Jenkins v. Hale
| Decision Date | 19 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-08-0208-AP/EL.,CV-08-0208-AP/EL. |
| Citation | 218 Ariz. 561,190 P.3d 175 |
| Parties | Royce JENKINS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Albert HALE; Jan Brewer, in her official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State; Coconino Board of Supervisors; Navajo County Board of Supervisors; Apache County Board of Supervisors; Mohave County Board of Supervisors; Yavapai County Board of Supervisors; Candace D. Owens, in her official capacity as Coconino County Recorder; Laurette Justman, in her official capacity as Navajo County Recorder; Lenora Y. Johnson, in her official capacity as Apache County Recorder; Joan McCall, in her official capacity as Mohave County Recorder; and Ana Wayman-Trujillo, in her official capacity as Yavapai County Recorder, Defendants/Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
K. Shipman, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Janice K. Brewer.
¶ 1 We have been asked to decide whether an elector's signature on a nominating petition is invalid as a matter of law if the elector provides a post office box address in the address portion of the signature line. We hold that it is not.
¶ 2 Albert Hale seeks his party's nomination for state senator from Legislative District Two. To qualify for the primary ballot, Hale needs 522 valid signatures on his nominating petitions. Hale submitted eighty petition sheets that contained more than 800 signatures from electors in Apache, Coconino, and Navajo Counties.
¶ 3 Royce Jenkins, a qualified elector, challenged 513 signatures: 321 from Apache County, 159 from Navajo County, and 33 from Coconino County. Of the challenged signatures, the Apache County Recorder validated 227 signatures and the Navajo County Recorder validated two signatures. The Coconino County Recorder found every challenged signature to be invalid. In total, the county recorders rejected 284 signatures. But the recorders differed in their validating methodologies: The Navajo and Coconino County Recorders invalidated signatures that contained only a post office box address; the Apache County Recorder, on the other hand, did not. If the Apache County Recorder could verify that the signer was a registered voter, the signature was approved.
¶ 4 On June 27, 2008, the superior court conducted a hearing. The trial judge found that Hale's petitions contained 523 valid signatures1 and granted Hale's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Jenkins appealed to this Court, and by an order dated July 7, 2008, we affirmed. This opinion explains our reasoning.
¶ 5 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 8.1 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 16-351(A) (2006).
¶ 6 In Arizona, candidates seeking placement on primary election ballots must gather signatures from qualified electors and file them with the appropriate elections official. A.R.S. § 16-322(A). These signatures are meant to ensure that candidates have "adequate support from eligible voters to warrant being placed on the ballot." Lubin v. Thomas, 213 Ariz. 496, 498, ¶ 15, 144 P.3d 510, 512 (2006).
¶ 7 The signatures must be collected on "nomination petitions," A.R.S. § 16-314(B), which must conform to certain enumerated statutory requirements, § 16-315(A). At the center of this controversy is the requirement that the petitions be divided into four columns bearing the following headings:
signature; printed name; actual residence address or description of place of residence, city, town or post office; and date of signing.
§ 16-315(A)(4) (emphasis added). Once signatures have been collected, the petition circulator must "verify that ... in his belief each signer was a qualified elector who resides at the address given as the signer's residence on the date indicated...." § 16-321(D).
¶ 8 Any qualified elector may challenge a candidate's petitions. See § 16-351(A) (regarding nomination challenges). The challenger may question the candidate's qualifications for office, § 16-351(B), or may test the validity of the nominating petitions or the signatures on the forms themselves, § 16-351(A)-(B). As a general rule, nominating petitions that are "circulated, signed and filed" are presumptively valid, Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 301, 855 P.2d 1357, 1362 (1993); Bd. of Supervisors of Maricopa County v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 502, 504, 446 P.2d 231, 233 (1968), and the challenger bears the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a signer is not a qualified elector, see Blaine v. McSpadden, 111 Ariz. 147, 149, 526 P.2d 390, 392 (1974).
¶ 9 Whether petition signatures are invalid if signers provide a post office box address implicates two questions. First, what address information did the legislature intend petition signers to provide on the nominating petition? Second, if the legislature intended signers to provide either a residence address or a description of the residence location, is a signature invalid as a matter of law if the signer provides a post office box address?
¶ 10 Our primary task in answering these questions is to discern the legislature's intent. Clifton v. Decillis, 187 Ariz. 112, 114, 927 P.2d 772, 774 (1996). The statute's text is the best evidence of that intent, but we "will examine the policy behind the statute, the evil sought to be remedied, the context, the language, and the historical background" if necessary to help us determine a statute's meaning. Lubin, 213 Ariz. at 498, ¶ 14, 144 P.3d at 512 (quoting Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 94, 98, ¶ 24, 139 P.3d 612, 616 (2006)). These questions present issues of law, which we review de novo. Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 101-02, ¶ 40, 139 P.3d at 619-20.
¶ 11 We must first determine what address information the legislature intended signers to provide on nominating petitions. Jenkins argues that the text of § 16-315(A)(4) requires either an "actual residence address" or a "description of [a] place of residence," and that a post office box is neither. Jenkins also argues that other statutory language shows the legislature's intent that signers provide a residence address. Finally, Jenkins urges us to construe "post office" to exclude post office boxes because the statute seeks to facilitate the election official's determination of whether the signer is a qualified elector, and a post office box number does not further that purpose.
¶ 12 Hale, on the other hand, argues that § 16-315(A)(4) is written in the disjunctive and that "post office" is an alternative to "actual residence address" or "description of place of residence, city, [or] town," and, therefore, it invites signers to provide post office box addresses.
¶ 13 Although the parties briefed and argued the case under § 16-315(A)(4), that section does not control the inquiry before us. It does, however, provide some guidance. Section 16-315(A)(4) sets forth the requirements for the form of the petition, which the petitions at issue in this case clearly satisfy. But § 16-315(A) does not specify what the signers of the petition must put in each column on the form. This lack of statutory guidance differs from the procedure for initiative, referendum, and recall elections, for which specific statutes dictate the information signers must provide on the petition forms. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(9) (). Compare A.R.S. §§ 19-101, -102 (2002) (describing form of petition), with A.R.S. § 19-112(A) (2002) (), and A.R.S. § 19-205(A) (2002) (). Section 16-315(A) therefore does not control the disposition of this case because the nominating petitions were prepared exactly as § 16-315(A) requires.
¶ 14 Nonetheless, the format required by § 16-315(A)(4), when considered with other provisions of the election statutes, provides guidance by suggesting that the legislature intended for signers to provide their residence address or a description of the residence location. Considered alone, § 16-315(A)(4) does not clearly require this information; the column heading indicates that a signer may provide either (1) an "actual residence address" or (2) a "description of [a] place of residence, city, town or post office." This language arguably invites the signer to provide a "description of [a] ... post office" that is distinct from one's "place of residence."
¶ 15 Other statutes, such as A.R.S. §§ 16-315(B)(4) and 16-321(D), however, shed light on the information desired. Section 16-315(B)(4) specifically requires the petition to include the circulator's "actual residence address or, if no street address, a description of residence location." We see no reason that the legislature would desire different address information from circulators than from signers since the purpose of the address requirement is to determine whether the signer is a qualified elector and whether the circulator is qualified to register to vote.
¶ 16 Section 16-321(D) similarly suggests that an actual residence location was desired. That section requires the circulator to verify that the signer "resides at the address given as the signer's residence." The "address given" evidently refers to the information beside the signer's name on the petition form. A circulator...
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