James v. Wilson, 1999-CA-000787-MR.
| Decision Date | 19 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 2000-CA-001690-MR.,No. 1999-CA-002172-MR.,No. 2000-CA-001687-MR.,No. 2000-CA401862-MR.,No. 2000-CA-001382-MR.,No. 2000-CA-001491-MR.,No. 2000-CA-001379-MR.,No. 1999-CA-000787-MR.,No. 1999-CA-001209-MR.,No. 2000-CA-001688-MR.,1999-CA-000787-MR.,1999-CA-001209-MR.,1999-CA-002172-MR.,2000-CA-001379-MR.,2000-CA-001382-MR.,2000-CA-001491-MR.,2000-CA-001687-MR.,2000-CA-001688-MR.,2000-CA-001690-MR.,2000-CA401862-MR. |
| Citation | 95 S.W.3d 875 |
| Parties | Joe JAMES and Judy James, Individually and as Co-Administrators of the Estate of Jessica Jeanette James, Thomas Wayne Steger and Sabrina Collins Steger, Individually and as Co-Administrators of the Estate of Kayce Steger and Chuck Hadley, Individually, and Gwen Hadley, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Nicole Marie Hadley, Appellants, v. Larry WILSON, Randy Wright, Glenda Collins, Connie Smith, Bill Bond, Barbara W. McGinty, Tobe Dulworth, Jana Mansfield, Georgia Tomlin, Alan Warford, Brandon Newberry, Tilford L. Underwood, Barbara Vick, Charles Courtney, Alan Mullins, Shirley Turner, Bob Steele, Roger Hayes and Donna Mattingly (No. 1999-CA-000787-MR), Trent Matthis, Sam McReynolds, Alan Coleman, Ryan Cornille and Jay Massie (No. 1999-CA-001209-MR), Amy White, Cathy Evanko and Pam Wrinkle (No. 1999-CA-002172-MR), Wendall Nace (No. 2000-CA-001379-MR), Sara Culp, Amanda Jones, Ben Strong, Becky Flynn and Robert Teer (No. 2000-CA-001382-MR and No. 2000-CA-001491-MR), Matthew Barnett, Michael Alonso, James O'Nan and Toby Nace (No. 2000-CA-001687-MR), Jeremy Ellis (No. 2000-CA-001688-MR), Mike Zink (No. 2000-CA-001690-MR), and John Carneal and Ann Carneal (No. 2000-CA-001862-MR), Appellees. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Mike Breen, Bowling Green, KY, for appellants.
Michael D. Moore, Richard C. Roberts (on brief), Whitlow, Roberts, Houston & Straub, Paducah, KY, for appellees John and Ann Carneal.
Robert L. Prince, Prince & Brien, P.S.C., Benton, KY, for appellee Wendall Nace.
Richard E. Peyton (on brief), Frymire, Evans, Peyton, Teague & Cartwright, Madisonville, KY, for appellee Sam McReynolds.
Daniel S. Stratemeyer (on brief), Paducah, KY, for appellee Ryan Cornille.
Max S. Hartz (brief only), McCarroll, Nunley & Hartz Owensboro, KY, for appellees Jay Massie and Robert Teer.
Stephen D. Gray (on brief), J. Christopher Hopgood, Dorsey, King, Gray & Norment, Henderson, KY, for appellee Trent Matthis.
Robert V. Bowers, Jr. (on brief), Richard L. Walls, Bennett, Bowman, Triplett & Vittitow, Owensboro, KY, for appellee Alan Coleman.
Reford H. Coleman (on brief), Matthew C. Hess (on brief), Coleman, Lochmiller & Hall, Elizabethtown, KY, for appellee Becky Flynn.
Timothy D. Mefford (on brief), Franklin, KY, for appellee Matthew Barnett.
Timothy L. Edelen, Paul T. Lawless (on brief), Bell, Orr, Ayers & Moore, P.S.C., Bowling Green, KY, for appellee Jeremy Ellis.
Richard L. Walter (on brief), Boehl, Stopher & Graves, LLP, Paducah, KY, for appellee Michael Alonso.
Stephen M. Arnett (on brief), Hulett & Arnett, Morganfield, KY, for appellee Toby Nace.
C.A. Woodall, III (on brief), Woodall & Quinn, PLLC, Cadiz, KY, for appellee Mike Zink.
Wm. Kevin Shannon (on brief), Bryant & Kautz, PSC, Paducah, KY, for appellee James O'Nan.
Whitni J. Cayce (on brief), Richard L. Walter, Boehl Stopher & Graves, LLP, Paducah, KY, for appellee Sara Culp.
Serieta G. Jaggers (on brief), Jackson & Jaggers, Paducah, KY, for appellee Ben Strong.
No brief filed for appellee Amanda Jones.
Michael A. Owsley, Regina A. Jackson (on brief), English, Lucas, Priest & Owsley, Bowling Green, KY, for appellees Larry Wilson, Randy Wright, Glenda Collins, Connie Smith, Bill Bond, Barbara W. McGinty, Tobe Dulworth, Jana Mansfield, Georgia Tomlin, Alan Warford, Brandon Newberry, Tilford L. Underwood, Barbara Vick, Charles Courtney, Alan Mullins, Shirley Turner, Bob Steele, Roger Hayes, Donna Mattingly, Amy White, Cathy Evanko and Pam Wrinkle.
Before GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON and JOHNSON, Judges.
It would be difficult to overstate the horrific nature of the events which gave rise to the case now before the Court, or the grievous effects they have had on the individuals and the community involved.
On December 1, 1997, Michael Carneal, then fourteen years of age, entered Heath High School in McCracken County, Kentucky, with a number of weapons. After inserting earplugs, he removed a .22 caliber pistol from his backpack and opened fire into a prayer group, killing three students and injuring five more.1 In the wake of that tragedy, appellants, the parents of the three students who were killed, sought to impose civil liability on some fifty-three defendants, not all of whom are presently before this Court.2
While the specific details and procedural history of this case are complicated and convoluted, the various legal theories advanced can be greatly simplified and grouped into meaningful categories. Specifically, the issues presented are:
• Should the venue of this action have been transferred outside McCracken County?
• Should the circuit judge have recused himself in light of comments he made to the media?
• Does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to the alleged negligence of the owner of the .22 caliber pistol used in the shooting?
• Does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to the alleged negligence of the parents of Michael Carneal?
• Did those students who allegedly had seen Michael Carneal previously bring a gun to school or who had some indication of his planned attack have a duty to warn others so as to give rise to a legally cognizable claim entitling appellants to relief?
• Does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to whether certain students negligently encouraged Michael Carneal to commit these horrific acts or conspired with Carneal to take over Heath High School?
• Finally, are those teachers and/or school personnel named as defendants-appellees in this case immune from a suit for damages?
For reasons to be explained below, we conclude that appellants have neither stated legally cognizable' claims upon which relief may be granted nor presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding those claims for which relief could potentially have been granted. With that introduction, we address each legal issue in turn.
All the legal questions before the Court for review in this case arise in the context of summary judgment3 or dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.4 Consequently, we shall outline separately those standards of review.
Summary judgment is only proper "where the movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances."5 However, "a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat that motion without presenting at least some affirmative evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial."6 The circuit court must view the record "in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor."7 The trial judge must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists."8
This Court has said that the standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is
whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... There is no requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial court since factual findings are not at issue.9
In the context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,10 the analysis is somewhat different. "The court should not grant the motion unless it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his claim."11 In making this decision, the circuit court is not required to make any factual determination; rather, the question is purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?
A sizeable portion of each of the several briefs filed by appellants in these appeals is devoted to the issue of whether these cases should be tried in McCracken County or moved elsewhere. The appellants contend that these cases and the related criminal case generated so much media attention that it would be impossible to impanel an impartial jury in McCracken County or, for that matter, in any county in Western Kentucky.
The circuit court neither granted nor denied the appellants' motion for a change of venue. Rather, the court deferred ruling on the motion until the day of trial in order to first determine whether it would be possible to seat an impartial jury in McCracken County. In the event that an impartial venire could not be had, the court indicated that it would grant the motion for change of venue.
It is, therefore, readily apparent that the circuit court's decision on the venue issue did not amount to a final order under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 54.01, and thus is not one from which an appeal may be taken. Consequently, the question of whether the place of trial should have been transferred to some venue other than McCracken County is not properly before us for review.12
Equally pervading the appellants' briefs is the contention that the special circuit judge, the Honorable William L. Shadoan, should have stepped aside because he could not impartially try these cases.13 At the heart of this allegation are several statements made by Judge Shadoan to the media, particularly the Paducah Sun newspaper. Appellants argue that statements made by Judge Shadoan evinced a lack of impartiality on his part and a failure to abide by the Kentucky...
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