Jellison v. Halloran
| Decision Date | 20 May 1889 |
| Citation | 40 Minn. 485 |
| Parties | ALBERT T. JELLISON <I>vs.</I> THOMAS HALLORAN. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
R. C. Benton and S. A. Reed, for appellant.
J. M. Shaw, F. H. Boardman, and Wm. A. Lancaster, for respondent.
This is an action under the statute to determine adverse claims to real estate, the complaint alleging title in the plaintiff, and that the land is vacant and unoccupied. At the trial of the cause the court granted a motion, made on the part of the plaintiff, for judgment on the pleadings. This appeal is from the judgment so allowed.
It becomes necessary to consider the effect of the answer. The answer embraces a general denial of each and every allegation of the complaint, "except that which is hereinafter expressly admitted, specifically denied, or qualified." It then admits the defendant's claim of an estate adverse to the claim of the plaintiff, and alleges that the defendant is the owner of the land, and in possession of it, and that he has been such owner and in possession since August, 1870. Then "for further answer" the defendant sets forth particularly a series of facts upon which a claim of title is based. The facts thus alleged may be briefly stated to be: The giving of a mortgage upon the premises by the former owner (Brown) in 1867; the death of Brown in January, 1868, and the appointment of an administrator of the estate; an action by the mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage, in which the administrator was made defendant; the filing of notice of lis pendens; a judgment for the sale of the mortgaged premises to pay the debt; a sale to the mortgagee pursuant to the judgment; confirmation of the sale; the fact that no redemption was made; a final decree of foreclosure; conveyance by the mortgagee by deed to the defendant, and a transfer of the rights of the grantor as mortgagee; possession by the defendant under such conveyance continued to the present time, — more than 15 years; that there has never been any attempt to redeem, and that the right of redemption has become barred by lapse of time. The payment of taxes by the defendant to the amount of $1,500 is also alleged. No affirmative relief is demanded.
The plaintiff contends that this answer should not be construed as putting in issue his asserted title in any other manner than by opposing to it the defendant's answer of title in himself; and that being claimed to be upon its face insufficient, it is urged that the plaintiff's title stands admitted. We, however, construe that part of the answer in the nature of a general denial as an unqualified denial of the plaintiff's title. A denial in this form is sufficient as a general denial of all allegations as to which no other answer is made; but, obviously, there should be no ambiguity as to what is elsewhere "admitted, denied, or qualified." Kingsley v. Gilman, 12 Minn. 425, (515;) Griffin v. Long Island R. Co., 101 N. Y. 348, (4 N. E. Rep. 740.) The defendant was called upon to answer to the averments of the complaint setting forth (1) title in the plaintiff; (2) that the premises were vacant and unoccupied; (3) that the defendant claimed adversely an estate or interest therein; and the defendant was required, from the nature of the action, to assert his adverse claim, if he made any. In specifically alleging in the answer that the defendant was in the actual possession of the premises, thus putting in issue the...
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