Jeffries v. Swank

• Decision Date: 30 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 70 C 3196.,70 C 3196.
• Citation: 337 F. Supp. 1062
• Parties: Virginia JEFFRIES et al., Plaintiffs, v. Harold O. SWANK et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

337 F. Supp. 1062

Virginia JEFFRIES et al., Plaintiffs, v. Harold O. SWANK et al., Defendants.

No. 70 C 3196.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

December 30, 1971.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark Spiegel, Edwin F. Mandel, Legal Aid Clinic, Chicago, Ill., Fredrick E. Merritt, Kaskaskia Legal Aid Agency, Centralia, Ill., for plaintiffs.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Walter K. Pyle, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AUSTIN, District Judge.

This is an action brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of a class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. The class consists of recipients and applicants for public assistance under the Social Security Act who have not or will not receive final decisions on administrative hearings by the Illinois Department of Public Aid within 60 days of the date of their request for a hearing. On April 9, this court granted plaintiffs leave to proceed as a class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court is presented here with three motions; 1. Defendants' Motion to Strike and Dismiss, 2. Defendants' Motion to Stay, and 3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I. The court will also consider the propriety of a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 in this case.

Under the public assistance program of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, financial aid is distributed by the Department to needy persons who are eligible for assistance under one of the categorical assistance programs authorized by the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq (hereinafter aid under the public assistance programs authorized by the Social Security Act; Aid to the Aged, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., and Aid to the Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 1351 et seq., will be termed "categorical assistance"). The categorical assistance programs are administered by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (hereinafter referred to as HEW) and jointly financed by the Federal and State governments. Those persons who meet the statutory criteria for assistance receive financial aid as a matter of statutory entitlement.

As a condition for receiving financial assistance from the Federal government for the categorical assistance programs, the appropriate state agency is required to comply with the provisions of the Social Security Act governing the categorical assistance programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., 601 et seq., 1201 et seq. and 1351 et seq., and the regulations issued thereunder. The Federal statutes establishing and regulating all categorical assistance programs require that the state agency:

"... provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for aid or assistance ... is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness." 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 302(a) (4), 602(a) (4) and 1352(a) (4).

In the exercise of its duties under the Social Security Act, HEW has issued a regulation pursuant to the above statutory provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 302(a) (4), 602(a) (4), 1202(a) (4) and 1352(a) (4), requiring that:

"(a) State plan requirements. A State plan ... must provide for a system of fair hearings under which: ... (11) Prompt, definitive and final administrative action will be taken within 60 days from the date of the request for a fair hearing, except where the claimant requests a delay in the hearing." 45 CFR § 205.10(a) (11), 36 F.R. 3034-35, February 13, 1971.

At issue in this case is the Illinois statute relating to hearings on appeal which states:

"A decision on appeal shall be given to the interested parties within 60 days from the date of the filing of the appeal, unless additional time is required for a proper disposition of the appeal." 23 Ill.Rev.Stat. § 11-8.6 (1969 ed.) (emphasis added).

The Illinois regulation implementing the Illinois statute states:

"Final administrative action will be taken by the Department within 60 days of the request for a fair hearing, except in instances where the appellant requests a delay in the hearing in order to prepare his case or the hearing is postponed or continued or for other reasons adjudged valid by the Hearing Officer." Illinois Department of Public Aid Categorical Assistance Manual, Section 6001.3.

The second amended complaint consists of three Counts. In Count I, the plaintiff class alleges that the state statute, and state administrative regulation, quoted above, and the practice of the Illinois Department of Public Aid are in violation of the sections of the Social Security Act and the implementing federal regulation quoted above and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Count II alleges that the practice of failing to render final judgments on categorical assistance appeals within a reasonable time from the date of request for a hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Count III alleges that there is a practice of scheduling hearing dates and issuing final decisions without rational standards which violates the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief.

Defendants' Motion to Strike and Dismiss

Defendants' argument that the plaintiff class fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is without merit. All well pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken by the court as true in a motion to dismiss. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 86 S.Ct. 347, 15 L.Ed.2d 247 (1965). There can be no doubt that the Illinois Department of Public Aid acts under color of state law. In Count I, plaintiffs allege that their rights under the Supremacy Clause are being violated. The Social Security Act requires a hearing, and the federal regulation implementing the statute requires a hearing within 60 days. These requirements are binding on a state receiving federal funds for its categorical assistance programs. Plaintiffs claim they have not received a hearing within 60 days. As to Count I, plaintiffs state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In Count II, plaintiffs allege that their rights to due process under the 14th Amendment are violated by defendants' failure to render final decisions in administrative hearings within a reasonable period of time from the date of request for such a hearing. In Count III, plaintiffs allege a capricious practice of scheduling hearings and issuing decisions without rational standards which violates their rights under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. As to each of Counts II and III, plaintiffs state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants argue that the state court ruling in People ex rel. Nelson v. Swank (70 L 8588, Circuit Court of Cook County, March 22, 1971) bars plaintiffs from prosecuting this suit under the doctrine of res judicata citing Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1967). However, despite the fact that there is a final judgment in Nelson involving the same cause of action, plaintiffs here were not parties, successors to, in privity with, or represented by the parties in the state action. There was no order in Nelson allowing a class action and no theory of an implicit order could comply with the notice requirements of Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940), Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2nd Cir. 1968). The doctrine of res judicata does not apply here.

Defendants further argue that Metcalf et al. v. Swank et al., 444 F.2d 1353 (7th Cir. 1971), which raised the issue of the constitutionality of a state imposed maximum shelter allowance for persons receiving welfare assistance, requires that plaintiffs here exhaust their administrative remedies before litigating their claims in the Federal courts.

The issue here bears little relation to that with which the 7th Circuit was concerned in Metcalf. Plaintiffs are presenting to this court the question of whether those very administrative remedies (which were not challenged in Metcalf) comply with Federal statutory and constitutional standards. To require exhaustion of the very state administrative remedy which plaintiffs assert to be illegal and unconstitutional in order to challenge their validity would be futile.

Defendants' motion to strike and dismiss is denied.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I

Count I seeks a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that the Illinois Department of Public Aid's failure to render final administrative decisions within 60 days of the request for an administrative hearing violates the Supremacy Clause, the Social Security Act and the HEW regulations promulgated thereunder.

No genuine issue as to any material fact exists in Count I. In support of their motion, plaintiffs offer exhibits which show that defendants fail as a general practice to grant hearings within 60 days of the request. Defendants do not deny the truth of these facts.

The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 302(a) (4), 602(a) (4), 1202(a) (4) and 1352(a) (4) requires an opportunity for a fair hearing, and pursuant to authority granted in 42 U.S.C. § 1203, the Secretary of HEW has promulgated a valid regulation, 45 CFR § 205.10(a) (11), implementing these statutes, which requires prompt final administrative action within 60 days from the date of the request for a fair hearing. The wording of both the statute and regulation is mandatory on its face. No evidence is offered to indicate a contrary intention by the Secretary of HEW. The regulation is clearly reasonable when one considers the dependence of recipients...