Jefferies v. District of Columbia
Decision Date | 08 January 2013 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 11–1159 (RCL). |
Citation | 916 F.Supp.2d 42 |
Parties | Nardyne JEFFERIES, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John F. Mercer, Mercer Law Associates, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Steven J. Anderson, Denise J. Baker, Office of Attorney General for DC, William Mark Nebeker, U.S. Attorney's Office, Clifford E. Pulliam, DC Housing Authority, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
This case arises out of the tragic March 30, 2010 death of sixteen-year-old Brishell Tashé Jones. The “theft” of a five-dollar piece of costume jewelry set off a chain of senseless retaliatory violence, eventually taking the lives of five teenagers. After attending the funeral of another young homicide victim, Ms. Jones congregated with a group of mourners on South Capitol Street. Orlando Carter and his crew—seeking revenge for an earlier assault—indiscriminately fired into the crowd from a rented minivan. Ms. Jones died from a gunshot wound to the head.1
Plaintiff Nardyne Jefferies is the mother of Ms. Jones, and the personal representative and executor of her estate. She has sought to hold a wide array of government agencies and private actors responsible for the death of her daughter. Among those parties is Romanian National Company ROMARM S.A. (“ROMARM”), which the Complaint alleges is “the manufacturer and exporter of the AK–47 assault rifle used in the retaliatory drive-by murder of Brishell Jones.” Compl. ¶ 30. The plaintiff alleges, “ROMARM had a duty to act, and either negligently or intentionally failed to act, or acted in a manner that created and/or increased the danger that put Brishell Jones directly in harm's way on March 30, 2010.” Id.
The law is very clear: The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”) explicitly bars this kind of suit. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901–03 (West 2013). This Act prohibits suits against firearms manufacturers and dealers for injuries “resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of” a firearm “by the person or a third party.” Id. § 7903. Since the controlling law unambiguously bars plaintiff's claims against ROMARM, a sua sponte dismissal is appropriate. The Court will dismiss all plaintiff's claims against ROMARM with prejudice.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “ ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a cause of action or case for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Typically, a court considers whether to dismiss a claim after the defendant files a motion to dismiss. “Complaints may also be dismissed, sua sponte if need be, under Rule 12(b)(6) whenever ‘the plaintiff cannot possibly win relief.’ ” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 331 (D.C.Cir.1994) (quoting Baker v. Director, United States Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C.Cir.1990)).2 In this District, Maynard v. District of Columbia, 579 F.Supp.2d 137, 142 (D.D.C.2008) (quoting Baker, 916 F.2d at 725, 726 & n. 2).
The court may dismiss a claim with prejudice when amending the complaint would be futile. See Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996) ( )(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted); Carty v. Author Solutions, Inc., 789 F.Supp.2d 131, 135–36 (D.D.C.2011) ( ).
It is clear that no “set of facts consistent with the allegations,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, could entitle plaintiff to any relief from ROMARM. The Complaint alleges that Ms. Jones' killers used a ROMARM-manufactured assault rifle during the drive by. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 47. The Complaint alleges that Ms. Jones' death was the direct and/or indirect result of the “negligence and/or incompetence by private gun manufacturer(s) (including ROMARM).” Id. ¶ 62. It alleges that “ROMARM had a duty to act, and either negligently or intentionally failed to act, or acted in a manner that created and/or increased the danger that put Brishell Jones directly in harm's way on March 30, 2010.” Id. ¶ 30.
Prior to the passage of the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, the District of Columbia had passed the Assault Weapons Manufacturing Strict Liability Act (“SLA”). D.C. Code ¶¶ 7–2551 (2001). The SLA provided that:
Any manufacturer, importer, or dealer of an assault weapon or machine gun shall be held strictly liable in tort, without regard to fault or proof of defect, for all direct and consequential damages that arise from bodily injury or death if the bodily injury or death proximately results from the discharge of the assault weapon or machine gun in the District of Columbia.
Id. § 7–2551.02. The SLA could have authorized an action against ROMARM. However, in 2006 Congress passed the PLCAA, which stated that firearms manufacturers, distributors, marketers and dealers “should not[ ] be liable for the harm caused by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse firearm products.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 7901(a)(5). The purpose of the PLCAA is to “prohibit causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition products ... for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by others when the product functioned as designed and intended.” Id. § 7901(b)(1).
Specifically, the PLCAA states, “A qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State court” and “[a] qualified civil liability action that is pending on October 26, 2005, shall be immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was brought or is currently pending.” Id. § 7902. The statute defines “qualified civil liability action” as “a civil action ... brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of [a firearm] 3 ... for damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of [a firearm] by the person or a third party.” Id. § 7903(6)(A). The PLCAA makes exceptions, inter alia, for negligent entrustment, breach of contract or warranty, and damages resulting directly from a defect or design or manufacture of the product (except where discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense). Id. §§ 7903(5)(A)(i)–(vi).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia have considered the effect and constitutionality of the PLCAA, as it relates to the SLA. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that SLA suits against assault weapon manufacturers do not fall under any exception to the PLCAA. District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. ( Beretta V ), 940 A.2d 163, 170–71 (D.C.2008), cert. denied––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1579, 173 L.Ed.2d 675 (2009). The Court held that the PLCAA barred suit against a gun manufacturer for injuries caused by the private, criminal use of its guns. Id. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that it was “bound by the D.C. Court of Appeals' interpretation of the SLA” in Beretta V, and agreed that the SLA does not create any exception to the PLCAA. Estate of Charlot v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 628 F.Supp.2d 174, 181 (D.D.C.2009). The Court then held that the PLCAA “preempts and displaces conflicting state law.” Id. at 184. The Court also upheld the constitutionality of the PLCAA against separation of powers challenges:
The Court rejects plaintiffs' argument that the PLCAA imposes an impermissible rule of decision upon the courts.... [T]he PLCAA does not directly interfere with judicial fact-finding. The PLCAA identifies particular types of claims that are not permissible and leaves it to the courts to apply those standards in the cases before them. The statute permits the courts to determine whether the cases before them ... are covered by the PLCAA.
Id. at 184 (internal citations omitted).
The PLCAA unequivocally bars plaintiff's claims against ROMARM. Plaintiff claims that Ms. Jones' killers used a ROMARM-manufactured assault rifle in the fatal shooting. Compl. ¶ 47. Plaintiff makes a blanket assertion that ROMARM's negligence directly and/or indirectly contributed to Ms. Jones' death, and that ROMARM owed a duty of care to Ms. Jones. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 62. However, no plausible reading of the facts could state a claim against ROMARM. It is uncontroverted that a third party discharged the assault rifle, during the commission of a criminal act. See Compl. ¶¶ 40–49; see also Keith L. Alexander, Theresa Vargas & Paul Duggan, D.C. jury convicts 5 of murder in attacks,Wash. PostT, May 8, 2012, at A14 (Ms. Jones' killers convicted of murder). The PLCAA explicitly and clearly prohibits this kind of suit. It is settled law that the SLA does not create any exception to the PLCAA, and this Court is bound to accept the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' interpretation of the SLA. See Beretta V, 940 A.2d at 170–71;Charlot, 628 F.Supp.2d...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int'l, LLC
... ... had arisen from a widely reported sniper attack involving a semiautomatic weapon in the District of Columbia a few years prior to the passage of PLCAA. (iii) the defendants could not rely on the ... any knowledge of the sales made by the others or by the local firearms dealers"), and Jefferies v. District of Columbia , 916 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2013) (claims against assault rifle ... ...
-
Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int'l, LLC
... ... American District Telegraph & Messenger Co. , 94 Conn. 707, 110 A. 540 (1920). In that case, the defendant security ... See District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (indicating that second ... any knowledge of the sales made by the others or by the local firearms dealers"), and Jefferies v. District of Columbia , 916 F.Supp.2d 42, 4546 (D.D.C. 2013) (claims against assault rifle ... ...
-
In re Acad., Ltd.
... ... mandamus proceeding at issue here arises from four lawsuits filed against Academy in Texas district court by some of the survivors of the shooting and relatives 625 S.W.3d 24 of those killed. 4 In ... , but also the improper use of the judiciary to circumvent legislative judgments." Jefferies v. District of Columbia , 916 F. Supp. 2d 42, 47 (D.D.C. 2013). The Jefferies court noted that ... ...
-
Fontaine v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Civil Action No. 13–cv–1892 KBJ
... ... Civil Action No. 13cv1892 KBJ United States District Court, District of Columbia. Signed May 16, 2014 42 F.Supp.3d 103 Julie Elice Fontaine, Mammoth ... See, e.g., Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C.Cir.1990) ; Jefferies v. District of Columbia, 916 F.Supp.2d 42, 4647 (D.D.C.2013) ; see also Adams v. Eureka Fire ... ...