Jennings v. Carson

• Citation: 220 S.W. 1090
• Decision Date: 05 May 1920
• Docket Number: (No. 106-2951.)
• Parties: JENNINGS, County Judge, et al. v. CARSON.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 1090

220 S.W. 1090

JENNINGS, County Judge, et al. v. CARSON.

(No. 106-2951.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

May 5, 1920.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Seventh Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by L. M. Carson against J. L. Jennings, County Judge, and others. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals (184 S. W. 562), and defendants bring error. Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

Hoover & Dial and H. E. Hoover, all of Canadian, for plaintiffs in error.

Baker & Willis, of Canadian, for defendant in error.

TAYLOR, J.

Defendant in error, and other citizens of Hemphill county, presented a petition to the board of school trustees of that county, requesting the formation of a school district out of parts of school districts Nos. 4 and 5. The board, after due consideration of the matters set out in the petition, refused to create the district. Thereupon defendant in error, without taking an appeal from the decision of the trustees to the state superintendent of public instruction, filed suit in the district court of Hemphill county, praying that the court, under the authority conferred by section 4a of an act of the Thirty-Fourth Legislature (Gen. Laws 34th Leg. c. 36, p. 68 [Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. 2749d]), take supervisory control of the action of the board of trustees in refusing to grant the petition, and in the exercise of such control to either create the district petitioned for, or grant a writ of mandamus directing the trustees to do so.

Defendant in error alleged, among other things, in the petition filed in the district court, that the trustees, in rejecting the petition and refusing to create the district prayed for, "grossly abused their power and authority." He also alleged that district No. 5 was about to order an election to determine whether it should issue school bonds in the sum of $1,000, and asked and procured the issuance of a temporary writ of injunction against the county judge and ex officio county superintendent to restrain him from ordering the election.

Trial of the case resulted in a judgment creating the new district, perpetuating the injunction theretofore issued, and directing the issuance of the writ of mandamus as prayed for. On original hearing the Court of Civil Appeals held that under the provisions of section 10 of the act of the Thirty-Fourth Legislature, supra (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, § 2749h), an appeal to the state superintendent of public instruction from the decision of the county trustees was a condition precedent to seeking redress in the district court, and, in the absence of a showing that such appeal had been prosecuted, reversed and dismissed the case. Upon reconsideration the court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction of the case, granted a motion for rehearing, and affirmed the judgment of the district court. 184 S. W. 562.

The question to be determined is whether defendant in error was required, as a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the district court, to prosecute an appeal from the decision of the county trustees to the state superintendent of public instruction, and thence to the state board of education. A perusal of the statutes having to do with the rural public free schools discloses that they relate, broadly speaking, to two classes of duties: First, those affecting property rights, such as creating, changing, and modifying school districts; and, second, those not affecting property rights, and largely administrative in their nature, such as pertain to the organization, management, and control of the schools in the various districts.

The Legislature uniformly, by successive enactments to establish and maintain a system of public free schools, made it incumbent upon the commissioners' court to discharge the duties referred to in the first class. None of the acts conferred the right of appeal from its decisions. The Supreme Court, in construing an act of the special session of the Eighteenth Legislature (Laws of Texas, vol. 9, p. 43), imposing on the commissioners' court the duty to subdivide the counties into school districts, held that its decisions in so doing, and in changing the districts, were final. Porter v. State, 74 Tex. 594, 14 S. W. 794. At the time of the decision of the Porter Case, supra, the district court, while not having appellate jurisdiction over the actions of the commissioners' court, had such supervisory control over its actions as grew out of its general equitable jurisdiction. Haverbekken v. Hale (Sup.) 204 S. W. 1162.

The school laws, prior to an act of the Thirty-Second Legislature (Gen. Laws 32d Leg. c. 26, p. 34 [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 2849a-2849o]), vested in district trustees and teachers the authority to manage and control the district schools, under the supervision of a county superintendent, or county judge acting in that capacity. The statutes conferred the right of appeal from the decisions of the subordinate school officers in certain matters to the state superintendent of public instruction, and thence to the state board of education. R. S. arts. 2752, 4509, 4510. It was necessary to prosecute the appeals in the manner designated before resort could be had to the courts. Nance v. Johnson, 84 Tex. 401, 19 S. W. 559. By the act of the Thirty-Second Legislature, supra, provision was made for the selection at stated intervals of five county school trustees, and authority was conferred upon them to manage and control the public high schools provided for in the act. Section 10 of the act (Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 2849j) is as follows:

"All appeals from decisions of the county superintendent of public instruction shall lie to the county school trustees, and from the said county...