely provided the instant federal petition to Wakulla Correctional Institution for mailing on August 2, 2011. His five grounds for relief are identical to the five claims raised in the Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief.

Claims Exhaustion & Procedural Bar

There are two prerequisites to a federal habeas review: (1) the applicant must have fairly apprised the highest state court with the appropriate jurisdiction of the federal rights allegedly violated, and (2) the applicant must have presented his claims in state court in a procedurally correct manner. Upshaw v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 576, 578-79 (11th Cir. 1995). A petition for writ of habeas corpus should not be entertained unless the petitioner has first exhausted his state remedies. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, reh'g denied,490 U.S. 107 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). Exhaustion is achieved by giving the Florida courts an opportunity to consider the petitioner's legal theory of a federal constitutional deficiency and the factual basis for that theory. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); Watson v. Dugger, 945 F.2d 367, 371-372 (11th Cir. 1991). James raises five grounds in his federal habeas petition, all of which were raised in his 3.850 petition in the trial court. However, James did not brief the issue in Ground Five in his appeal of the trial court's denial of his post-conviction motion. James claims, in Ground Five, that counsel misadvised him that he would receive a life sentence if he proceeded to trial based on an armed burglary charge that counsel knew would be nolle prossed prior to the acceptance of the offer. The claim was addressed by the trial court in the evidentiary hearing on James's Rule 3.850 motion and then rejected. Briefing was, therefore, required in order for the issue to be heard on appeal.¹ Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 851-52 (Fla. 1990) ("The purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the points on appeal. Merely making reference to arguments below without further elucidation does not suffice to preserve issues, and these claims are deemed to have been waived."). Consequently, Ground Five was unexhausted and is now procedurally barred.

A petitioner can avoid the procedural bar by showing either cause and prejudice or by establishing the kind of fundamental miscarriage of justice occasioned by a constitutional violation that resulted in the conviction of a defendant who was actuallyinnocent. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986). James makes no showing to overcome the procedural bar of his claim in Ground Five. The remainder of James's claims for relief were raised in the appeal of the denial of his 3.850 motion and are exhausted, and they will be resolved on their merits.

28 U.S.C. § 2254

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) explicitly requires a federal court to entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus only on the ground that the petitioner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Federal courts may intervene in the state judicial process only to correct wrongs of a constitutional dimension. Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 457 U.S. 1141 (1982); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982). The writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, was not enacted to enforce state-created rights. Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). Even when a petition which actually involves state law issues is "couched in terms of equal protection and due process," this limitation on federal habeas corpus review is of equal force. Willeford v. Estelle, 538 F.2d 1194, 1196-98 (5th Cir. 1976).

The AEDPA Standard

On April 24, 1996, the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("the AEDPA"). Section 104 of the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by adding the following provision:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted withrespect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(

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