Jenson v. Olson

• Decision Date: 25 March 1966
• Docket Number: No. 40034,40034
• Citation: 273 Minn. 390,141 N.W.2d 488
• Parties: Roger W. JENSON, Appellant, v. T. O. OLSON et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 488

141 N.W.2d 488

273 Minn. 390

Roger W. JENSON, Appellant, v. T. O. OLSON et al., Respondents.

No. 40034.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 25, 1966.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A hearing conducted by the Civil Service Commission of the city of Minneapolis to review the discharge of a municipal employee is a quasi-judicial proceeding.

2. A witness who testifies at a quasi-judicial hearing enjoys an absolute immunity from liability for libel, slander, or wrongful interference with a contractual relationship if the statements alleged to be offensive are relevant to the subject matter of the proceedings.

3. An allegation of conspiracy does not prevent a witness from enjoying immunity from liability for relevant testimony given by him in a quasi-judicial proceeding if his statements are otherwise privileged.

James Malcolm Williams, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Keith M. Stidd, City Atty., G. V. Johnson, Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, for respondents.

OTIS, Justice.

This is an action brought by a discharged employee of the city of Minneapolis to recover damages from witnesses who testified against him at a civil service hearing. Plaintiff alleges his employment was terminated as a result of defendants' slanderous testimony. He appeals from summary judgment granted defendants. The facts are set forth in Jenson v. Olson (8 Cir.) 353 F.2d 825, and in our prior opinion, State ex rel. Jenson v. Civil Service Commission, 268 Minn. 536, 130 N.W.2d 143, certiorari denied, 380 U.S. 943, 85 S.Ct. 1023, 13 L.Ed.2d 962, where a determination that plaintiff's discharge was proper was upheld.

The testimony to which plaintiff objects was elicited from fellow employees and was relevant to the question of whether he competently performed his professional duties. The theory on which plaintiff seeks to recover is contained in the following paragraph of the complaint:

'That the aforementioned slanderous statements made by the defendants and each of them were untrue and malicious and were intended by the defendants and each of them to besmirch the professional character of the plaintiff herein by attacking the plaintiff's honesty, his attitude toward social work, his ability, his mentality, his personality, its definitions (sic) and eccentricities, his emotional maturity, his attitute toward his superiors, his professional interest, his working capacity and to indicate that he intentionally falsified official records, that these malicious, slanderous statements were made for the purpose of causing the plaintiff to lose his professional status as a social worker and in fact did cause the plaintiff to be suspended and discharged from the position as social worker with the stigma of professional misconduct. That the aforementioned defendant H. V. Jensen directed the aforesaid slanderous invective by the other defendants of besmirching the plaintiff's professional character and further that all the defendants did act in concert for the purpose of bringing about plaintiff's discharge and bringing about the placing upon the plaintiff of the stigma of professional misconduct and with malicious intent so that punitive and exemplary damages should be awarded.'

In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the statements complained of were made by defendants while testifying as witnesses at a civil service hearing relating to plaintiff's discharge and had reference to the subject matter of a quasi-judicial proceeding and were therefore privileged. In our opinion, the court's decision was correct.

We have not had the benefit of oral argument, and plaintiff's brief is confined to a discussion of the necessity for a fact determination with respect to the questions of privilege and interference with a contractual relationship. It is plaintiff's theory that if the libel and slander took place prior to, and outside of, the civil service hearing, or was for the purpose of interfering with his contractual relations, the motion for summary judgment should have been denied.

Except for the bald allegation that 'defendants did act in concert,' all of the statements of which plaintiff complains were alleged by him to have been made at one of the three sessions of the civil service hearing conducted to review his discharge. Nowhere in the complaint is there a claim that any libel or slander occurred elsewhere. ¹

1. We do not agree that the issue of whether defendants were testifying before a judicial tribunal was a fact question. Such a hearing has all the attributes of a quasi-judicial proceedings. It was conducted under c. 19, § 11, of the Minneapolis City Charter which, among other things, provides for the issuing of subpoenas, the administering of oaths, and the production of books and papers, and requires that charges be in writing with an opportunity to be heard. A Pennsylvania court has construed similar charter provisions as conferring on the civil...