Jenkins v. Hardeman Cnty.

• Decision Date: 10 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 13-2054,13-2054
• Parties: NELSON JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. HARDEMAN COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

NELSON JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. HARDEMAN COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants.

No. 13-2054

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE EASTERN DIVISION

SO ORDERED: October 10, 2013

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, AND DENYING MOTION FOR A MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION

On January 29, 2013, the Plaintiff, Nelson Jenkins, brought this action against the Defendants, Hardeman County, Tennessee (the "County"); the Hardeman County Sheriff's Department; Sheriff John Doolen, in his individual and official capacities; Captain Leonard Brown, in his individual and official capacities; Lieutenant Chris McKinney, in his individual and official capacities; and John Does One through Five, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation of the Tennessee Constitution, and negligence and negligent supervision and training under Tennessee state law. Before the Court is the motion of the named Defendants to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." It must "provide fair notice to the defendant of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Sykes v. United States, 507 F. App'x 455, 457 (6th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "the complaint must contain sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Morris Aviation, LLC v. Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc., F. App'x ___, 2013 WL 4564740, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 29, 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he district court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must accept all the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true." Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008)). The complaint need not have detailed factual allegations, but must "contain more than conclusions and an unsubstantiated recitation of the necessary elements of a claim." McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 658 (6th Cir. 2012), reh'g & reh'g en banc denied (Oct. 18, 2012).

FACTS ALLEGED

Jenkins claims that, on or about May 15, 2011, he began serving a sentence at the Hardeman County jail for a probation violation and remained there until his release in February 2013. (D.E. 1 ¶¶ 3, 10.) Prior to his incarceration, he had been diagnosed with pancreatitis and was receiving regular medical treatment that properly controlled his condition. (Id. ¶ 11.) After he arrived at the jail, he completed a medical history form and advised jail officials of his ailment. (Id. ¶ 12.) While in the Defendants' custody, he repeatedly complained of bodily pain and of his need to be seen by a physician for his pancreatitis. (Id. ¶ 13.) His requests were ignored or refused and, on oneoccasion, Jenkins was told by a jail official that "we can't take you to the doctor." (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff continued to be severely ill for several weeks. (Id. ¶ 15.) At some point he was taken to the jail nurse, who provided him with over-the-counter pain medication. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) His condition continued to deteriorate, resulting in an inability to eat and his feet turning black. (Id. ¶ 17.) At some point thereafter, Jenkins lost consciousness and woke up in a Jackson, Tennessee hospital. (Id. ¶ 18.)

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES AND ANALYSIS

Federal Claims.

Official Capacity.

The movants seek dismissal of the official capacity claims against Defendants Doolen, Brown and McKinney. "In an official capacity action, the plaintiff seeks damages not from the individual officer, but from the entity for which the officer is an agent. "A suit against an individual in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against the governmental entity." Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). Thus, a damages suit against Doolen, Brown and McKinney in their official capacities is a suit against Hardeman County. The official capacity claims for damages against these Defendants are therefore DISMISSED. See Cox v. Reagan, No. 3:06-CV-250, 2009 WL 2579655, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009) (as official capacity suit against officer was essentially a suit against the municipality, which was a named defendant, there was no need to maintain official capacity suit and dismissal was appropriate).

Sheriff's Department as Suable Entity.

The Defendants also request relief under Rule 12(b)(6) from Plaintiff's claims against the Hardeman County Sheriff's Department on the grounds that it is not a suable entity. As theirposition is supported by the caselaw, the claims are DISMISSED. See Matthews, 35 F.3d at 1049 (because police department was not an entity which could be sued, the county was the proper party to address allegations of plaintiff's § 1983 complaint); Johnson v. Wichita Cnty., Tex. Sheriff's Office, No. 1:12-CV-394, 2013 WL 3833667, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. July 23, 2013) (noting that district courts in Tennessee "hold law enforcement agencies are inappropriate defendants; plaintiffs must sue the municipalities the agencies represent").

Merits of § 1983 Claim.

§ 1983 Generally

Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff "must show that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Chigano v. City of Knoxville, ___ F. App'x ___, 2013 WL 3466427, at *3 (6th Cir. July 10, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant motion, the Defendants contend that no deprivation of a constitutional right has been properly alleged.

Constitutional Violations

Eighth Amendment

"The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners from the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 434 (6th Cir. 2011)). "Aprisoner's Eighth Amendment right is violated when prison doctors or officials are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs." Runkle v. Kemen, ___ F. App'x ___, 2013 WL 2249462, at *3 (6th Cir. May 23, 2013) (quoting Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)) (alterations omitted). "An Eighth Amendment claim has an objective and subjective component." Id. "To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "To satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk." Id. (alteration omitted). "The requirement that the official have subjectively perceived a risk of harm and then disregarded it is meant to prevent the constitutionalization of medical malpractice claims; thus, a plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference must show more than negligence or the misdiagnosis of an ailment." Id. (alteration omitted). "Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness -- it cannot be predicated on negligence, inadvertence, or good faith error." Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 624 (6th Cir. 2012). "To state a cognizable claim, [a plaintiff] must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs -- indifference that offends the evolving standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference may be "manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976) (internal footnote omitted), reh'g denied (Jan. 17, 1977); see also Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 684 (6th Cir. 2013).

The Defendants submit that Jenkins' Eighth Amendment claims should be dismissed because his complaint alleges nothing more than that the care provided by the Hardeman County Jail was inadequate. Courts in this Circuit have distinguished "between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment." Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). "[A] prisoner states a proper cause of action when he alleges that prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury." Id. at 860. While "federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments," "in some cases the medical attention rendered may be so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all." Id. at 860 n.5. Taking the allegations in the light most favorable to Jenkins, the Court finds that, at the pleading stage, it cannot say Plaintiff has failed to properly allege that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and, specifically, that the care ...