James v. State

• Decision Date: 09 October 1967
• Docket Number: No. 24206,24206
• Citation: 157 S.E.2d 471,223 Ga. 677
• Parties: William Haywood JAMES v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 471

157 S.E.2d 471

223 Ga. 677

William Haywood JAMES v. The STATE.

No. 24206.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 9, 1967.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The trial judge had a separate hearing, out of the presence of the jury, as to the voluntariness of the defendant's incriminating statements, prior to the introduction of the statements in evidence, and it was not erroneous to refuse to decide the question of voluntariness before the commencement of the trial.

2. It was not necessary to have a hearing on the question of the voluntariness of the incriminating statements of the defendant by a jury different from that trying the case.

3. The statement of the defendant about the injuries received by him was not induced by any hope of benefit.

4. The trial judge was authorized to find from the evidence submitted to him that the statements by the defendant were made voluntarily, and that his constitutional rights were not violated when the statements were obtained.

5. Since the defendant did not have the power to compel his wife to testify in the case, her failure to testify was not a proper subject matter of argument by counsel for the State.

6. This court can not consider an assignment of error on argument of counsel for the State where the transcript shows that the asserted argument was not made.

7. It was error to exclude testimony regarding violent incidents occurring on the night of the homicide in the same area, which might illustrate the conditions existing at the time of the homicide.

8. It was not error to refuse to allow a witness, who had testified that he participated in rioting after the homicide, to answer the question as to whether he would have participated in rioting if he had the opportunity.

9. It was improper for the judge in the presence of the jury to state that he wanted actions of counsel in interviewing a witness investigated.

10. The testimony of the mother of the deceased that her son was shot on the sidewalk in front of their apartment was a reasonable deduction from the facts related by her.

11. The statement of a police officer that he knew the defendant prior to the homicide did not place the defendant's character in issue.

12. An assignment of error which is not argued is considered as abandoned.

Muskett & Moore, Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Sol. Gen., J. Walter LeCraw, George K. McPherson, Jr., Amber W. Anderson, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Marion O. Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mathew Robins, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

MOBLEY, Justice.

William Haywood James was convicted of the murder of Hulet M. Varner, Jr., with a recommendation of mercy, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The evidence for the State showed the following: On the night of September 10, 1966, a group of Negro youths were returning from a football game, and as they were coming up Boulevard, near Ponce de Leon Avenue, in the City of Atlanta, a car described as a 1959 black and white Chevrolet with a hole in the right tail light (identified as the car owned by the defendant) was driven up beside them, and a woman in the car called to them, 'Hey, how are you doing.' Someone in the group replied, one witness stating that one of the group said, 'Hey, baby,' or 'Hey, sweetheart.' The woman pulled a gun out of a paper sack, and the youths ran away from the car. Several minutes later they heard shots fired from the direction in which the car was going. On the same evening another group of Negro youths were on Boulevard, in front of a building numbered 420 Boulevard, when a car of the same description stopped in front of them. The man and woman in the car were talking to each other. Then the man, who was driving the car, backed it to where the group was standing, and the woman asked the youths if they called them, and they replied that they had not. The driver then pushed the woman aside and shot into the group several times, wounding one of the youths and killing the deceased. The driver of the car was identified by several witnesses as the defendant on trial. The witnesses to the shooting testified that no one attacked the persons in the car, or hit the car with any object, prior to the shooting. There was testimony that a riot occurred after the shooting.

In his unsworn statement the defendant related the following: On the night of September 10, 1966, he and his wife were traveling from a launderette on Ponce de Leon Avenue to their home. When they turned the corner into Boulevard, there was a group of Negroes walking slowly, chanting something which he could not understand. They started calling to his wife, saying 'Hey, baby,' and making obscene and threatening remarks to him and his wife. He proceeded a little faster, and there was another group up the street. At the next corner he had to stop for a red light, and he saw a group of Negroes who were calling to each other by name, and shouting, 'black power,' and, 'let's keep Carmichael out of jail.' One jumped on the bumper of his car, and beat on the trunk, shouting, 'black power and down with white people, up with black people.' The defendant proceeded up the street, and a Negro man at a whiskey store threw a bottle, which went over the hood of his car because he suddenly pressed on the brakes. The man on the back of the car tried to stop them. A car pulled out in front of them, which blocked them. When the defendant tried to back the car, a group blocked him in that direction. His wife became frantic, and she reached for the gun which he kept in the car for her protection. He told her to give it to him, and he put the gun under the seat. He intended to try to back up the car again but someone hit him with a brick on the side of his head, and made threatening and obscene remarks to them. He then saw a man with a small pistol, which looked as if it were pointed at his wife. He reached underneath the seat and got his pistol, and fired it two or three times into the crowd, and they started dispersing. He rushed from the scene, and was too frightened to tell anyone what happened.

1. Twenty assignments of error are enumerated. Assignments 1 through 5, 15, 16, 18, and 19 relate to the introduction in evidence of statements or admissions of the defendant. The incriminating admissions were his statements to the police officers interrogating him that the injuries on his head and side which he displayed to them were received on Thursday night, and not on Saturday night, the time of the homicide; his denial of ownership of the car described by the witnesses, his later admission of ownership of the car after the officers told him that his fingerprints were on the car, and his denial that he used the car on the night of the homicide.

In the first assignment of error it is asserted that it was error not to grant an independent hearing as to whether any statements or admissions made by the defendant were voluntary. In the fourth assignment of error it is contended that the court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained by the State in violation of his constitutional rights.

At the commencement of the trial, counsel for the defendant submitted a written motion to suppress evidence of admissions or statements of the defendant asserted to have been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The trial judge refused to hear evidence on the question of voluntariness at that time. He did have a separate hearing, out of the presence of the jury, as to the voluntariness of the defendant's statements, and whether his constitutional rights were denied him at the time of making the statements, prior to the introduction of the statements in evidence. Counsel for the defendant rely on Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, which held that an accused is entitled to a state court hearing on the issue of voluntariness of a confession by a body other than the one trying his guilt or innocence. In that case (at page 376, 84 S.Ct. at page 1780) it was held: 'It is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession, * * * and even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction * * * Equally clear is the defendant's constitutional right at some stage in the proceeding to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession.'

The rulings in Jackson v. Denno, supra, were followed in the present case by the trial judge, who heard lengthy testimony in regard to the circumstances surrounding the statements or admissions of the defendant, out of the presence of the jury. This was done 'at some stage in the proceedings' within the meaning of the decision in Jackson v. Denno, supra, and the assignments of error on the denial of the motion to suppress evidence are without merit.

The second assignment of error is the failure of the judge to make a specific finding as to whether or not any statements or admissions made by the defendant were voluntary, prior to submitting the issue to the jury. The record shows that both by an oral announcement (not in the presence of the jury), and a written order, the judge made a specific finding that the statements were voluntary and admissible, and there is no merit in this contention.

2. The third assignment of error asserts that the judge erred in not submitting the issue of voluntariness of any statements or admissions of the defendant to an independent jury separate from the jury which tried the case. It is insisted that under Georgia law questions of voluntariness of a confession have been held to be issues for determination by a jury, citing Claybourn v. State, 190 Ga. 861, 11 S.E.2d 23, and Bryant...