James v. State, 1480
| Citation | 223 So.2d 52 |
| Decision Date | 13 May 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 1480,1480 |
| Parties | Roosevelt JAMES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Louis R. Bowen, Jr., Public Defeder; Franklin H. Baker and Edward G. Helvenston, Asst. Public Defenders, Orlando, for appellant.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
The defendant, Roosevelt James, brings this appeal from a final judgment and sentence of the Criminal Court of Record for Orange County, Florida. The defendant was charged by an information filed in that court with (1) breaking and entering; (2) grand larceny; and (3) possession of burglarious tools. He was represented at the arraignment and trial by a privately retained attorney. Following a plea of not guilty, the defendant was tried in March 1967. The jury found the defendant guilty on all three counts. The public defender represents the defendant in connection with this appeal.
There is no substantial conflict in the facts. The defendant was driving his automobile on the streets of Orlando at approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 16, 1966. He was spotted by an officer of the Orlando Police Department who became suspicious because the vehicle was riding low in the rear. The officer stopped the defendant and checked his driver's license. In doing so he noticed cigarettes on the back seat of the automobile. The officer asked the defendant about the cigarettes on the seat, and the deefndant said they belonged to a friend. The officer then asked what was in the back of the vehicle to make it ride so low. The defendant replied that he had 'stuff' and 'clothes' in the trunk. Next the officer asked if the defendant would open the trunk and let him look inside. The defendant said he would and without hesitation or objection took the keys from the ignition and opened the trunk lid. As the defendant raised the trunk lid he said, 'You got me'. The officer saw in the trunk a large case containing cartons of cigarettes.
Following the search of the trunk, the officer put the defendant under arrest and immediately warned him of his constitutional rights. In substance the officer told the defendant that he had a right to remain silent, that anything he said might be used against him, and that he had a right to an attorney. Then the defendant was placed in the back of the police car and driven to the Orlando Police Station. While on route, the officer asked the defendant various questions about his possible involvement in a burglary at a local Winn-Dixie store earlier that evening, and the defendant admitted participating in it.
The comments made by the defendant to the arresting officer both before and after the arrest were introduced in evidence through the testimony of the arresting officer. During the testimony of the officer, but before he testified to the admissions made after the arrest, the jury was excused from the courtroom. The state then proceeded to lay a predicate for the introduction of these admissions by proffering testimony showing (1) the advisory which was given by the officer to the defendant relating to his constitutional rights; (2) the voluntariness of the defendant's statements to the officer; and (3) the substance of those statements. With the jury still out, the defendant objected to the proffer of the testimony on the ground that the warning given by the arresting officer to the defendant did not comply with the standards established by Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The trial court ruled that the testimony would be admitted, and the jury returned. The state then proceeded to introduce the testimony of the officer as to his post-arrest conversation with the defendant while on route to the police station.
During the course of the trial the defendant's attorney moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search of the trunk, and when such was offered in evidence, the defendant's attorney renewed his objection. This objection was overruled and the evidence was admitted.
The questions for decision are:
(1) did the trial court commit reversible error when it admitted in evidence the testimony of the arresting officer as to the statements made to him by the defendant; and
(2) did the trial court commit reversible error by permitting the introduction of evidence obtained as a result of the search of the trunk of the defendant's vehicle.
For purposes of discussing the first question it will be helpful to divide the statements made by the defendant and introduced through the testimony of the arresting officer into two classes, one consisting of the pre-arrest statements and the other the post-arrest statements.
The pre-arrest statements were to the effect that the defendant had 'stuff' and 'clothes' in the trunk and that the cigarettes spotted on the back seat of the automobile belonged to a friend. They also included the spontaneous 'you got me' remark made by the defendant as he opened the lid of the trunk.
The post-arrest statements made by the defendant while he was on route to the police station were to the effect that he actually had participated in the breaking and entering of the Winn-Dixie store earlier that evening.
As to the pre-arrest comments, the defendant argues that they were inadmissible because they were preceded by no warning whatsoever. As to the post-arrest comments, the defendant contends that they were inadmissible because the Miranda warning given by the arresting officer was inadequate.
Considering first the pre-arrest comments, it appears that they were made before the defendant was taken into custody or otherwise substantially deprived of his freedom. For this reason they were made prior to the attachment of the right to Miranda warnings. See Wingard v. State, Fla.App.1968, 208 So.2d 263. There are additional reasons why the introduction of the defendant's pre-arrest statements regarding the cigarettes, 'clothes', and 'stuff' should not be considered reversible error even assuming that Miranda warnings were required. These statements were so inconsequential that their admission, if error, was harmless. See Section 924.33, F.S.1967, F.S.A., and State v. Galasso, Fla.1968, 217 So.2d 326.
The other pre-arrest statement, i.e., the 'you got me' comment, was not inconsequential and undoubtedly was prejudicial to the defendant, but it was a volunteered statement and not the result of in custody interrogation. That Miranda v. Arizona does not apply to such a statement is clear from the language of that decision. See also Battles v. State, Fla.App.1968, 208 So.2d 150.
Finally, it appears from the record that at no time did the defendant offer any objection at the trial to the introduction of the testimony relating to his pre-arrest comments. For the foregoing reasons we conclude that no reversible error was occasioned by the introduction of the arresting officer's testimony concerning the prearrest comments which the defendant made to him.
As to the post-arrest comments a more difficult question is presented. The warning or advisory required by Miranda v. Arizona, supra, as a condition precedent to in custody interrogation includes not only the advice that a person in custody has a right to remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him, but also that he has the right to consult with an attorney before interrogation and to have the attorney with him during interrogation and, further, that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. The warning given to the defendant in the present case was incomplete in that it did not advise the defendant that he was entitled to an...
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