James v. United States

• Decision Date: 13 June 2014
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 13–cv–1789 KBJ
• Citation: 48 F.Supp.3d 58
• Parties: Norman James, Plaintiff, v. United States of America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

48 F.Supp.3d 58

Norman James, Plaintiff

v.United States of America, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 13–cv–1789 KBJ

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed June 13, 2014

Norman James, Washington, DC, pro se.

Rafique Omar Anderson, Robert N. Englund, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge

In August of 2013, pro se Plaintiff Norman James (“James”) filed an action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia related to two alleged incidents of police misconduct. (See Attach. to Suppl. Mem. to Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 12, at 34 (“Compl.”); Superior Court Original File, ECF No. 3–1 at 34 (“Am. Compl.”).)¹ James maintained, first, that Officer Lee of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) had improperly detained him and had mistakenly accused him of assault when James attempted to assist a woman who was crying on the street. (Compl.) James also alleged that, when he went to Superior Court to file a lawsuit related to that initial miscarriage of justice, another officer questioned him about his possible association with an individual who had just been arrested in the courthouse, and three U.S. Marshals, one FBI agent, and two clerks who overheard the interaction allegedly laughed at James, purportedly defaming him. (Am.Compl.) James's amended complaint regarding both of these incidents—which was removed to federal court on November 14, 2013 (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1)—seeks one million dollars in damages from (1) the various state and federal law enforcement officers involved in the two events; (2) the person who was arrested in Superior Court; and (3) an individual named “Jose.” (Id. )

Before this Court at present is the United States' motion to dismiss the complaint, in which it argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over James's action because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity for the defamationclaims. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 2, at 3.)² Because this Court agrees that it lacks jurisdiction over James's claims against the United States, the United States' motion to dismiss is GRANTED . Moreover, as explained below, this Court concludes that James has failed to articulate any facts that state a plausible claim for relief against the remaining defendants in this matter. Accordingly, the entire case is DISMISSED with prejudice. A separate order consistent with this opinion will follow.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

James's handwritten complaints contain very little factual information and are difficult to decipher, but what can be gleaned about the relevant events, both from the original complaint and the amended complaint, is as follows.³

On an unspecified date, James alleges that he heard a shirtless and shoeless woman crying near the Government Printing Office (“GPO”), and that he requested assistance for her from two nearby GPO police officers. (See Compl.; Am. Compl.) James asserts that the officers accused him of assaulting the woman (Compl.) and “refused to give their names” (Am. Compl.). He further asserts that MPD Officer Lee placed him “in handcuffs” and that the officers “put the [woman] in the back seat of the car.” (Compl.) Thereafter, James filed a complaint in Superior Court of the District of Columbia arising from this incident, alleging that “[u]nnecessary force and false accusation was used by the police.” (Id. )

The amended complaint alleges additional facts arising out of James's trip to the courthouse to file his civil complaint. Specifically, James states that “after walking from the judge's chamber to the Civil Division[,]” an unnamed officer came into the courthouse and arrested an individual named “Chris Walker.” (Am. Compl.) That officer then asked James—who was a total bystander—if he was with Walker (the arrestee). The complaint does not provide any additional details regarding that interaction, but James alleges that two clerks, three unnamed U.S. Marshals and one FBI agent then laughed at him, which, according to the complaint, constituted defamation. (Id. ) James then amended his initial complaint to include this incident.

A Notice of Removal was filed in this matter on November 14, 2013, and as a part of that Notice, the Chief of the Civil Division of the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia certified that the federal officers named in James' lawsuit “were acting within the scope of their employment as employees of the United States at the time of the alleged incidents.” (Certification, Ex. B to Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1–2 (“Westfall Certification”).)⁴ Consequently, the United States has been substituted for the federal officers as a defendant in this matter, and this Court construes James's removed complaint as one that has been brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 –80, insofar as the federal defendant is concerned. See Osborn, 549 U.S. at 229–30, 127 S.Ct. 881 (when the Attorney General issues a Westfall Certification in a suit brought in state court, the “litigation is thereafter governed by the [FTCA]”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (establishing that a tort action against the United States must be treated as one brought under FTCA).

The United States has now moved to dismiss the claims against the federal defendant for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. (See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 2, at 3–4.) The motion also maintains that service was improperly effected in this case. (Id. at 4.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Dismissal For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The United States contends that this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain James's defamation claim against it, and thus that the amended complaint's claims against it must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). It is well-settled that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ; Halcomb v. Office of the Senate Sergeant–at–Arms of the U.S. Senate, 209 F.Supp.2d 175, 176 (D.D.C.2002). Indeed, when it comes to Rule 12(b)(1), it is “ ‘presumed that a cause lies outside [the federal courts'] limited jurisdiction,’ unless the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court possesses jurisdiction[.]” Muhammed v. F . D . I . C . , 751 F.Supp.2d 114, 118 (D.D.C.2010) (first alteration in original) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ).

“[T]he court must scrutinize the plaintiff's allegations more closely when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under ... Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F.Supp.2d 59, 65 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C.Cir.2003) ). Still, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2008), but it need not “accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations [,]” Rann v. Chao, 154 F.Supp.2d 61, 64 (D.D.C.2001).

B. Sua Sponte Dismissal For Failure To State A Claim

“Ordinarily, the sufficiency of a complaint is tested by a [defendant's] motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim” upon which relief can be granted. Bauer v. Marmara, 942 F.Supp.2d 31, 37 (D.D.C.2013) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ). But if the complaint's failure to state a claim for the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) “is patent, it is practical and fully consistent with plaintiffs' rights and the efficient use of judicial resources for the court to act on its own initiative and dismiss the action.” Bauer, 942 F.Supp.2d at 37 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 331 (D.C.Cir.1994) ; Baker v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C.Cir.1990). Moreover, under Rule 8(a), a court is authorized to dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The plausibility standard is satisfied “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted).

In deciding whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court “must treat the complaint's factual allegations—including mixed questions of law and fact—as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor.”Epps v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 719 F.Supp.2d 7, 13 (D.D.C.2010) (citations omitted). However, the court need not accept as true inferences unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint or legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002).

C. Standards For Pro Se Plaintiffs

In applying the legal standards addressed above, the Court is mindful of the fact that James is proceeding in this matter pro se. The pleadings of pro se parties are to be “liberally construed,” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). “This benefit is not, however, a license to...