Jellison v. Halloran
| Decision Date | 25 July 1890 |
| Citation | 44 Minn. 199 |
| Parties | ALBERT T. JELLISON <I>vs.</I> THOMAS HALLORAN. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action to determine adverse claims, brought in the district court for Hennepin county. After the decision of a former appeal, (40 Minn. 485,) reversing a judgment for plaintiff on the pleadings, the action was tried by Rea, J., who ordered judgment for defendant. The plaintiff appeals from an order refusing a new trial.
J. M. Shaw, F. H. Boardman, and W. A. Lancaster, for appellant.
D. A. Secombe, for respondent.
From the record and findings in this case, it appears that on and prior to the 17th day of May, 1867, one Charlotte W. Brown was the owner in fee of government lot 4, in section 32, township 29, range 24, in Hennepin county, which is the land in controversy, to which plaintiff claims title. Mrs. Brown died on that day, the land then being incumbered by a mortgage by her executed to one A. G. Ruliffson on January 5, 1867, for $940, payable in one year, with interest at 12 per cent. March 13, 1868, one J. C. Whitney was appointed administrator of her estate, and thereupon qualified, and entered upon his duties as such. Thereafter the mortgagee brought an action to foreclose his mortgage, in which the administrator was made defendant, but the heirs of the deceased mortgagor, of which the plaintiff was one, were not made parties; and thereafter such proceedings were had that judgment of foreclosure was duly entered, and the mortgaged premises duly sold to the mortgagee for the amount due, being about $1,200. The certificate of sale was duly issued and recorded, and the sale confirmed, during the same year, 1868. The foreclosure proceedings were afterwards completed, the sale confirmed, and the record thereof duly made, including the recording of the certificate of foreclosure sale. There having been no redemption, the mortgagee, Ruliffson, sold and conveyed the premises by warranty deed to the defendant, in consideration of the sum of $2,200, which deed was duly recorded September 12, 1870. The defendant sets out his title substantially as above stated, and alleges that he entered into actual possession of the premises upon the delivery of the deed to him, "occupying, using, and paying taxes thereon, and has continued in possession of the same from that date up to the present time, — more than fifteen years." The plaintiff, in reply, admits the execution of the mortgage and the conveyance by Ruliffson to defendant, denies his possession, and denies the validity of the foreclosure as to the plaintiff, and alleges title in himself as devisee of Mrs. Brown.
Subsequent to the foreclosure, it seems that a will of Mrs. Brown was produced, and allowed and admitted to probate on the 27th day of August, 1869; and in December following an administrator with the will annexed was appointed, who thereafter qualified. The will devised several parcels of real estate to divers parties, and the real estate in question here to the plaintiff and one Julia Jellison. On the 25th day of December, 1869, the administrator filed an inventory of the real estate of the deceased, and a petition for a final decree of distribution; and such decree was thereafter made and entered in the probate court. But neither the inventory, petition, nor decree of distribution included or referred to this land in question, devised to and claimed by the plaintiff; and the inventory and petition referred to contained a statement that all the debts of the deceased had been fully paid except a small debt of less than $100, and the final decree contained a recital to the same effect. Both the debt due Ruliffson and the property mortgaged to secure it were ignored by the administrator and the probate court in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the testator. It does not appear that the second administrator ever took possession or made any claim to it. At that time, it was in the possession of Whitney, who delivered it to the defendant when the latter received his conveyance from the mortgagee. The administrator doubtless treated the mortgage debt as paid by the sale of the land, and considered that the latter was lost to the estate by the foreclosure. The court further finds that the defendant entered into the actual possession of the premises under his deed, which was duly recorded, "and from that time till the month of June, 1887, remained in the actual, open, notorious, and exclusive...
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