Jennings v. State

• Citation: 782 So.2d 853
• Decision Date: 22 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. SC93056.,SC93056.
• Parties: Bryan Fredrick JENNINGS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

782 So.2d 853

Bryan Fredrick JENNINGS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC93056.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 22, 2001.

Martin J. McClain, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Bryan Fredrick Jennings appeals an order entered by the trial court below pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Appellant was tried and convicted (at his third trial) of first-degree murder, burglary, kidnapping and sexual battery, and was sentenced to death in accordance with the jury recommendation. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal in Jennings v. State, 512 So.2d 169 (Fla.1987) (Jennings I).

Appellant subsequently sought postconviction relief, which was denied by the trial court. This Court affirmed the trial court's order in part, but also found merit in appellant's claim that he was entitled to certain portions of the State's files pursuant to chapter 119, Florida Statutes. Thus, the Court extended the time limitation in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and remanded the case to provide appellant with time to file new Brady claims that might arise from the disclosure of files. See Jennings v. State, 583 So.2d 316, 319 (Fla.1991) (Jennings II)

. On October 30-31, 1997, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. On March 19, 1998, the trial court denied appellant's motion for relief and this appeal followed.

The first issue is whether the trial court erred in denying relief based on appellant's Brady¹ and Strickland² claims. Appellant's Brady claims are not supported by exculpatory evidence. Moreover, the Strickland claims are likewise unavailing.³

1. Prosecutor's Notes on Allen Kruger: The trial court properly found that the State did not violate Brady based on the recently revealed interview notes taken by a prosecutor who interviewed Allen Kruger who, in addition to Clarence Muszynski and Billy Crisco, testified that appellant confessed to the above crimes. The Unites States Supreme Court defined a Brady claim as follows:

There are three components of a true Brady violation: [1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Where evidence has been withheld, the ultimate test under Brady becomes whether the disclosed information is of such a nature and weight that "confidence in the outcome of the trial is undermined to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that had the information been disclosed to the defendant, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553, 559 (Fla.1999).

In the present case, appellant seeks relief under Brady based on the following quotation from the prosecutors's notes pursuant to the Kruger interview: "(doesn't recall [appellant] saying anything about age of V or molesting her—after reading state.—could have.)" The excerpt is located towards the end of two pages of handwritten notes. The language pertains only to appellant having made statements relative to the victim's age and her molestation, and not Kruger's other statements regarding how he came forward with Jennings' incriminating statements regarding the murder, kidnapping and burglary. Moreover, the quote does not evidence any overreaching on the part of the State. Thus, the statement "after reading state.— could have" is not exculpatory and does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.⁴

Appellant further argues that the notes provide Brady material relative to the consciousness of the victim:

[Defendant] said "I dropped her out of a window. She was laying there but not dead. I picked her up by her legs and slammed her down on the concrete. I picked her up and carried her to the river for the sharks, turtles and crabs. I held her head under water for 10 minutes."

The notation does not expressly say whether or not the victim was unconscious and, if so, at what point she lost consciousness. Furthermore, as the trial court found, the above quote is "substantially the same" as Kruger's trial testimony; thus, the notation does not constitute undisclosed exculpatory Brady material. Next, appellant argues that the note, "omit—no agency proof," establishes that Muszynski was as agent of the State when he spoke with appellant about the crime, At the hearing, assistant state attorney Michael Hunt denied that Muszynski was a state agent:

No, sir, not at all. In fact, to the contrary.... [T]here's absolutely no proof or no evidence of any agency relationship between Mr. Muszinski [sic] and the prosecution or law enforcement regarding any witness, much less Mr. Kruger.

Moreover, trial defense counsel questioned Muszynki during a voir dire about a possible agency relationship. Muszynki stated that he initiated contact with the State and defense counsel queried:

Q: It is your testimony here that you were not approached by the State to act in the capacity of an agent or to obtain statements from [appellant] or any other person?

A: No, sir. He gave it to me because he wanted somebody to look out for him at the prison.

Q: Did you approach him first about it?

A: No, sir, he came to me.

Because the prosecutor testified that an agency relationship did not exist, Muszynski denied being recruited by the State, and appellant failed to establish an agency through any other evidence, the notation does not constitute exculpatory Brady material.

Appellant also claims that the notes undermine the credibility of Kruger based on the timing of when he contacted the authorities. The notes contain the following:

(Note—W[itness] came to light after Rick [Muszynski] told BCSO [Brevard County Sheriff's Office] of his presence)

Appellant asserts that the State's case is undermined because the order in which witnesses Kruger and Muszynski first spoke to the authorities is brought into question; thus, the note constitutes Brady impeachment evidence. However, the trial court found:

Mr. Hunt's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was that this was a parenthetical note to himself, not something conveyed to him by the witness. Further he testified that he was not initially involved in the investigation of the case and would have to rely upon the case reports but that "Mr. Kruger came forward voluntarily, at some point, independent of Mr. Muszinski [sic]." (See Exhibit "E", Evidentiary Hearing Testimony —Michael Hunt, pgs. 278-290).

. . . .

How Kruger came forward or when Kruger came forward is not favorable evidence which was suppressed or would have changed the outcome of the trial. The parenthetical note of Michael Hunt appears to be an error on the part of Mr. Hunt; it was based solely on his review of previously disclosed case reports. The fact remains that Kruger came forward voluntarily, and all of the credible testimony shows that he came forward before Muszynski.[⁵]

Because the notation regarding which witness contacted the State first was made by Hunt based on case reports and not on what Kruger told him, and because the appellant fails to establish the relevance of who contacted the State first, appellant has not established a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.

2. Judy Slocum's Taped Statement: Appellant's successive claim that the State violated Brady based on the prosecution's Slocum tape is procedurally barred because the issue was raised and denied in his prior rule 3.850 motion and appeal. See Jennings II, 583 So.2d at 319

(this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to appellant's allegation of a Brady violation based on the Slocum tape); Mills v. State, 684 So.2d 801, 805 (Fla.1996) (finding Brady claim procedurally barred where defendant raised same claim in previous rule 3.850 motion). Because the issue is procedurally barred, the trial court properly denied relief.

3. Muszynski's Letter to the State Attorney: Appellant seeks relief based on a letter from Muszynski to the State Attorney. The claim is likewise barred since it was raised in appellant's prior rule 3.850 motion and his appeal. This Court held in Jennings II:

We reject without discussion Jennings' remaining claims, listed below, brought in his rule 3.850 motion:

(1) The state violated Brady by withholding a letter from Clarence Muszynski requesting the appointment of counsel.

583 So.2d at 322. Because appellant's successive claim regarding Muszynski's letter requesting counsel is procedurally barred, the trial court properly denied relief. See Mills, 684 So.2d at 805

.⁶

4. Information Regarding Other Suspects: In order for an appellant to prevail on a Brady claim, the defendant must show, among other things, that there is a "reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Mills, 684 So.2d at 805 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). Here, appellant fails to satisfy that burden. The trial court's order denying relief provides, in part:

It has been alleged that the defense could have used the information regarding these suspects in its defense; the evidence negates this contention. "If a defendant's purpose is to shift suspicion from himself to another person, evidence of past criminal conduct of that other person should be of such nature that it would be admissible if that person were on trial for the present offense." State v. Savino, 567 So.2d 892, 894 (Fla.1990). See also Crump v. State, 622 So.2d 963 (Fla.1993)

. The information contained in the notecards would not have been...