James v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 14 June 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:10-cv-731-J-34JRK
• Parties: ROBERT LEWIS JAMES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

ROBERT LEWIS JAMES, Petitioner,

v.SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:10-cv-731-J-34JRK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DONE: June 14, 2013

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Robert Lewis James, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) (Doc. #1) and Memorandum of Law (Doc. #2) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 19, 2010. James challenges a 2006 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for sale or delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondents' Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response) (Doc. #9) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On September 2, 2010, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. #6), admonishing James regarding his obligations and giving James a time frame in which to submit a reply. James submitted a brief in reply on January 11, 2011. See Petitioner's Respon[se] to Respondents' Response (Reply) (Doc. #11). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On February 16, 2006, the State of Florida charged Robert James with sale or delivery of cocaine (count one) and possession of cocaine (count two). Resp. Ex. B, Information. James entered a plea of guilty on May 18, 2006. See Resp. Ex. F at 27-73, Transcript of the Plea and Sentencing Proceeding (Tr.); 74-75, Plea of Guilty. That same day, the trial court adjudicated James guilty of both counts and sentenced him, as a habitual felony offender, to a term of fifteen years imprisonment on count one and a term of five years imprisonment on count two, to run concurrently to the term imposed for count one. Resp. Ex. D, Judgment. James did not appeal.

On September 18, 2006, James filed a pro se motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Resp. Ex. F at 1-8. In his request for post conviction relief, James asserted that counsel (Kimberly Sadler) was ineffective because she failed to: negotiate a defined plea (ground three); object to the imposition of a habitual felony offender sentence (ground four); and file a timely notice of appeal (ground five). Additionally, James asserted that the State failed to provide written notice of its intent to seek a habitual offender sentence, which hindered his ability to intelligently and knowingly enter the plea (ground one), and the trial court failed to determine if he was personally aware of the possibility andreasonable consequences of habitualization or of entering into an open plea (ground two). The trial court denied the Rule 3.850 motion on December 17, 2009. Id. at 10-12. On May 11, 2010, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision per curiam, see James v. State, 36 So.3d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Resp. Ex. I, and the mandate issued on June 8, 2010, see Resp. Ex. I.

On May 26, 2010, James filed a second pro se motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Resp. Ex. J at 1-17. In this request for post conviction relief, James asserted that counsel was ineffective because she: allowed him to plead guilty to both counts in violation of double jeopardy (ground one); permitted him to plead guilty to both counts when his actions only constituted purchasing cocaine, not sale or delivery of cocaine (ground two); and failed to investigate and present the entrapment defense (ground three). Finding that the motion was filed more than two years after James' conviction became final, the trial court denied the motion as procedurally barred on June 1, 2010. Id. at 18-19. On August 4, 2010, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision per curiam, see James v. State, 41 So.3d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Resp. Ex. E, and the mandate issued on August 31, 2010, see Resp. Ex. E.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

The Petition is timely filed within the one-year period of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Response at 4-5.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

There are prerequisites to a federal habeas review. Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present[]" every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhausta claim, "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).

In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'"opportunity to pass upon and correct" alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)) To provide the State with the necessary "opportunity," the prisoner must "fairly present" his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S.Ct. 887; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).

The United States Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of procedural default:

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural default, under which a federal court will notreview the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[¹ ] supra, at 747-748, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Sykes,[² ] supra, at 84-85, 97 S.Ct. 2497. A state court's invocation of a procedural rule to deny a prisoner's claims precludes federal review of the claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the judgment and the rule is firmly established and consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. --, --, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127-1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. --, --, 130 S.Ct. 612, 617-618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law. SeeColeman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012).

Thus, procedural defaults may be excused under certain circumstances: notwithstanding that a claim has been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 922 (2012) (citations omitted); In Re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 821 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In order for Petitioner to establish cause,

the procedural default "must result from some objective factor external to the defense that prevented [him] from raising the claim and which cannot be fairly attributable to his own conduct." McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Carrier,[³ ] 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639). Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show that "the errors at trial actually and substantially disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied fundamental fairness." Id. at 1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 934 (1999).

In Martinez, the Supreme Court modified the general rule in Coleman⁴ to expand the "cause" that may excuse a procedural default. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315.

Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when an attorney's errors (or the absence of an attorney) caused a procedural default in an initial-review collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that the initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel orwith ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper consideration was given to a substantial claim. From this it follows that, when a State

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