James v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-60822-CIV.,05-60822-CIV.
• Citation: 489 F.Supp.2d 1341
• Parties: Rodney JAMES, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WASH DEPOT HOLDINGS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

489 F.Supp.2d 1341

Rodney JAMES, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WASH DEPOT HOLDINGS, INC., Defendant.

No. 05-60822-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

May 14, 2007.

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Chris Kleppin, Glasser Boreth Ceasar & Kleppin, Plantation, FL, for Plaintiff.

Peter Wolfson Zinober, Shane T. Munoz, Jaimi Lamb Kerr, Zinober & McCrea, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES

DIMITROULEAS, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Plaintiff, Rodney James and his Counsel's Verified Motion for Attorney's Fees [DE 141]. The Court has carefully considered the Motion [DE 141]. Defendant Wash Depot's Response [DE 166], Plaintiff and his Counsel's Reply [DE 175], Plaintiffs Notice of Additional Authority [DE 180], Defendants' Notices of Supplemental Authority [DEs 188 & 190], the parties affidavits and exhibits and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

I. BACKGROUND

In the underlying lawsuit, Plaintiff asserted claims of: (1) race discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"); (2) retaliation under the FCRA, for alleged complaints of race discrimination; (3) retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), for alleged complaints about his pay; (4) retaliation under the Florida Whistleblower Act ("FWA"), for alleged complaints about discrimination, his pay, and the alleged hiring of illegal workers; (5) failure to pay minimum wage under the FLSA; and (6) failure to pay overtime under the FLSA. In his Rule 26 disclosures, Plaintiff calculated that he had suffered more than $600,000 in damages.

On November 21, 2006 this Court entered an Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to all of the Plaintiffs claims except the minimum wage and overtime claims under the FLSA [DE 102]. The two FLSA claims proceeded to trial. After a three-day jury trial the jury found in favor of Wash Depot with respect to the minimum wage claim and in favor of James on the overtime claim. The jury awarded James $1,746.81 in damages. After liquidating damages, Plaintiffs total judgment in the matter was $3,493.62.

As a prevailing plaintiff under the FLSA, Plaintiff and his counsel now seek $377,090.62 in attorneys fees for prevailing on the FLSA overtime claim. Plaintiff claims that all of the hours claimed in this motion were spent on the FLSA wage and hour claims rather than on the discrimination and retaliation claims, on which the Defendant prevailed. Defendant vigorously objects to the award of any fees in this matter and further argues that if fees are awarded that the amount should be significantly less than what the Plaintiff requests.

II. DISCUSSION

In the United States, the "American Rule" provides that, absent a contrary direction from Congress, the prevailing party in a litigation is not ordinarily entitled to recover attorneys fees from his opponent. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). The FLSA, however, explicitly provides that the Court "shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Thus, fee awards are mandatory for prevailing plaintiffs in FLSA cases. See Kreager v. Solomon & Flanagan, P.A., 775 F.2d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir.1985); Shelton v. Ervin, 830 F.2d 182, 184 (11th Cir.1987) ("Section 216 provides for an award of attorney's fees, as opposed to granting the court discretion in awarding such fees, to the prevailing plaintiff in FLSA cases."). There is no real dispute that James is a prevailing plaintiff in this action with respect to his FLSA overtime claims, and as such, is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees.¹ The Supreme Court has held that a party is a "prevailing party" for purposes of an attorney's fee award if the party "succeeded on any significant claim affording it some of the relief sought." Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989).

In the Eleventh Circuit, Norman v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir.1988), and Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), provide the framework for awarding attorneys fees to prevailing plaintiffs. To begin its analysis, the Court must first determine the "lodestar," which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended in a litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. See e.g. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933; Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. While the "lodestar" method effectively replaced the balancing test previously prescribed by Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19, the twelve (12) Johnson factors² "might still be considered in terms of their influence on the lodestar amount." Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. The burden of establishing the number of hours reasonably expended, lies with the Plaintiff, and "[w]here the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933; see also Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303. Similarly, the Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the hourly rate requested is a reasonable one. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir.1994).

The determination of reasonableness lies in the sound discretion of the trial court, Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. In determining whether the number of hours expended on the litigation was reasonable, the district court should exclude from its initial fee calculation "hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Also, in making this calculation, the court should exclude "time spent on discrete and unsuccessful claims." Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. "The congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Fee applicants are required to exercise "billing judgment" and exclude these hours from their fee application. ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423 (11th Cir.1999), "If fee applicants do not exercise billing judgment, courts are obligated to do it for them, to cut the amount of hours for which payment is sought, pruning out those that are `excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'" Id.

When determining a reasonable hourly rate, the rate should be "the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation." Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. "Evidence of rates may be adduced through direct evidence of charges by lawyers under similar circumstances or by opinion evidence." Id. On the issue of a reasonable rate, the Court is itself considered an expert and can make an informed judgment as to a proper award of fees even without the benefit of outside testimony. Id. at 1303; see also Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781.

"The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the `results obtained.'" Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. "There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations. The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. The court necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The most important factor to consider is the result obtained. Id. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933. If the success was limited or the plaintiff's victory was limited, the lodestar must be reduced to reflect the limited result. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302; See also Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1579-80 (11th Cir.1987). Fee awards, however, should not simply be proportionate to the results obtained by the Plaintiff. Andrews v. United States, 122 F.3d 1367, 1376 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986)). As this Court has noted before, "[g]iven the nature of claims under the FLSA, it is not uncommon that attorneys' .fee requests will exceed the amount of judgment in the case.'" Tyler v. Westway Auto. Serv. Ctr., Inc., 133 Fed.Appx. 604, 2005 WL 1208573, *9 (S.D.Fla.2005) (quoting Holyfield v. F.P. Quinn & Co., 1991 WL 65928, *1 (N.D.Ill. April 21, 1991) (court awarded approximately $7,000 in fees even though the judgment was only $921)); see also Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574, 106 S.Ct. 2686) ("`Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms.'"). It is against this background that the Plaintiffs attorneys fees request must be evaluated.

a. Calculating the Lodestar

1. The Number of Hours Expended

In this motion, Plaintiffs counsel requests $377,090.62 in attorneys fees. This amount is based on the Plaintiffs calculated lodestar of $301,672.50 with a 25% upward adjustment for "excellent results obtained." The Plaintiff has submitted an hourly log detailing time expended on the litigation by the three attorneys involved (Chris Kleppin (416.1). Lloyd S. Glasser (260.0) and Harry 0. Boreth (46.6)) [DE 141-2 Ex. 5]. Defendant objects to specific time entries as redundant, or expended on ultimately unsuccessful claims. In his Reply, Plaintiffs counsel does not directly address or dispute any of the specific objections made by the Defendant...