Jean–Laurent v. Hennessy

• Decision Date: 24 October 2011
• Docket Number: No. 05–CV–1155 (KAM)(LB).,05–CV–1155 (KAM)(LB).
• Citation: 840 F.Supp.2d 529
• Parties: Phillip JEAN–LAURENT, Plaintiff, v. P.O. David HENNESSY; P.O. John Doe; Sgt. Paul O'Donnell, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

840 F.Supp.2d 529

Phillip JEAN–LAURENT, Plaintiff,

v.P.O. David HENNESSY; P.O. John Doe; Sgt. Paul O'Donnell, Defendants.

No. 05–CV–1155 (KAM)(LB).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Oct. 24, 2011.

Phillip Jean–Laurent, South Ozone Park, NY, pro se.

Anna Nguyen Fretel, Joseph Anthony Marutollo, Morgan David Kunz, New York City Law Department, Benjamin E. Stockman, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MATSUMOTO, District Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Phillip Jean–Laurent brought this action against New York City Police Department Officers David Hennessy and “John Doe,” and Sergeant Paul O'Donnell, alleging violations of his federal rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and New York State tort law in connection with his arrest on June 11, 2002. Pending before the court are the parties' motions in limine to preclude certain evidence at trial pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, 404, 602, 608, 609, 801, 802 and 902. For the following reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part the parties' motions.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action pro se in the Southern District of New York on February 2, 2005. (ECF No. 4–3, Initial Complaint (“Init. Compl.”).) The case was transferred to the Eastern District of New York on February 24, 2005 because the underlying events occurred in this judicial district. ( See ECF No. 4, Transfer Order.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on December 5, 2005. (ECF No. 22, Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”).) On August 1, 2008, Judge Bianco denied in part and granted in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 79, Memorandum and Order dated 8/1/2008.) The claims that survived defendants' motion for summary judgment were those alleging (1) a federal claim for excessive force; (2) a federal claim for unreasonablesearch and seizure as to plaintiff's alleged public strip search; and (3) state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy and “deprivation of money,” or conversion, under New York law. ( Id.)

Discovery proceeded before Judge Bloom, and was closed on December 17, 2009, except with respect to identification of plaintiff's witnesses. (ECF No. 127, Order dated 12/17/2009.) In an abundance of caution, Judge Bloom granted one last opportunity, until October 10, 2010, for plaintiff to properly identify all witnesses on his witness list. ( Id.) On January 31, 2011, the parties submitted their Second Revised Joint Pre–Trial Order, which included several stipulations of fact. (ECF No. 144 (“Sec. Rev. JPTO”) at 5.)

On August 11, 2011, the parties filed the motions in limine presently before the court. (ECF No. 152, Defendants' Pretrial Submissions Concerning Matters To Be Resolved in Limine (“Defs.' Mem.”); ECF No. 155, Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (“Pl.'s Mem.”).) Defendants filed a memorandum of law in opposition to plaintiff's motions in limine ( see ECF No. 156, Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (“Defs.' Opp'n”)), but plaintiff did not file an opposition to defendants' motions. Trial is scheduled to begin on November 14, 2011. The court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts of the instant case. See Jean–Laurent v. Hennessy, No. 05–cv–1155, 2008 WL 3049875 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008).

DISCUSSION

II. Standard for a Motion in Limine

The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow the trial court to rule in advance of trial on the admissibility and relevance of certain forecasted evidence. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir.1996) (same); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. L.E. Myers Co. Grp., 937 F.Supp. 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (same). “Evidence should be excluded on a motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” United States v. Paredes, 176 F.Supp.2d 179, 181 (S.D.N.Y.2001). Indeed, courts considering a motion in limine may reserve decision until trial, so that the motion is placed in the appropriate factual context. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 937 F.Supp. at 287. Further, the court's ruling regarding a motion in limine is “subject to change when the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was [expected].” Luce, 469 U.S. at 41, 105 S.Ct. 460.

III. Admissibility of Evidence Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence

A. General Relevance Provisions

The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence at trial. Rule 402 requires that evidence be relevant to be admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is defined as evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. Therefore, the court's determination of what constitutes “relevant evidence” is guided by the nature of the claims and defenses in the cause of action.

1. Relevant Evidence in Excessive Force Claims

The motions in limine at bar primarily relate to plaintiff's excessive force and strip search claims.¹ In an excessiveforce claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he question is whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Bryant v. City of New York, 404 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, evidence that bears on the objective reasonableness of the officers' conduct is relevant to the excessive force claim in the present case. An analysis of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)).

2. Relevant Evidence in Claims Alleging Unreasonable Strip Search

Before a person can be lawfully subjected to a strip search, the “Fourth Amendment requires an individualized ‘reasonable suspicion that [a misdemeanor] arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the crime charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestee, and/or the circumstances of the arrest.’ ” Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir.1986)). Therefore, evidence relevant to the strip search claim bears on whether defendants had the requisite “reasonable suspicion,” which the Second Circuit has defined as “something stronger than a mere hunch, but something weaker than probable cause.” Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Determination of the reasonableness of defendants' suspicion “turns on an objective assessment of the ... facts and circumstances confronting [the searching officer] at the time.” Hartline, 546 F.3d at 100 (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470–71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

B. Application of Probative–Prejudice Analysis

In addition to the relevancy of the evidence that the parties seek to offer or exclude in their motions, several Rules of Evidence bear on the court's determination of admissibility. Each of the Rules relevant to the pending motions, discussed below, are subject to the probative-prejudice balancing analysis provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 permits the exclusion of evidence, even if relevant, “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. The district court has broad discretion in making decisions under Rule 403's probative-prejudice balancing analysis. Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 327–28 (2d Cir.1986). “In making a Rule 403 determination, courts should ask whether the evidence's proper value ‘is more than matched by [the possibility] ... that it will divert the jury from the facts which should control their verdict.’ ” Bensen v. Am. Ultramar, Ltd., No. 92–CIV–4420, 1996 WL 422262, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1996) (quoting United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir.1944)). The court applies the foregoing analysis to the parties' pending motions.

IV. Plaintiff's Motions in Limine

The court notes at the outset that a number of plaintiff's motions in liminedirectly correspond to motions in limine submitted by defendants. Therefore, where appropriate, the court has considered defendants' motions in limine with their memorandum of law in opposition to plaintiff's motions in limine.

A. Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Felony Convictions That Are More Than Ten Years Old

Plaintiff seeks to preclude the introduction of evidence of his prior felony convictions that are more than ten years old. (Pl.'s Mem. at 1–2.) Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b), such evidence is inadmissible unless (a) “the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction ... substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect,” and (b) the proponent of such evidence gives sufficient written notice of intent to introduce the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 609(b).

Defendants have not indicated any intention to introduce evidence of prior felony convictions dating back more than ten years. Even if defendants had sought to introduce such evidence, however, they would be barred for failure to comply with the notice requirement. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion in limine is granted.

B. Admissibility of Plaintiff's Prior Misdemeanor Convictions

Plain...