Jenkins v. State, No. 97-CT-01117-SCT.
| Decision Date | 18 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-CT-01117-SCT. |
| Citation | 759 So.2d 1229 |
| Parties | Hanson JENKINS, Jr., a/k/a "Bob" v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Richard A. Rehfeldt, Jackson, A. Randall Harris, Ridgeland, Attorneys for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Charles W. Maris, Jr., Attorney for Appellee.
EN BANC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¶ 1. We grant certiorari in this case to consider the interpretation of the manifest necessity requirement attentive to claims founded upon double jeopardy and arising out of the grant of a mistrial. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in its application of the principle. Nevertheless, because we find that the Court of Appeals also misinterpreted the record in concluding that any double jeopardy issue was raised or preserved, we affirm its judgment and that of the trial court.
¶ 2. Hanson Jenkins, Jr. was twice put on trial under an indictment which charged him with sale of less than one ounce of marijuana and possession of more than one ounce of marijuana with intent to distribute. Jenkins was found guilty at his second trial and was sentenced to seventeen years in prison with five years suspended and twelve years to serve.
¶ 3. Jenkins raised six issues on appeal to the Court of Appeals of Mississippi. The Court of Appeals found these issues to be without merit and affirmed the convictions. Jenkins v. State, No. 97-KA-01117-SCT (Miss.Ct.App. Aug. 10, 1999).
¶ 4. Jenkins's petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari raised a single issue. It is an important issue because it involves whether Jenkins was denied a constitutional guarantee: Did the fact that Jenkins was retried, after a mistrial was granted in his first trial, result in a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. 3, § 21 of the Mississippi Constitution?
¶ 5. Certiorari was granted because the Court of Appeals reached the right result in affirming Jenkins's conviction, but for the wrong reasons. We granted the writ to correct that error, lest the bench and bar be misled.
¶ 6. There was confusion over the seating of jurors in Jenkins's first trial. The Court of Appeals summarized the situation in its majority opinion, which we quote to avoid the use of paraphrase, as follows:
The convictions now before us were the result of Jenkins's second trial on this indictment. The first trial ended in a mistrial declared by the trial court, on its own motion, when it was discovered that one juror selected to sit in trial of the case had, through circumstances not fully understood, failed to take his seat in the jury box. Instead, another member of the venire not selected as a juror had taken that seat. This problem was not discovered until the trial had commenced. Upon initial discovery of the problem, defense counsel moved for a mistrial but the trial court denied the motion, concluding that a qualified alternate juror could be substituted for the missing juror without any prejudice to the defendant. However, later during the proceeding, the prodigal juror was located and the trial court inquired further into the circumstances. At that point, it began to appear that the trial court, in calling out the names of those selected to sit on the jury, had failed to call this juror's name. The trial court was apparently of the opinion that the court's failure to call the juror presented a different circumstance than the case where the juror's name was actually called but the juror failed to properly respond. Based on these developments, and without seeking the view of either the State or the defense, the trial court declared a mistrial on its own motion.
¶ 7. The Court of Appeals determined that the State was not barred from trying Jenkins a second time, because a "manifest necessity" for a mistrial was presented by these facts. The majority found support, in prior opinions by the United States Supreme Court and this Court, for the proposition that juror problems are matters vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. Three dissenting judges would have reversed and rendered for Jenkins pursuant to an analysis of precedents applied to the same facts.
¶ 8. A reviewing court examines the entire record to determine if a manifest necessity exists for a mistrial. United States v. Bauman, 887 F.2d 546, 550 (5th Cir.1989). If the record in this case revealed only the facts above presented, we would likely be compelled to reverse Jenkins's convictions. Our analysis of the entire record explains how we can disagree with the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, yet affirm the conviction.
¶ 9. The transcript of the first trial reveals that a juror was discovered to be missing before any testimony had been taken. The trial court announced that it was considering seating an alternate juror. The defendant thereupon moved for a mistrial. The trial judge announced that the trial would proceed with the seating of an alternate juror. The trial began. Some direct testimony was being taken from a police officer when the prodigal juror returned. The following exchange occurred outside the presence of the jury:
¶ 10. The record indicates that the trial judge and attorneys then questioned the prodigal juror. The juror said his understanding was the judge said he could leave. The transcript reads:
(emphasis added).
¶ 11. The transcript reveals no ruling at this point on the renewed motion. Two bailiffs and the circuit clerk were then questioned. One bailiff and the circuit clerk were under the impression that the judge did not call the prodigal juror's name when the jury was seated.
¶ 12. The following exchange then occurred:
(emphasis added). (Here the transcript of the first trial ends.).
¶ 13. The transcript shows that the trial court granted the renewed motion for mistrial. There is no indication that the defense objected to the grant of the mistrial at the time it was finally granted, nor did the defense object to the court's several remarks which characterize the order as a ruling in favor of the defense on the renewed motion.
¶ 14. Some six months later, and prior to commencement of the second trial, Jenkins's counsel made a written motion to dismiss the indictment. The motion was based on the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the motion described the grant of mistrial as a sua sponte action by the trial judge. The...
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Wilson v. State
...unless taking into consideration all the circumstances that there was a ‘manifest necessity’ for the mistrial." Jenkins v. State , 759 So. 2d 1229, 1234 (Miss. 2000) (citing Watts v. State , 492 So. 2d 1281, 1284 (Miss. 1986) ).[T]here is no simple rule or formula defining the standard of "......
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...to the public interest in allowing the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his case to an impartial jury.” Jenkins v. State, 759 So.2d 1229, 1234–35 (¶¶ 21–22) (Miss.2000) (citing Washington, 434 U.S. at 503–05, 98 S.Ct. 824 ). But because a mistrial frustrates the defendant......
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Knox v. State, 2003-KA-00768-COA.
...STANDARD OF REVIEW "A reviewing court examines the entire record to determine if a manifest necessity exists for a mistrial." Jenkins v. State, 759 So.2d 1229, 1232(¶ 8) (Miss.2000) (citing United States v. Bauman, 887 F.2d 546, 550 (5th ¶ 8. On November 13, 2001, Knox was tried for the mur......
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...double jeopardy, unless taking into consideration all the circumstances[,] there was a 'manifest necessity' for the mistrial." Jenkins v. State, 759 So. 2d 1229, 1234 (¶18) (Miss. 2000) (citing Watts v. State, 492 So. 2d 1281, 1284 (Miss. 1986)).¶12. On the other hand, if a "mistrial [was] ......