Miller v. Board of Sup'rs of Pinal County

• Decision Date: 22 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. CV-92-0269-AP,CV-92-0269-AP
• Citation: 855 P.2d 1357,175 Ariz. 296
• Parties: , 84 Ed. Law Rep. 549 Betty L. MILLER, a qualified elector of the County of Pinal, State of Arizona, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF PINAL COUNTY and the individual members thereof in their official capacity; Kathleen C. Felix, Pinal County Recorder; and Gilbert B. Hoyos, Pinal County Elections Department Director, Defendants, and Jack HARMON, an individual residing in the County of Pinal, State of Arizona, Defendant/Real Party in Interest-Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 1357

855 P.2d 1357

175 Ariz. 296, 84 Ed. Law Rep. 549

Betty L. MILLER, a qualified elector of the County of Pinal, State of Arizona, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF PINAL COUNTY and the individual members thereof in their official capacity; Kathleen C. Felix, Pinal County Recorder; and Gilbert B. Hoyos, Pinal County Elections Department Director, Defendants and Jack HARMON, an individual residing in the County of Pinal, State of Arizona, Defendant/Real Party in Interest-Appellant.

No. CV-92-0269-AP.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

July 22, 1993.

[175 Ariz. 297] David F. Alexander, Mesa, for Betty L. Miller.

Roy A. Mendoza, Pinal County Atty. by Allen C. McVey, Florence, for defendants.

Udall, Shumway, Blackhurst, Allen & Lyons, P.C. by David K. Udall, Richard J. Harris, Mesa, and Taylor & Cawthorne, Ltd. by Elizabeth B. Harmon, Tucson, for Jack Harmon.

OPINION

FELDMAN, Chief Justice.

Dr. Jack Harmon ("Harmon") brings a direct appeal from an injunction granted by the Superior Court of Pinal County in an action challenging nominating petitions. See A.R.S. § 16-351 (1984) (establishing the proper procedure to challenge such petitions). The trial court ruled that Harmon's petitions lacked sufficient valid signatures to qualify him for the ballot in the Democratic primary election for the office of Pinal County Superintendent of Schools.

This court has direct jurisdiction to review election appeals from the superior court. A.R.S. § 16-351(A) ("Such decision shall be appealable only to the supreme court."); see ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, §§ 5(3) and 5(6). After hearing argument, we vacated the trial court's judgment by order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. Our order noted that this written opinion would follow.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Harmon, a Pinal County educator for twenty-five years, served as the superintendent of the Oracle School District from 1973 to 1990. During his career, Harmon taught at various levels and served as a counselor, coach, vice principal, and principal. In 1992, he directed an educational foundation and served on the Oracle Elementary School District board.

On June 19, 1992, Harmon filed 60 nominating petitions containing 1104 signatures to qualify as a candidate in the 1992 Democratic primary election for county school superintendent. One day after the filing deadline, Betty L. Miller ("Miller") filed a complaint in the Pinal County Superior Court challenging the sufficiency of Harmon's petitions. Specifically, Miller questioned whether Harmon had obtained the minimum 667 signatures from qualified Pinal County electors, as required by Arizona law. See A.R.S. § 16-322(A)(10). Miller sought to enjoin the Pinal County Board of Supervisors ("Board") from placing Harmon's name on the primary election ballot.

During the two-day bench trial, Miller raised many distinct challenges to particular signatures and petitions filed by Harmon. Overall, the trial court considered a myriad of factual and legal issues, including claims that: (1) some signatories were not registered voters on the date that they signed the petition; (2) some did not reside in Pinal County; (3) some addresses written on the petitions were illegible or non-existent; (4) some addresses on the petitions were different from those given on the affidavit of registration; (5) some signatories were disqualified because they had changed address within the same precinct after registering to vote; (6) some signatures did not match the signatures shown on the affidavit of registration; (7) some signatures were illegible; (8) some persons signed Harmon's petitions more than once; (9) some had signed the petitions of other candidates for the same office; (10) some petition circulators were not qualified electors in Pinal County; and (11) some circulators were not present when the petitions were signed.

Both parties submitted timely requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Ariz.R.Civ.P. 52(a). On July 8, 1992, the trial judge took the matter under advisement, stating that he would rule the next day. Five days later, at the statutory deadline, the trial court issued a minute entry order enjoining the Board from printing Harmon's name on the primary election ballot. The order and subsequent judgment contained the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. In full, they read as follows:

THE COURT FINDS as a matter of fact that there are at least 568 signatures not valid as a result of unqualified circulators, [illegible] signatures, invalid addresses, persons living out of the precinct and duplication in signing other petitions for the same office, therefore,

THE COURT FINDS as a matter of law insufficient signatures to place the candidate on the ballot.

On July 17, Harmon filed his notice of appeal to this court. We later granted Miller's motion to suspend the appeal and revest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider her motion to amend the judgment. Miller's proposed amended judgment included forty-five distinct findings of fact. On July 27, after considering Miller's motion, the trial court decided not to amend its original judgment. On subsequent consideration, we vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions that the trial court dismiss the complaint.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Harmon's direct appeal presented four issues:

1. whether the trial court's order sufficiently stated the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by Arizona law; if not,

2. whether the trial court's failure to do so in an injunction order is reversible error;

3. whether the failure denied Harmon meaningful review on the merits regarding the validity of nominating petitions; and

4. whether upholding the lower court's order would deny Harmon his due process rights under Arizona law.

DISCUSSION

A. Were the trial court's findings of fact sufficient to satisfy Arizona law?

1. The findings of fact requirement

Rule 52(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure expressly requires that [i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ..., the court, if requested before trial, shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. In granting or refusing preliminary injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action.

Also, Rule 65(h) requires that "[e]very order granting an injunction ... shall set forth the reasons for its issuance and shall be specific in terms." Well-settled Arizona case law supports the findings of fact requirement. See Amfac Elec. Supply Co. v. Rainer Constr. Co., 123 Ariz. 413, 414, 600 P.2d 26, 27 (1979); Keystone Copper Min. Co. v. Miller, 63 Ariz. 544, 553, 164 P.2d 603, 608 (1945); Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 134, 796 P.2d 930, 936 (Ct.App.1990); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1986) (specifically holding that the trial court must make findings of fact if the remedy sought is a preliminary injunction).

Requiring a trial court to state separately findings of fact and conclusions of law accomplishes several goals. First, a defeated party may more easily determine whether the case presents issues for appellate review. See Rogge v. Weaver, 368 P.2d 810, 814 n. 7 (Alaska 1962). Second, findings and conclusions clarify what has been decided and thus provide guidance in applying the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata. Wattleton v. International Bhd. of Boiler Makers, 686 F.2d 586, 591 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S.Ct. 1199-1200, 75 L.Ed.2d 442 (1983). Third, the requirement prompts judges to consider issues more carefully because "they are required to state not only the end result of their inquiry, but the process by which they reached it." United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 199, 84 S.Ct. 639, 643, 11 L.Ed.2d 629 (1964).

Finally, and most important, findings and conclusions permit an appellate court to examine more closely the basis on which the trial court relied in reaching the ultimate judgment. City of Phoenix v. Consolidated Water Co., 101 Ariz. 43, 45, 415 P.2d 866, 868 (1966); Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Utah 1983) ("Proper findings are essential to enable [the appellate court] to perform its function of assuring that the findings support the judgment and that the evidence supports the findings."). See generally 5A James W. Moore & Jo D. Lucas, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE p 52.06 (2d ed. 1992).

2. Sufficiency of the findings

With these principles in mind, we must determine whether this trial court fulfilled its legal duty. A trial court's findings of fact satisfy Arizona law if they are "pertinent to the issues and comprehensive enough to provide a basis for the decision." Gilliland v. Rodriquez, 77 Ariz. 163, 167, 268 P.2d 334, 337 (1954); see also Post v. Industrial Comm'n, 160 Ariz. 4, 7, 770 P.2d 308, 311 (1989).

Findings of fact satisfy this requirement if they are sufficiently specific to allow an appellate court "to test the validity of the judgment." Gilliland, 77 Ariz. at 167, 268 P.2d at 337; see Elliott, 165 Ariz. at 131, 796 P.2d at 933; Post, 160 Ariz. at 7, 770 P.2d at 311; Ellingson v. Fuller, 20 Ariz.App. 456, 460, 513 P.2d 1339, 1343 (1973). An appellate court must be able to discern more than a permissible interpretation of the trial court's analysis. Urban Dev. Co. v. Dekreon, 526 P.2d 325, 328 (Alaska 1974); cf. Post, 160 Ariz. at 7, 770 P.2d at 311. The reviewing court needs a sufficient factual basis that explains how the trial court actually arrived at its conclusion. Post, 160 Ariz. at 7, 770 P.2d at 311; Dekreon, 526 P.2d at 328. Without this explanation, "an appellate court cannot effectively review the decision-making process of the trial court." Dekreon, 526 P.2d at 328; see also Post, 160 Ariz. at 7, 770 P.2d at 311.

The findings of fact in ...