Jefferson County Drain. Dist. No. Six v. Gulf Oil Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1969
• Docket Number: No. 7040,7040
• Citation: 437 S.W.2d 415
• Parties: JEFFERSON COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT NO. SIX, Appellant, v. GULF OIL CORPORATION, Appellee. . Beaumont
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 415

437 S.W.2d 415

JEFFERSON COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT NO. SIX, Appellant, v. GULF OIL CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 7040.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

Beaumont.

Jan. 30, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1969.

W. G. Walley, Jr., J. B. Morris and J. Kenneth Hynes, Beaumont, for appellant.

W. B. Edwards, William F. Erwin, Jr., Fred A. Lange, Houston, for appellee.

KEITH, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court granting Gulf Oil Corporation (hereinafter styled 'Gulf') a permanent injunction restraining Jefferson County Drainage District No. Six (hereinafter styled 'District') 'from constructing or installing a boxed culvert in, or upon' certain property owned by Gulf. The trial was without a jury and no findings of fact or conclusions of law were filed.

The property was on a service road forming an integral part of Interstate Highway 10 in the City of Beaumont, upon which Gulf had constructed a large service station. Immediately to the south of the improved portion of Gulf's property was a large open and unlined drainage ditch used, if not owned, by the Drainage District. Still further south, Continental Oil Company (hereinafter styled 'conoco') owned property which had not been improved at the time the litigation was commenced.

Gulf alleged that Conoco, being desirous of developing its property, presumably for a service station which would compete with Gulf's existing facility, initiated discussions with the Drainage District in 1966 seeking to have the District condemn an easement over the lands owned by both Gulf and Conoco then occupied by the open ditch; and, after the acquisition of the easements from the two companies, the District would then 'box' the entire ditch with a large concrete culvert, cover the 'box' with dirt, and thereby make usable the forty feet of Conoco's land fronting on the service road.

After perfecting the appeal to this Court, the District filed a motion to advance submission of this cause, attaching a certified copy of a resolution wherein the Conoco proposal was set forth in more detail than was shown upon the trial. Among the recitations in the resolution is this:

'WHEREAS, Continental Oil Company has made a firm offer to Jefferson County Drainage District No. 6 to waive all claims for damages to its remaining property from which is to be taken the right of way needed to be acquired from Continental Oil Company for said improvement and to further donate to Jefferson County Drainage District No. 6 the cost of installing within the proposed new right of way a concrete box to the extent of Eighteen Thousand ($18,000.00) Dollars, of said cost of installation of said concrete box, all as is set forth in the offer in writing from Continental Oil Company attached hereto; * * *'

The District began condemnation proceedings with the filing of its petition with the Judge of the County Court at Law on June 26, 1968, seeking to condemn an easement over Gulf's land for drainage purposes. The special commissioners took their respective oaths and gave notice to Gulf of a hearing to be held on July 15, 1968. Claiming that it had not had the full ten-day's notice required by Article 3264, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., Gulf brought suit in the District Court against the District seeking an injunction.

The petition alleged Gulf's ownership in fee simple of its entire tract, the filing of the condemnation proceedings, and quoted some of the allegations of the condemnation proceedings then pending. These allegations were excerpted by Gulf from the petition for condemnation which had been filed by the District:

'It is necessary and expedient for the maintenance of proper drainage in said District that the Petitioner acquire an easement for drainage purposes across, through and upon the above described real estate for the purpose of constructing a drainage ditch thereon and providing proper right-of-way for maintenance of the same * * *

'Jefferson County Drainage District No. 6 of Jefferson County, Texas, is in the process of constructing certain drainage improvements within said District consisting of a drainage ditch for the carrying off of surface water within the District which will otherwise overflow on the lands of some of the citizens residing within the District creating the danger of flooding and doing great damage to homes and commercial establishments. The ditch to be constructed for the purpose of preventing such damages and to alleviate present conditions will cross lands of the Defendant (plaintiff herein) located within the limits of the Drainage District and it is necessary that the District acquire easement across, through, and upon * * *'

The District allegations so noted were then traversed by Gulf as being 'incomplete, incorrect, erroneous and misleading * * * (and) there is, in fact, no necessity, no expediency, and no public interest to be served by the condemnation * * *' These allegations with reference to Conoco then follow:

'Continental Oil Company is the owner of the tract of land on the other side of the Beaumont High School ditch, which forms the boundary between its property and that belonging to plaintiff herein . Continental has petitioned the defendant to condemn an easement over plaintiff's one-half of said ditch, and in consideration therefor it has agreed to donate an easement across its one-half of said ditch and has agreed to pay the costs of constructing a pipe in the ditch and the costs of covering the entire ditch in order that the now existing, adequate, sufficient, and efficient drainage ditch will be artificially converted, under the guise of public necessity, to a culvert, so that it can be filled in and overlaid with top soil so as to increase the size and enhance the commercial usability and value of Continental's property, increasing its dimensions sufficiently to accommodate a retail service station thereon. Plaintiff would further show the Court that the pipe which defendant proposes to lay in the ditch and the covering of the ditch will not aid 'in carrying off of surface water within the District which will otherwise overflow on the lands of some of the citizens residing within the District', but rather the flow of water in the ditch will be impeded by the contemplated improvements. Continental and defendant have made this agreement for the sole purpose of enabling Continental to use their one-half of the ditch for the purpose of constructing a service station thereon. The proposed taking of plaintiff's property for the private use of Continental violates Section 17 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Texas.'

Gulf then offered in the pleadings to donate the required easement to the District 'provided the ditch is not covered.' Gulf sought a temporary injunction after hearing, and a permanent injunction upon a final trial, restraining the District from acquiring Gulf's property through eminent domain proceedings, or alternatively, that the District be enjoined from covering any part of the ditch so acquired from either Gulf or Conoco. As noted above, Conoco was not made a party to the suit.

The amended answer filed by the District contained a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court, a plea in abatement, a special plea in bar, and a general denial. The special plea asserted, in substance, that being created as a drainage district by the Legislature, it was clothed with the power of condemnation under Article 8151, V.A.C.S., and Article 8154, placed upon the drainage commissioners, not the Court, the duty of keeping the ditches in repair, etc.

It was alleged further that a hearing was had (following proper notice) before the Special Commissioners on August 21, 1968, with an award having been made to Gulf from which it had appealed to the County Court of Jefferson County at Law by filing its objections and exceptions on September 10, 1968. From these allegations, the conclusion was drawn that the exclusive jurisdiction to hear the entire controversy was vested in the County Court at Law and that the District Court was without jurisdiction to interfere with the jurisdiction of the County Court at Law. Copies of the condemnation proceedings were attached to the answer and are in the record before us. Such proceedings...