Jenkins v. Hearn Vascular Surgery, P.A., COA11–454.

• Docket Nº: No. COA11–454.
• Citation: 719 S.E.2d 151
• Case Date: November 15, 2011
• Court: Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)

719 S.E.2d 151

Gordon W. JENKINS, Guardian Ad Litem for Miriam HAJEH, a minor, and Asma S. Hajeh and Jamal Hajeh, Plaintiffs,
v.
HEARN VASCULAR SURGERY, P.A. d/b/a Carolina Vascular and Vein Specialists and Andrew T. Hearn, M.D., Defendants.

No. COA11–454.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Nov. 15, 2011.

[719 S.E.2d 152]

Appeal by Defendants from Order entered 15 December 2010 by Judge R. Stuart Albright in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 October 2011.

Wilson Helms & Cartledge, LLP, Winston–Salem, by G. Gray Wilson and Linda L. Helms, for Defendants.

Pulley Watson King & Lischer, P.A., Durham, by Richard N. Watson, for Plaintiffs.

THIGPEN, Judge.

Hearn Vascular Surgery, P.A., doing business as Carolina Vascular and Vein Specialists, and Andrew T. Hearn, M.D. (“Dr. Hearn”) (collectively, “Defendants”) appeal from an order entered 15 December 2010

[719 S.E.2d 153]

denying their N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 12(b)(3) motion for change of venue and their N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. First we must determine whether the trial court's interlocutory order denying Defendants' motions is suitable for immediate appellate review. If the order is immediately appealable, we must then decide whether the trial court erred in denying defendants' motion for change of venue and motion to dismiss. We conclude the portion of the order denying Defendant's motion for change of venue is immediately appealable, and venue is properly in Alamance County. We also conclude the order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. We therefore dismiss Defendants' appeal from the portion of the order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss.

The evidence of record tends to show that Asma Hajeh (“Asma”) and Jamal Hajeh (“Jamal”) are husband and wife and the parents of Miriam Hajeh (“Miriam”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Asma and Jamal are residents of Alamance County. Gordon W. Jenkins, a Forsyth County resident, is Miriam's guardian ad litem.

On 24 December 2009, Asma, who was three weeks pregnant, began suffering from acute appendicitis. Jamal drove Asma to Alamance Regional Medical Center, where Dr. Hearn performed a laparoscopic appendectomy. Asma was discharged from Alamance Regional Medical Center on 27 December 2009.

On 9 May 2010, when Asma was twenty-three weeks pregnant, Asma began experiencing abdominal pain and vomiting. Asma was readmitted to the Alamance Regional Medical Center and transferred to Forsyth Medical Center in Winston–Salem the next day. Examinations at Forsyth Medical Center revealed Asma was suffering from sepsis as a result of acute appendicitis. An open laparotomy surgery was performed on 10 May 2010, which revealed that a four centimeter portion of Asma's appendix remained in her body and had not been removed by Dr. Hearn.

Asma also went into premature labor on 10 May 2010, and attempts to prevent premature labor were unsuccessful. Asma delivered a one pound, eight ounce baby girl—Miriam.

Miriam was hospitalized at Forsyth Medical Center and was a patient in the Forsyth Medical Center Neonatal Intensive Care Unit from the date of her birth on 10 May 2010 until after the filing of the complaint in this case on 22 September 2010. Miriam suffers from permanent and severe physical and cognitive conditions. Plaintiffs' complaint, filed in Forsyth County, alleges Dr. Hearn's negligence in failing to remove Asma's entire appendix during the 24 December 2009 appendectomy.

On 23 November 2010, Defendants filed motions pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 12(b)(3) and Rule 12(b)(6), contending Plaintiffs instituted the action in an improper venue, and Plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the alleged negligence injured a nonviable fetus.

On 15 December 2010, the trial court entered an order denying Defendants' motions made pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 12(b)(3) and Rule 12(b)(6).

On 12 January 2011, Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's 15 December 2010 order.

I: Interlocutory Appeal

We must first determine whether the interlocutory order denying Defendants' motions made pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 12(b)(3) and Rule 12(b)(6) is immediately appealable. We conclude the denial of Defendants' motion for change of venue is immediately appealable, and the denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss is not.

“Interlocutory orders are those made during the pendency of an action which do not dispose of the case, but instead leave it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp., 363 N.C. 555, 558, 681 S.E.2d 770, 773 (2009) (quotation omitted). “As a general rule, interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “immediate appeal of interlocutory orders

[719 S.E.2d 154]

and judgments is available in at least two instances: when the trial court certifies, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A–1, Rule 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay of the appeal; and when the interlocutory order affects a substantial right under N.C.G.S. §§ 1–277(a) and 7A–27(d)(1).” Id. (quotation omitted).

In the present case, the trial court did not certify pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 54(b) its order denying Defendants' motions. We must determine whether the order affects a substantial right.

i: Venue

We first consider whether the portion of the order denying Defendants' motion for change of venue affects a substantial right. We conclude it does. We further conclude the trial court erred by denying Defendants' motion for change of venue, as venue is properly in Alamance County.

“[T]he denial of a motion for change of venue, though interlocutory, affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable where the county designated in the complaint is not proper.” Caldwell v. Smith, 203 N.C.App. 725, ––––, 692 S.E.2d 483, 484 (2010) (citations omitted); see also Roberts v. Adventure Holdings, LLC, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 703 S.E.2d 784, 786 (2010) (stating, “the grant or denial of venue established by statute is deemed a substantial right, it is immediately appealable”) (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, because Defendants have alleged the county indicated in the complaint is improper, we address the merits of Defendants' appeal.

Generally, absent an applicable specific statutory provision, venue is proper in the county in which any party is a resident at the commencement of the action. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–82 (2009) (providing, “[i]n all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement”). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–83 (2009) provides the following:

If the county designated for that purpose in the summons and complaint is not the proper one, the action may, however, be tried therein, unless the defendant,...