Jebco Ventures, Inc. v. City of Smyrna

• Decision Date: 09 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. S89A0478,S89A0478
• Citation: 259 Ga. 599,385 S.E.2d 397
• Parties: JEBCO VENTURES, INC., et al. v. CITY OF SMYRNA et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 397

385 S.E.2d 397

259 Ga. 599

JEBCO VENTURES, INC., et al. v. CITY OF SMYRNA et al.

No. S89A0478.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 9, 1989.

Reconsideration Denied Nov. 29, 1989.

Hylton B. Dupree, Jr., Mark A. Johnson, Hylton B. Dupree, Jr., P.C., Marietta, for Jebco Ventures, Inc., et al.

Charles E. Camp, Cochran, Camp & Snipes, Smyrna, for City of Smyrna et al.

MARSHALL, Chief Justice.

In this case, the plaintiffs-appellants, who own property in the City of Smyrna, contend that the defendants-appellees, the aforementioned municipality and its city council, acted in an unconstitutional manner in denying their application to rezone a two-tract parcel of land from Office & Institutional, and Residential Townhome Development, to Neighborhood Shopping, in order to permit the construction of a shopping mall at the intersection of Hurt and Concord Roads in the City of Smyrna.

The subject property is composed of a 3.901-acre tract owned by appellant Ramen Patel, and an 8.083-acre tract of land owned by appellant Richard Thompson.

The foregoing acreage is part of a 22.059-acre tract of land, which was the subject property in City of Smyrna v. Ruff, 240 Ga. 250, 240 S.E.2d 19 (1977), wherein it was held that, under the evidence of record in that case, the single-family residential zoning classification of the property resulted in a taking of property without just compensation and thus was unconstitutional under Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262, 219 S.E.2d 399 (1975).

In the present case, the appellants contend that this holding in Ruff is a "binding precedent" here. Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga.App. 768(1), 172 S.E.2d 344 (1969); Bray v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 103 Ga.App. 783, 120 S.E.2d 628 (1961).

The appellants also contend that, under criteria enunciated in Guhl v. Holcomb Bridge Road Corp., 238 Ga. 322, 232 S.E.2d 830 (1977), the evidence here shows in a clear and convincing manner that the existing zoning causes them a significant economic detriment and bears an insubstantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.

For reasons which follow, we reject these arguments and affirm. These are the facts:

The evidence in Ruff showed that the 22.059-acre tract is a triangular tract of land and is adjacent to Concord and Hurt Roads, which are two heavily traveled roads. The tract is located in a "fringe area" between commercial and residential properties. Future land-use maps for Cobb County and the City of Smyrna designated this property for office and institutional use. Concerns as to traffic congestion were not addressed by the city. And, the evidence showed that the property was worth $230,000 as zoned for single-family residential use; whereas the property was worth $760,000 if rezoned for neighborhood shopping, and office and institutional use, which was its highest and best use.

Following our decision in Ruff, the City of Smyrna rezoned the Patel tract to Office & Institutional, and the Thompson tract was rezoned to Neighborhood Shopping. However, in 1983, Ralph Combs, who had purchased what is now referred to as the Thompson tract, filed an application for rezoning of that tract to Residential Townhome Development, and the application was granted.

In June of 1984, appellant Thompson bought that tract, and in October of 1986, appellant Patel bought the other tract involved in this case.

As found by the trial court, the evidence in this case shows that the Thompson tract has appreciated in value since its purchase by Thompson, and, with regard to the Patel tract, the evidence shows "little loss in value."

However, these tracts have not yet been developed, although there have been other successful single-family and multi-family residential developments in the area.

In any event, both Patel and Thompson have entered into contracts to sell their properties to appellant, Jebco Ventures, Inc., conditioned upon the granting of their rezoning application.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court in this case entered findings of fact to the effect that the subject property tends to be a dividing line between properties which are almost exclusively residential in one direction and commercially developed properties in the other direction.

And, as to the remaining facts of this case, it is sufficient to state that, although the evidence as a whole fully supports the trial court's findings, there is some conflict in the evidence in regard to whether the commercial development of the subject property would adversely affect the market valuation of surrounding residential properties; whether such decreased valuation of surrounding properties would outweigh any decrease in the valuation of the subject property under its current, rather than proposed, zoning classification; whether development of the subject property for single-family or multi-family residential use is feasible under the facts and circumstances of this case; and whether the construction of a shopping center on this property would significantly increase traffic congestion in the area.

A real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the appellants stated that, in his opinion, the market value of the Patel tract is $255,000, as presently zoned, and the market value of the Thompson tract is $400,000, as presently zoned; whereas, if rezoned General Commercial, these two tracts would have a combined market valuation of $1,550,000.

1. As previously stated, the appellants' first contention is that City of Smyrna v Ruff, supra, constitutes a "binding precedent" in regard to the issue of whether the residential zoning of the subject property is constitutional.

As we noted in Norris v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 254 Ga. 684, 333 S.E.2d 835 (1985), the doctrine of "binding precedent" was first enunciated by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Bray v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 103 Ga.App. 783, 120 S.E.2d 628, supra, and it next finds expression in Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga.App. 768(1), 172 S.E.2d 344, supra.

As further noted in Norris, the doctrine of "binding precedent," as applied in Bray and Standard Oil, is "a species of collateral estoppel in which no privity is required." 254 Ga. at 685, 333 S.E.2d 835.

In this regard, a plea of collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, bars parties or their privies from relitigating issues which they have actually had adjudicated at a prior...