Jefferson v. State

• Decision Date: 31 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2011–CP–00265–COA.,2011–CP–00265–COA.
• Citation: 95 So.3d 709
• Parties: Dennis JEFFERSON a/k/a Dennis E. Jefferson, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

95 So.3d 709

Dennis JEFFERSON a/k/a Dennis E. Jefferson, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2011–CP–00265–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

July 31, 2012.

Dennis Jefferson, appellant, pro se.

Office of the Attorney General by Roger Googe Jr., attorney for appellee.

Before GRIFFIS, P.J., MAXWELL and RUSSELL, JJ.

MAXWELL, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. In 2009, the Mississippi Legislature created a statutory right to compensation by the State for “innocent people” wrongfully convicted and imprisoned. The following year, Dennis Jefferson petitioned for statutory compensation. Jefferson claimed he was entitled to compensation because this court reversed his burglary conviction in 2008 and, under the direct-remand rule, remanded his case to the circuit court for resentencing for the lesser-included crime of willful trespass. Because the Legislature did not expressly provide for compensation when reversal of a conviction results in a direct remand for sentencing on a lesser-included crime, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of Jefferson's compensation claim.

BACKGROUND

I. Mississippi's Compensation Act for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment

¶ 2. In 2009, the Legislature enacted a civil procedure for “innocent people” wrongfully convicted and imprisoned to be financially compensated for “the particular and substantial horror of being imprisoned for a crime one did not commit.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11–44–1 (Supp.2011). Jurisdiction lies in the circuit court where the conviction occurred, and the defendant is the State, represented by the Attorney General's Office. Miss.Code Ann. § 11–44–5 (Supp.2011). “Persons convicted, incarcerated and released from custody prior to July 1, 2009, shall commence an action under this chapter not later than June 30, 2012.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11–44–9(1) (Supp.2011). Otherwise, an action “shall be commenced within three (3) years after either the grant of a pardon or the grant of judicial relief and satisfaction of other conditions described in [s]ection 11–44–3(1).” Id.

¶ 3. Pursuit of a claim under this statute is in lieu of a claim under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and is not subject to the same immunities or notice provisions of the MTCA. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11–44–7(4)–(5), 11–44–9(2) (Supp.2011). But “[a]ny claimant who receives compensation under this chapter shall sign a release from all claims against the state regarding the incarceration for which the claimant receives compensation.” Miss.Code. Ann. § 11–44–15 (Supp.2011).

¶ 4. Mississippi Code Annotated section 11–44–3 (Supp.2011) sets forth what a claimant must establish in order to survive dismissal by the circuit court. If a claimant establishes a claim under section 11–44–3, he must then meet the burden of proof under Mississippi Code Annotated section 11–44–7(1) (Supp.2011). If a claimant meets this burden, he or she is entitled to “Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) for each year of incarceration regardless of the number of felonies for which a claimant was convicted” and reasonable attorney's fees. Miss.Code Ann. § 11–44–7(2) (Supp.2011).

II. Jefferson's Burglary Conviction and Appeal

¶ 5. Jefferson was charged with violating Mississippi Code Annotated section 97–17–23(1) (Rev.2006), which criminalizes “burglary of a dwelling house.” Jefferson v. State, 977 So.2d 431, 435 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2008). After a jury trial, he was found guilty of burglary of a building other than a dwelling under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97–17–33 (Rev.2006), which the State incorrectly argued was a lesser-included offense. Jefferson, 977 So.2d at 435 (¶ 10) & n. 2. Jefferson was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and ordered to pay a $10,000 fine. Id. at 436 (¶ 11).

¶ 6. On direct appeal, this court reversed Jefferson's conviction and sentence because the evidence was not legally sufficient to convict Jefferson of either dwelling-house or non-dwelling-house burglary. Id. at 437 (¶¶ 14–16). We found it was “clear there was a theft from an open, freestanding structure, and a possible entry of a freestanding shed.” Id. at 457 (¶ 16). But because the shed was not attached to the house, we held there could be no “burglary of a dwelling.” Id. at 438 (¶ 18). We also found the evidence insufficient to establish a burglary of a “non-dwelling house” because there was no evidence of a breaking and entering. Id. at 437 (¶ 16).

¶ 7. However, because “[i]mplicit in every conviction of burglary ... is a finding that the defendant committed a trespass,” this court, under the direct-remand rule, remanded the case to the Yazoo County Circuit Court for resentencing for willful trespass. Id. at 437–38 (¶¶ 17–18). We held:

Viewing the proof in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to uphold a finding of guilty upon a charge of trespass. This conclusion stems from either Jefferson's participation as a principle in the trespass, which could be gleaned from Coleman's testimony, or as an aider and abetter as a result of Huffman's testimony.

Id. at (¶ 18).

III. Jefferson's Petition for Compensation

¶ 8. On June 23, 2010, Jefferson filed pro se a “Petition Pursuant to SB 3024” in the Yazoo County Circuit Court, the court where he had been convicted of burglary. Senate Bill 3024 ¹ was codified as Mississippi Code Annotated sections 11–44–1 to 11–44–15. The circuit court correctly recognized that Jefferson had filed a petition for compensation for wrongful conviction.

¶ 9. Jefferson named as defendants the State of Mississippi, Yazoo County, the Yazoo County District Attorney, and an unspecified Yazoo County supervisor. But there is no evidence these entities or persons were served with process, and none filed a response. Jefferson attached no exhibits to his petition, but he did specifically reference this court's published opinion that reversed his sentence for burglary and directly remanded the case for him to be sentenced for criminal trespass. Jefferson alleged he had served approximately twenty months in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections before his release on April 16, 2006, two weeks after the mandate to resentence him was issued.²

¶ 10. Jefferson claimed he was wrongfully convicted and sentenced. He requested $50,000 in compensation and a declaratory judgment that his due-process rights were violated. He also requested appointed counsel ³ and permission to amend his complaint.⁴

¶ 11. On November 22, 2010, the circuit court issued an order finding Jefferson's petition failed to comply with section 11–44–3. The circuit court dismissed the entire petition as improper.

¶ 12. Though no motion for reconsideration appears on the circuit court's docket or in the record,⁵ the circuit court did enter an order denying Jefferson's motion for reconsideration on January 20, 2011. Jefferson timely appealed this order.

¶ 13. We note that the circuit court incorrectly granted Jefferson leave to file his appeal in forma pauperis. Jefferson's compensation claim is a civil matter. And “the right to appear in forma pauperis in a civil matter exists at the trial level only.” Ivy v. Merchant, 666 So.2d 445, 450 (Miss.1995) (citing Moreno v. State, 637 So.2d 200, 202 (Miss.1994); Nelson v. Bank of Miss., 498 So.2d 365, 366 (Miss.1986)). In contrast to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99–39–25 (Rev.2007), which expressly permits a claimant under the Uniform Post–Conviction Collateral Relief Act to appeal “on such terms and conditions as are provided for in criminalcases,” Mississippi Code Annotated section 11–44–11 (Supp.2011) entitles a compensation claimant “to appeal the decision as in other civil cases.” (Emphasis added). The compensation statute gave the circuit court no authority to grant Jefferson's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Consequently, the citizens of Yazoo County are unduly burdened to pay the costs of this appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶ 14. On appeal, Jefferson argues the circuit court erroneously dismissed his compensation claim against the State.⁶ Specifically, Jefferson claims the circuit court dismissed his petition with prejudice without permitting him ninety days to refile.

¶ 15. The record clearly shows Jefferson's petition was dismissed without prejudice. Section 11–44–3(1)–(2) lists specific requirements to establish a claim for compensation. And section 11–44–3(3) expressly authorizes the circuit court “on its own motion” to dismiss a claim “[i]f the court finds after reading the claim that the claimant has not demonstrated” the requirements of section 11–44–3(1)–(2). A dismissal under section 11–44–3(3) “shall be without prejudice to allow adequate refiling within ninety (90) days.”

¶ 16. The statute gave Jefferson the right to refile within ninety days. Nowhere in its order did the circuit court restrict this right by dismissing the petition with prejudice. And nowhere in the record did the circuit court deny Jefferson's attempt to refile his petition. After dismissal, Jefferson chose not to refile his petition but instead filed an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration, followed by this appeal. Thus, it was his own actions—and not the circuit court's erroneous application of section 11–44–3(3)—that led to him not refiling a petition within ninety days.

¶ 17. This leaves us with the more salient issue—whether Jefferson's petition, as filed, failed to meet the requirements of section 11–44–3(1)–(2) and, consequently, was properly dismissed under section 11–44–3(3). We review the circuit court's dismissal of Jefferson's claim de novo. See Scaggs v. GPCH–GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1275 (¶ 6) (Miss.2006) (reviewing motion to dismiss de novo). Further, this particular dismissal required interpreting a statute, which is a question of law that we likewise review de novo. See Coleman v. State, 947 So.2d 878, 880 (¶ 9) (Miss.2006).

¶ 18. Under section 11–44–3(1):

In order to present an actionable claim for wrongful conviction and...