Jensen v. State, 68921
| Decision Date | 30 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 68921,68921 |
| Citation | 926 S.W.2d 925 |
| Parties | Denis JENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Jefferson City, Teresa Mayhew Hess, Assistant Attorney General, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.
H. Morley Swingle, Prosecuting Attorney, Cape Girardeau County, Jackson, for defendant-respondent.
Denis Jensen appeals an order denying his unconditional release from the custody of the Department of Mental Health pursuant to § 552.040 RSMo 1994. We reverse with instructions.
Mr. Jensen was committed to Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center (SEMMHC) on October 9, 1990, after pleading not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect to the charge of attempted robbery in the first degree. He was an inpatient at SEMMHC until October 25, 1993, when he was granted a conditional release. The conditional release allowed Mr. Jensen to live independently in an apartment, take medication on his own, and receive psychiatric care at SEMMHC on an outpatient basis.
On May 12, 1995, the Superintendent of SEMMHC filed an application on behalf of Mr. Jensen for his unconditional release.
A hearing regarding the unconditional release was held on July 13, 1995. Testimony in favor of the unconditional release was given by Dr. Byron English, Mr. Jensen's treating psychologist at SEMMHC, Ms. Deanna Schoenfield, his case monitor, and by Mr. Jensen.
Dr. English testified Mr. Jensen suffers from bipolar disorder but controls his mental illness by taking lithium carbonate. He testified Mr. Jensen has no recurring symptoms of the disease since taking medication. He also noted that since Mr. Jensen's conditional release in October 1993, Mr. Jensen has been responsible for taking his own medication and has done so consistently.
Dr. English described Mr. Jensen's insight into his illness as "very good" and "as good as any patient's [insight] we've ever had." He testified Mr. Jensen "knows how [his] illness has affected his behavior in the past" and "knows that he has to take his medication to control [his] illness." Dr. English stated Mr. Jensen was "always completely compliant" with the treatment program while at SEMMHC and since his conditional release.
Dr. English noted that since Mr. Jensen's conditional release in 1993, he has married, been very active in mental health groups, and become the president of the Mineral Area Mental Health Network. He further testified Mr. Jensen has been employed part-time at an outpatient clinic for two years where he is in contact with many doctors and mental health care workers on a daily basis. Dr. English stated he has seen no suggestion or symptoms that would render Mr. Jensen dangerous to himself or others in the reasonable future. He opined Mr. Jensen would continue to take his medication and participate in therapy with a psychiatrist even with no one checking on him. Dr. English concluded his testimony by saying he supported Mr. Jensen's unconditional release.
Ms. Deanna Schoenfield, substantially reiterated Dr. English's testimony and further supported an unconditional release for Mr. Jensen. Mr. Jensen's testimony reaffirmed the testimony of Dr. English and Ms. Schoenfield. Mr. Jensen indicated he knew the importance of taking his medication and would continue to do so if granted an unconditional release. No evidence was presented opposing the unconditional release.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made findings regarding the factors to be considered pursuant to § 552.040.6 RSMo 1994, and took the case under submission.
On July 20, 1995, the trial court entered a written order denying Mr. Jensen's unconditional release without specific findings. This appeal followed.
Defendants who have been acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect and subsequently committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health may petition the court for an unconditional release pursuant to § 552.040. Pursuant to this statute, the burden of proof is placed on the committed person to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that he "does not have, and in the reasonable future is not likely to have, a mental disease or defect rendering him dangerous to the safety of himself or others." 1 § 552.040.6 RSMo 1994.
Pursuant to § 552.040.6 RSMo 1994, the trial court "shall consider the following factors in addition to any other relevant evidence" in determining whether the committed person has proven their mental illness will not render them a danger to themselves or others:
(1) Whether or not the committed person presently has a mental disease or defect;
(2) The nature of the offense for which the committed person was committed;
(3) The committed person's behavior while confined in a mental health facility;
(4) The elapsed time between the hearing and the last reported unlawful or dangerous act.
(5) Whether the person has had conditional releases without incident; and
(6) Whether the determination that the committed person is not dangerous to himself or others is dependent on the person's taking drugs, medicine or narcotics.
§ 552.040.6 RSMo 1994.
With regard to these factors the trial court found: (1) Mr. Jensen suffers from bipolar disorder; (2) his offense was attempted robbery; (3) his behavior while confined at SEMMHC was "exemplary"; (4) over five years had elapsed since the offense; (5) Mr. Jensen had "uneventful" conditional releases, continued to take his medication and had not demonstrated any behavior indicating he might be a danger to himself or others; and (6) Mr. Jensen's need for lithium carbonate is a "lifetime requirement".
The trial court made a lengthy record at the conclusion of the hearing. We include only a small portion of his findings here:
THE COURT: I am then finding myself in the Catch-22 situation of wanting personally to release Mr. Jensen from the conditions, but finding myself having to require a condition of his release; specifically, that he continue with his psychiatric examination and that he continue to take the medication as prescribed. What this means is I can only give you the relief you're asking for if I can do that unconditionally, and based on finding number six, I can't do that unconditionally.
Mr. Jensen, I want you to understand that I would personally like to do this. However, as long as the testimony is that you require medication in the future to ensure and guarantee your present circumstances, I feel I have no alternative but to deny your request. This is not to say that you cannot continue your psychiatric care and upon the advice of a physician perhaps remove the requirement, but in all candor, by your testimony you expect to take this medication for life.
...
This is a legal technicality that I'm not very comfortable with because I have to again personally commend you for everything that you've done and continue to do. Unfortunately, none of us has a crystal ball.
...
And I cannot be guaranteed by you or anyone else that should you be released from this, that should you stop taking the medication or stop getting the treatment, that you would not be adversely affected. I am personally not comfortable with what I have to do, but I feel like I have no choice. I don't know how you could have done any better, but I don't know how I can find any other way.
...
I would personally very much like to say you can have everything you've asked for.... And I'll commend you for everything you've done. I just don't see where I have the ability or the authority to do it.
In his first point on appeal, Mr. Jensen argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his unconditional release. He argues the trial court erred by making one factor, the continued need of medication under § 552.040.6(6) RSMo 1994, dispositive of the outcome instead of weighing the need for medication as one of several non-exclusive factors to be considered.
The Western District addressed this identical issue in State v. Dudley, 903 S.W.2d 581 (Mo.App.1995). Since the facts in Dudley are nearly identical to this case, it is necessary for our analysis to include them.
Dudley was charged with first degree robbery and armed criminal action. Id. at 582. He was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and was remanded to the custody of the Department of Mental Health. Id. Ten years later, after successful conditional releases, Dudley petitioned for unconditional release. Id. at 583.
Dudley's psychiatrist testified at the release...
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State v. Weekly, WD 61086.
...and the acquittee has established his or her commitment to the continued use of the medication. For instance, in Jensen v. State, 926 S.W.2d 925 (Mo.App.1996), a patient suffering from bipolar disorder was found eligible for unconditional release because the patient had uneventful condition......
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State, v. Revels
...issues as being decided in accordance with the result reached by the trial court. Rule 73.01(a)(3). Id. at 111 n.1; cf. Jensen v. State, 926 S.W.2d 925, 928 [5] (Mo. App. 1996). Rule 73.01(a)(3) is now Rule 73.01(c), which requires the request for specific findings to be made on the record ......
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Rawlings, Jr. v. State
...not required simply because the person seeking release must continue to take medications to avoid being dangerous. See Jensen v. State, 926 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. App. 1996); State v. Dudley, 903 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. App. 1995). On the other hand, if the court believed that Mr. Rawlings would be unlike......
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...v. Putnoki, supra, 200 Conn. 219-21. The acquittee next relies on State v. Dudley, 903 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. App. 1995), and Jensen v. State, 926 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. App. 1996). In Dudley, the acquittee was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of robbery in the first degree. State v......