Jane Doe v. New London Cmty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 17 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–0405.,13–0405.
• Citation: 848 N.W.2d 347
• Parties: Jane DOE, Appellee, v. NEW LONDON COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, Gina Sisk, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

848 N.W.2d 347

Jane DOE, Appellee,

v.NEW LONDON COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant,Gina Sisk, Defendant.

No. 13–0405.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 20, 2014.

Rehearing Denied July 17, 2014.

Prior Version Recognized as Unconstitutional

I.C.A. § 670.5

Steven E. Ort of Bell, Ort & Liechty, New London, for appellant New London Community School District.

Roxanne Barton Conlin of Roxanne Conlin & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Alfredo G. Parrish and Tammy M. Westhoff Gentry of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Boles Gribble Gentry & Fisher, L.L.P., Des Moines, for defendant Gina Sisk.

MANSFIELD, Justice.

This case requires us to decide the timeliness of a lawsuit filed against a school district in 2012 alleging past sexual abuse. The abuse was alleged to have occurred when the plaintiff was a high school student in the early 2000s. The alleged abuser was a teacher who also served as the plaintiff's track coach.

The school district moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations in the pre–2007 Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act. The district court denied the motion. We granted the district's application for interlocutory appeal. We now reverse the district court, holding: (1) the common law discovery rule does not apply to claims under the pre–2007 Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act; (2) Iowa Code section 614.8A (2005) does not apply to individuals who were fourteen years or older when the alleged sexual abuse occurred; and (3) the absence of a discovery rule in the pre–2007 Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act does not violate article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution.

I. Facts and Procedural Background.

Like the parties and the district court, we assume the truth of plaintiff's factual allegations for purposes of our review.

Plaintiff Jane Doe attended school in the New London Community School District (the District). When Doe started eighth grade in August 1999, defendant Gina Sisk began her first year as an employee of the District and taught Doe's eighth-grade science class. Doe participated in track and field beginning in March of 2000; Sisk was her coach.

During the summer of 2000, Doe was fourteen years old and between the eighth and ninth grades. At that time, Sisk began to engage in improper sexual conduct toward her. The starting point was when Sisk drove Doe and another female student to Lincoln, Nebraska, to participate in a regional track meet. While there, Sisk, Doe, and the other student shared a hotel room. Sisk purchased and viewed a pornographic video in the hotel room shared with Doe and the other student. Sisk and Doe then slept together in the same hotel room bed, and Sisk fondled Doe's genitals.

Following the encounter in the hotel room in July 2000, Sisk regularly initiated sexual contact with Doe. The acts included kissing, fondling, digital penetration, and oral sex. Sisk instructed Doe to lie to her parents and others so Sisk could gain access to Doe. Sisk also arranged subsequent liaisons with Doe at hotels and motels.

The sexual activity continued during the 2000–2001 school year and thereafter. Doe feared for her safety at times during the relationship with Sisk. During one argument, Sisk pushed Doe into a locker and later called and harassed her. On another occasion, Sisk held a knife to Doe's throat and attempted to smother her with a pillow after Doe threatened to reveal the relationship. In addition to threatening violence, Sisk also threatened Doe's position on the track team. During the summer of 2002 when the relationship temporarily ceased, Sisk repeatedly drove by Doe's home and called her cell phone.

In the spring of 2003, Doe was called to the principal's office at the high school and asked whether she was involved in a relationship with Sisk. Sisk had instructed Doe to deny any relationship, and Doe did so “out of fear of Defendant Sisk and [a] desire to protect her position on the track team.” Doe was not further questioned by the school about Sisk or any relationship with her.

In May of 2003, as her junior year was ending, Doe decided to enlist in the United States Coast Guard. She “wanted to escape Defendant Sisk's control and knew that this would not be possible if she attended a local college to run track.” Even after Doe joined the Coast Guard upon her high school graduation in 2004, Sisk continued to contact Doe by sending her letters and visiting her in Florida and Tennessee. Doe finally ceased all contact with Sisk in 2006. In July 2008, Doe left active duty with the Coast Guard.

In 2011, Doe sought the services of a counselor due to issues with anxiety and depression. It was through counseling that Doe claims she “discovered a causal link between the sexual abuse she endured as an adolescent, at the hands of Defendant Sisk, and the emotional problems she had been experiencing for many years.”

On March 2, 2012, Doe filed a petition against Sisk and the District. She asserted claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Sisk. Against the District, she alleged claims of respondeat superior, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent supervision, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Against both defendants, she asserted claims of negligence and violations under the Iowa Constitution. Sisk denied Doe's allegations about the sexual relationship. The District also denied any wrongdoing. Both the District and Sisk filed motions for summary judgment arguing that Doe's claims were barred by the statute of limitations in the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA). SeeIowa Code § 670.5 (2005).¹ Doe resisted and maintained her claims were timely filed because of the discovery rule. She alleged that the IMTCA incorporates a common law discovery rule allowing claims to be brought within two years of the date when the injury and its cause reasonably could have been discovered. See, e.g., Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261, 269 (Iowa 1995) (“The common law discovery rule requires that the plaintiff know or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known both the fact of the injury and its cause.”). Alternatively, if the IMTCA did not include a discovery rule, she alleged that this circumstance violated the equal protection clause in the Iowa Constitution. SeeIowa Const. art. I, § 6.

On February 18, 2013, the district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment and held that “at least two genuine issues of material fact” were in dispute. “First, Doe and the Defendants disagree as to whether or not Doe provided [the District] with notice of her claim before the commencement of this action....” Second, according to the district court, “the parties disagree, and the Court believes that the record is not developed to the point to resolve the question of when Doe's injuries occurred.” The district court went on to state that the defendants had not “satisfied [their] burden of production to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the application of the appropriate statute of limitations to [Doe]'s claim.”

Both Sisk and the District filed applications for interlocutory appeal, which we granted. While the appeal was pending, Sisk was dismissed from the lawsuit by stipulation. The District continued to pursue its appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

We review the district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors of law. Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). We view the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 443 (Iowa 2013). We review constitutional issues de novo. Lewis v. Jaeger, 818 N.W.2d 165, 175 (Iowa 2012).

III. Analysis.

The district court denied the summary judgment motions after finding the presence of genuine issues of material fact. However, the parties now essentially agree that the dispositive issue is one of law—whether a discovery rule is available to the plaintiff. If it is not, then plaintiff's claims are time-barred. Our conclusion that the fate of this lawsuit turns on the availability of a discovery rule appears to be inescapable. No injury is alleged to have occurred after 2006, and no notice is alleged to have been given after March 2003, yet Doe did not file suit until March 2012. Of course, we exclude the time period from July 2004 until July 2008 when Doe was in the Coast Guard. See50 App. U.S.C.A. § 526(a) (West Supp.2013) (tolling of statutes of limitation during military service). Still, more than two years elapsed from July 2008, when Doe left active duty, until March 2012, when she filed suit.

The IMTCA has a two-year statute of limitations, seeIowa Code § 670.5, and no party disputes the applicability of the IMTCA to the present case. Sisk was employed by the District when the alleged abuse occurred. See id. § 670.1(2) ( “ Municipality ” means city, county, township, school district, and any other unit of local government....); id. § 670.2 (“[E]very municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers and employees, acting within the scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function.”).

A. Does the IMTCA Incorporate a Common Law Discovery Rule? At the time of the alleged misconduct, the IMTCA provided as follows:

Every person who claims damages from any municipality or any officer, employee or agent of a municipality for or on account of any wrongful death, loss or injury within the scope of section 670.2 or section 670.8 or under common law shall commence an action therefor within six months, unless said person shall cause to be presented to...