Jeffley v State

• Decision Date: 15 February 2001
• Citation: 38 S.W.3d 847
• Parties: <!--38 S.W.3d 847 (Tex.App.-Houston 2001) JENNIFER JEFFLEY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee NO. 14-97-01403-CR In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 847

38 S.W.3d 847 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001)

JENNIFER JEFFLEY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

NO. 14-97-01403-CR

In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

February 15, 2001.

On Appeal from the 182nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 743,307

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Fowler, and Edelman.

OPINION

Fowler, Justice

Appellant Jennifer Jeffley was certified to stand trial as an adult for the felony offense of capital murder. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1994). A jury found her guilty and assessed punishment at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In seventeen points of error, appellant presents four issues for review. She claims the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her oral and written statements and in admitting the statements at trial because the statements were (1) the result of custodial interrogation, (2) involuntary, and (3) hearsay. She also complains that the trial court erred in not submitting the issue of voluntariness to the jury. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural Background

Appellant, a fifteen year-old eighth grader, resided at the Green Arbor Apartments. On October 29, 1996, officers from the Houston Police Department (HPD) were called to the Green Arbor Apartments to investigate the death of resident Maria Palomina. The officers found the body of Palomina just inside the door of her ground floor apartment. Further inside the apartment, the officers observed some broken ceramic pottery pieces, Palomina's eyeglasses, and blood splatters next to Palomina's body. Inside an open kitchen drawer containing cutlery knives and utensils, they found a plastic sheeting with some small blood splatters on it. The officers also observed blood smears on the wall and two purses on a table. One officer attempted to recover fingerprints and took samples of blood, hair, and fiber for analysis. Other officers took written statements from the staff and residents of the apartment complex.

Eva Mondragon, Palomina's neighbor, told police that appellant, appellant's boyfriend, Youngster, and Youngster's brother, Kenneth Driver, spent the night at her apartment. On Monday, the day of the murder, Mondragon and the two boys were awakened by screams from Palomina's apartment. They ran outside the apartment and stood on the stairs looking down into Palomina's patio. Mondragon observed Palomina's patio screen door dangling from the door frame and heard someone moaning for help. She inquired if Palomina was okay. A voice unknown to her responded, "I am okay. I just fell and hit my head." Mondragon ran to the apartment management office for help. When she returned, Driver and his brother had gone downstairs and were standing outside Palomina's apartment; they had been joined by appellant.

According to Daniel Truesdale, the apartment's maintenance man, the apartment manager sent him to Palomina's apartment because "there's possible [sic] a lady dead in an apartment." Truesdale jumped the patio fence and entered Palomina's apartment. He then opened the front door to let the manager in. She checked Palomina's pulse and called 911. Truesdale observed Mondragon and appellant come about five feet inside the apartment before the apartment manager asked them to step outside.

For her own part, appellant stated in her first written statement that she had arisen early and left Mondragon's apartment to make some phone calls at another neighbor's apartment. As she walked back to Mondragon's apartment, she saw Mondragon on the steps outside her apartment talking to Palomina. Mondragon was asking Palomina if she was OK. Appellant could not see Palomina but she heard someone say, "Yeah, I'm OK. I just fell and hit my head." Mondragon asked if Palomina wanted her to call the police and the voice answered, "No, No, No, I'm OK, I just hit my head." Appellant said that Mondragon told her the voice did not sound right and appellant agreed, so she told Mondragon to call the police. While Mondragon was gone, appellant continued to talk to the voice and attempted to enter the apartment through the front door. She was standing in front of the steps with Mondragon when the manager and the maintenance man arrived. The maintenance man jumped over the patio fence. Appellant peered over the fence and into the open patio door. She saw the apartment manager inside the apartment and heard her inquire if Palomina was alive. At that point, appellant went over the fence, into the apartment, and up to Palomina's body. She observed the screen door on the patio floor, a broken orange flower pot, and dirt in front of Palomina's body. She saw a piece of the pot lying on Palomina's shoulder near her neck and she moved it so she could check her pulse. She became nervous because there was blood everywhere so she went back over the patio fence. When she got back, one of the young men told her that an ambulance was on its way. She walked to the front door and saw Mondragon standing at the front door so she went in. She saw the manager cover Palomina's body with a bed spread. She also saw Palomina's purse on the floor by her leg. Someone had kicked the purse so appellant picked it up and put it in a chair by the table. Then appellant went outside.

The day after the murder, Detective Roy Swainson returned to the apartment complex and spoke with appellant and her grandmother, who was visiting the family, about taking appellant to the police station for additional questioning. Appellant willingly accompanied Detective Swainson to the police station along with her boyfriend's brother. Neither appellant's mother nor grandmother accompanied her to the station.

Sergeant Waymon Allen, one of the officers who had investigated the crime scene the previous day, interviewed appellant at the police station. During the course of the interview, which was lengthy - three hours and forty-five minutes - Allen asked appellant about inconsistencies in her first statement and then about inconsistencies in the next two statements she gave that day. Each of appellant's statements of the events that she witnessed at the apartment complex conflicted with Mondragon's and Truesdale's statements. In her fourth oral statement, appellant gave information that inculpated her in the murder. Following this statement, Allen transported appellant to Judge Carol Carrier's office, where Carrier administered the required juvenile warnings to appellant. Appellant returned to the police station with Allen. Soon after she began to give a written statement to Allen, appellant's mother called to see if appellant was still there. Swainson told her that appellant was giving a modified version of her earlier statement and that they would be getting in contact with her in the next couple of hours to explain what had occurred. He did not inform her mother that appellant was confessing or offer to allow her to speak with her daughter.

When appellant completed the written statement, Allen took her to Judge Travis Lewis, who administered the second set of magistrate warnings. Appellant then signed the written statement and Allen transported her back to the police station. Around midnight, almost nine hours after she was first taken to the police station, appellant spoke with her mother by phone. Sometime between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., Allen informed appellant's grandmother and mother that appellant was not coming home and that she was being charged with capital murder.

Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress her oral and written statements, alleging violations of the her right to remain silent and right to counsel as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution. In addition, she asserted the statements were obtained in violation of article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and section 51 of the Texas Family Code. Appellant also alleged her statements were obtained through threats, deception, or coercion because she and her family were told that "as soon as she made the right statement she was free to leave." After hearing testimony and argument, the trial court denied the motion and later filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Over objection, the trial court admitted the oral and written statements into evidence at trial.

Admissibility of Oral and Written Statements

In her first seven points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her oral and written statements because they were custodial statements taken in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution, article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and sections 51.095 and 52.02 of the Texas Family Code. However, neither in her motion to suppress nor at the hearing on the motion did appellant complain of a violation of section 52.02 of the family code. Therefore, she waives review of this ground. Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Davis v. State, 22 S.W.3d 8, 11 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding a motion to suppress which states one legal theory cannot be used to support a different legal theory on appeal). Nevertheless, we address points of error one through five and point of error seven.

Standard of Review

In a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The trial court may thus believe or disbelieve any or all of the witness's testimony. Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). As the trier of fact, the trial court may...